



AFRICAN LABOUR PROBLEMS 
ON THE SOUTH AFRICAN GOLD MINES 
WITH . SPECIAL REFERENCE TO THE STRll<E OF 1946, 
OIGITISEO 
l ··-
The copyright ·of this thesis is held by the 
University of Cape Town. 
Reproductio111 of the whore or any part 
may be made for study purposes only, and 
not for publication. 
O\G\TISED 
1'0 JUL 2012 
A dissertation submitted for the degree of Master 
of Arts in the University of Cape Town, 
by 
Charles Ro Diamond 
November'" 1969, 
The aim of this work has been to place the African Mine Strike of 
'• 
1946 in historical perspective, by tracing through the years the 
results of the policy of the gold mining industry and the paternalism 
of the Government, and thus the causes of the strike. My task was 
aggravated by the fact that many of the principles in this story were 
either not in the country or could not see me. In addition, records 
of some particularly important court cases, as well as the files of . 
-
such organisations as the Communist Party, have been destroyed. 
My main debt is to Professor H.M. Robertson. His advice, 
encouragement I and assistance have always been invaluable 0 
I am also grateful to Dr. FranCis Wilson who read the manus.cript 
' and made helpful suggestions. 
I have profited by advice and help from other quarters: Senator 
... W. Ballinger gave permission to use his private papers; Chris Inskip 
helped with statistical.compilations; Miss Hazel Suchet selflessly 
typed the original draft from my often illegible handwriting, and 
















Origins of the Colour Bar • o •••••• o •••••••••••• o •• 
Union and a Decade of Strife , .•..•• o ••••••••••••• 20 
The African Miners' Strike - 1920 42 
The Supply of African Labour ..•...............•.• 58 J 
Two Decades of Experiment and Innovation, 
1920-1940 • • o ~Goo o • o • o o e e • o • e o • o • e e • • c e • • • • • .e e • 94 
Appendix: Percentile composition by origin of 
total African labour force on the Witwatersrand 
Gold Mines, 1930-1941 
tansdown Commission - some general remarks 
African labour conditions: recruitment and 
contract, the black workers' obligations to 
the industry ... " o " o •• " •• Cl o " •••• o o () ,• o " " • () " ., • " " • " • " 
African labour conditions: cash wages and wages 
in kind, the contractual liabilities of the industry ... 
Appendix A: Permanent Workers 
Appendix B~ Percentile histograms of rates per 
shift for all African employees on the Witwatersrand 
Gold Mines, 1931 and 1943 
Appendix C: Average cash wages per shift of 
African labour on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, 
'1930-1942 
African labour conditions: the migrant, his income 
and expenditure 
African labour conditions: trade unions and the 
r!g ht tq strike 0 0 0 e I'> 0 0 0 () 0 & 0 e 0 () e 0 0 0 0 (I 0 II e 9 0 8 9 0 9 0 9 • 
Appendix: Tribal Natives and Trade Unionism 
Nineteen hundred and forty-six •. o ••• o o o •• o. o o •• o 








For convenience, the following abbreviations have been used: 
T.C.M. Transvaal Chamber of Mines 
G.P.C. Gold Producers' Committee 
G.M.E. Government Mining Engineer 
A.M.W.U. - African Mine Workers' Union 
S.A.J.E. South African Journal of Economics 
N.G.I. (1913) Native Grievances Inquiry of 1914 · 
L.G.M. (1920) Low Grade Mines Commission (Final) of 1920 
·M.I.B. (1922) ·Mining Industry Board of 1922 
N.E.C. (1930) Native Economic Commission of 1930-32 
W. N. W. C. (1943) - Witwatersrand Native Wages Commission of 1943 
N.L.C. '(1947) NativeLaws Commission of 1947 
\ 
\ ' 
""NATIVE LABOUR IN SOUTH AFRICA IS SO CHEAP THAT 
IT HAS COME TO BE LOOKED UPON AS A THING WHICH 
CAN- BE USED., EXTRAVAGANTLY'-
A WITNESS BEFORE THE ECONOMIC COMMISSION OF 1914, 
ORIGINS OF THE COLOUR BAR, 
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A supply of black labour which would permit the profitable exploitation 
of the Witwatersrand gold mines has been of major importance ever since 
the discovery of the first gold deposits in the 1880's. The basic problem 
of the gold mines has been succintly put by Professor Frankel: 
f' 
"To develop the vast areas suspected of being gold-bearing, 
the Rand depended particularly on the supply of foreign 
capital on the one hand, and the supply of native labour 
on the othero" (1) 
The industrial employment of the African first gained momentum during 
• 
the opening of the diamond diggings in the 1870's; it was the pattern of 
labour relations developed here which was later transplanted to the gold 
mines. It therefore follows that ari understanding of labour conditions 
on the diamond fields would also further our understanding of developments 
on the gold mines, 
·During the early years on the diamond fields, the wage rates of the 
African labourer were very sensitive to fluctuations in the supply of and 
demand for labouro (
2
) Africans flocked to the mines, and by 1874 
ten thousand blacks were employed in Kimberleyo Supply still fluctuated 
considerably, with the result that wage rates rose steadily "from 1 Os. per 
month to lOso per week, and sometimes, on an occasion of great shortage, 
(3) 
to 30s, per week". After 1882, however, wage-rates became more 
stable and, according to the Reports of the Inspectors of Mines, the most 
prevalent wage for the years 1882-1889 was 25s. per week (with free 
lodging but no food)o (4) 
Systematic recruiting was not considered necessary except during 
those temporary shortages of labour which occurred during a diamond rush, 
(1). Frankel, S.H., Capital Investment in Africa, O.U.P., London, 1938, 
p. 860 
(2) Van der Horst, Sheila T,, Native Labour in South Africa, 0. U.P., 
Cape Town, 1942, Po 790 
(3) Transvaal Labour Commission _(1904), Evidence, Cd 1897, Q383 l 
quoted by van der Horst, p. 77. 
(4) Van der Horst, p. 80, 
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When it was resorted to, it was through 'touts' who acted as independent 
entrepreneurs in supplying African labour to a variety of employers I including 
those in occupations which had arisen out of the establishment of diamond 
mining iri Griqualand West 0 not in actually digging for diamonds. Also, 
these early efforts at recruiting were not always successful as the Africans 
"often went without their wages", and " contractors also sometimes took 
advantage of the Natives' simplicity, and defrauded them or absconded, 
leaving them stranded and without passes, "(l) According to Doxey, 
despite the compound system, the searching of Africans for stolen diamonds, 
and the competitive and rival demand for African labour after the discovery 
and development of gold mining, the De Beers Consolidated Comµrny "has 
' (2) 
hardly ever had to recruit labour." 
The acute problems of the marketing and constant theft of diamonds 
were eliminated firstly by the amalgamation of the individual mines into 
mining companies, (
3
) which concentrated control of the industry and diamond 
output in the hands of a few men, and secondly by the creation of the closed 
compound system, The latter was explicitly a colour bar measure because 
it was applicable to blacks only, 
Prior to the introduction of Closed compounds, accommodation for the 
African labourer had been very makeshift and living condit~ons were poor, 
with a high death rate. Over half the labour force usually did not report 
for work at the beginning of each week following excessive drinking, 
Furthermore, the African was subjected to a thorough search each time he 
left the diggings. 
(1) Robertson, H. M., "150 Years of Economic Contact between Black 
and White" r South African Journal of Economics 0 Johannesburg, 
1935, pp, 9 and 10. 
(2) Doxey, G, V., The Indus.trial ''Colour Bar in South Africa, 0. U. P., 
London, 1961, p, 35. 
(3) Another reason for amalgamation was the increasing necessity to 
use capital intensive techniques of miningo 
I -
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Closed compounds clearly altered the conditions of employment of 
the African, According to Reports of the Inspectors of Mines, the system 
mitigated the evils of excessive wine and the temptation of quick gains by 
selling stolen diamonds. The African labourer was now accommodated in 
a dormitory as soon as he signed up with the mining company, and left 
this temporary home only when his period of employment expired. The 
search the African underwent on his departure was far more thorough and 
effective than had been feasible under the previous practice of daily 
searches, Africans, according to the Inspector's Report of 1890, "after 
experience of the compound system, liked it, and, being enabled to save 
money instead of spending it to the benefit of low canteen-keepers, soon 
improved in physique and morale," (l) "They showed "no universal dislike" 
of being accommodated in closed compounds. Doxey, in fact, lists the 
closed compound system as one of the reasons why De Beers has very 
rarely had to resort to recruiting, (
2
) 
From the onset these compounds largely catered for unmarried men, 
I 
All Africans employed on 'the Kimberley and De Beers mines were in closed 
compounds by 1888, (
3
) Although the majority of African labourers stayed 
at work by the end of the 1880's for from 9 to 18 months, (
4
) a permanent 
labour force was not encouraged as no provisions were made for the families 
of the married men, 
Black and white did not have equal rights on the diamond diggings. 
There were various measures which prejudiced the position of the African, 
such as those whi.ch attempted to prevent him from being a claim holder and 
from selling diamonds, These laws were not always successfully enforced. , 
(1) Reports of Inspectors of Diamond Mines, Gll, 1890, p. 21, quoted 
by van der Horst, p, 83 o 
(2) Doxey, p,35, 
(3) Report of the Inspectors of Diamond Mines, G22, 1889, pp. 6 and 10, 
quoted by van der Horst, p, BL 
(4) (Cape) Blue Book on Native Affairs, GS, 1886, p. 5 quoted by van der 
Horst, p. 84, 
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For example, for a short time, between October 1871 and July 1872, 
the African was permitted to register as a claim holder. However, he 
had been excluded from doing so before the annexation of Griqualand West 
by the Crown in 1871 as well as "prohibited from roaming about after nine 
o'clock in the evening, . o ••• o o not allowed to buy or sell diamonds, 
o o ••• o not permitted to purchase intoxicating liquor without an order in 
writing from their employerso " (1) He was again excluded seven months 
after the annexati.on because of the protests of the white diggers. Even 
so this law was not always observed, so that the Barkly West Inspector 
of Claims reported in 1887 that there were 1, 150 registered diggers at the 
river diggings in 1886, of which 150 were 'natives' o (
2
) At this early 
stage, at least, restrictions on the basis of colour were not rigidly applied. 
Because of the racial undertone of these measures and the fact that 
' 
the skiiled worker was invariably white and the unskilled black; writing 
in 1942 Sir Keith Hancock suggested that the industrial colour bar was 
initiated on the diamond diggings in Kimberley: 
"The skilled white worker is a latecomer to South Africa. 
Before the mining age Cape Town was the most advanced 
urban centre, and most of the skilled work in Cape Town 
was in the hands of the Coloured people. In the last 
quarter of the nineteenth century numbers of skilled workers 
from overseas began to arrive. They brought with them their 
habits of trade-union combination; in 1881 the carpenters 
and joiners established in Cape Town a branch of their British 
union; other skilled workers followed this lead. The Cape 
unions made no attempt to establish a colour bar. The 
principle of free entry to the unions, with equal pay for equal 
work and equal chances of promotion for all races, was in 
1913 written into the cor:stitution of the Cape Federation of 
Labour Unions o It has remained an accepted principle in 
Cape Town to this day." 
(1) Theal, G., History of South Africa Since 1795, Vol. 5, 1908, 
p. 266, quoted by Doxey, Po 190 
(2) Report of the Inspector of Claims, Barkly West, G26, 1887, 
p. 12, quoted by van der Horst, Po 8L 
The term 'native' was used at this time to refer to all non-
Europeans o 
- 5 -
"In the mining industry of the north the contrary principle 
was adopted. This contrast cannot be explained by 
'Afrikaner race prejudice' or the theory of human inequality 
which was asserted in the Voortrekker Republics. The 
colour bar in industry originated among British workers 
under the Union Jack. 'It was at the diamond fields that 
the gate to all but low paid and unskilled labour was slammed 
against the native in industry,' From the Kimberley diggings 
the colour bar was carried by English-speaking workers into 
the mining areas of the South African Republic. There, to be 
sure, the Afrikaner populations readily acc~pted it as conforming 
to the pre-ordained scheme of human relationships. 
But i.t originated as a natural product of social and economic 
circumstances in Kimberley. Whereas in Cape Town immigrant 
British workers had met skilled Coloured craftsmen in an 
environment of urban civilization and legal equality, the 
British immigrants further north met 'raw' Natives under the 
rough conditions of the mining frontier~" {l) 
This view is contested by Professor H. M. Robertson who argues (2) 
that: 
"attempts to introduce a colour bar at Kimberley precede the 
development of modern industry there. They date from the 
early primitive working by pick and shovel of small independent 
claims and were not attempts to reserve jobs, but to reserve 
rights. o o o ••••••• the ingredients ·of the Kimberly colour bar 
were essentially restrictions on property acquisition, residential 
rights and entrepreneurial rights, not class-of-job rights, and 
so they are in line with the general tradition in which ·white 
control over the bulk of the natural resources of South Africa 
grew up - not the initiation of a new sort of job reservation. 
I would not deny that a de facto differentiation between 
(predominantly} white skilled jobs and (predominantly} non-
white unskilled jobs grew up in Kimberley. Nor would I 
deny that ostensibly all-embracing regulations (e.g. stripping 
and search for illegal possession of diamonds) were imposed 
unequally on white and black .•.• o ••••• In early mining 
development (and indeed in much of early industrial development 
(1) Hancock, Keith. , Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs, Vol. II , 
Part II, Problems of Economic Policy, 1918-1939, London, O. U .P., 
1942, PPo 39-40, quoted by H,M; Robertson, unpublished paper. 
(2) Robertson, H. M., unpublished paper. 
] 
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as well) the cleavage was between those who had skills (or 
the adaptability rapidly to acquire skills) and those who 
had not. And this distinction was not so much one between 
white and black as between immigrant and indigenous. 
It is true that it was between white immigrant and black indigen 
for the most part, because the indigenous whites did not come 
into the unskilled labour market for low-paid labour along;=;ide 
blacks." 
Whatever the pros and cons in this matter it remains true that it 
was in Kimberley that the foundations were laid for the introduction of 
the colour bar on the Witwatersrando The privileges and prejudices of 
the European diamond diggers were transplanted to the gold mines and 
later given legislative sanctiono 
A Chamber of Mines was established in 1889 as an informal association 
of mine managers; the .body immediately attempted to reduce African wage 
rates, establish a fixed sale of remuneration for black labour throughout 
the industry and ipcrease the supply of unskilled blacks to the mines. 
The measures introduced were, however, only partially successful 
there being "temporary reductions" in wages as "when the supply of labour 
forthcoming at the agreed wage-rate fell short, competition between 
(1) 
employers forced the wage rates up above the level." An agreement 
not to pay above a certain maximum in order to reduce competition was 
(2) 
reached but soon abandonedo Twenty years later the setting of a 
maximum on African earnings so successfully curtailed the earning power 
of the Afri.can and inhibited competitiveness within the industry that the 
expedient of the 'maximum' was severely criticised by. the Commissioner 
. t d t • t. t Af . . I • ( 3) appom e o mves iga e ncan miners gnevances. 
The disproporti.on between the supply of and demand for African 
labourers at the going wage was so great that the Chamber formed the 
first labour organisation in 1893. (
4
) This organisation did not recruit 
(1) Van der Horst, Po 13 O. 
(2) Annual Report of the Chamber of Mines for 189 2, p. 10, quoted by 
the Transvaal Labour Commission (1904), Cd 1896, p. 80 
·(3) Native Grievances Inquiry, U.G.37 of 1914., Paras. 255-264. 
(4) Transvaal Labour Commission (1904), Po 8. 
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labour but endeavoured to increase the supply to the mines by° creating 
a favourable climate (l) for the individual recruiters. This arrangement 
did not prove satisfactory with the result that the Rand Native Labour 
Association was established in 1897 to act as a central recruiting 
organisation on behalf of all the companies associated with the Chamber. 
The total number of African labourers employed on the gold mines 
rose rapidly and progressively during the decade before the Boer War. 
Average wage rates fluctuated, however, as new agreements to reduce 
wages were made, evaded, and made again. The figures below(
2
) 
refer to Witwatersrand gold companies only. In addition to cash wages, 
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Supply was said to be in excess of demand in March, 1896,and again in 
. (4) . 
March,1897. For the rest of this period, the Chamber repeatedly 
complained of shortages. 
(1) It spread information about conditions on the Rand and generally 
tried to improve these conditions. 
(2) Evidence of the Chamber of Mines to the Transvaal Labour 
Commission (1904), Cd 1897, Exhibit No. 1. 
(3) Up to 189 7, payment was for four weeks - thereafter on completion 
of 30 working days. 
(4) Chamber of Mines, Annual Report for 189 7, p. 111 quoted by 
van der Horst, p. 138. 
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It is apparent, therefore, that the wages of _black mine workers, 
were, from the outset influenced by monopsony power. By the turn of 
the century the pattern of wages with which we shall later become more 
familiar had been established - average wages did not fluctuate as much 
as in the 1890's and were strictly controlled despite shortfalls in the 
supply of unskilled labour at these rates and the dis-economies of 
scale resulting from restricted production. 
Recruiting involved the mines in a considerable continuing investment 
which they obviously would not wish to undertake unless it brought greater 
savings on greater additional returns. It was wasteful to incur the expense 
where desertion was common. To check desertion and to spread the cost 
of recruiting over the full period of service it was essential to be able to 
enforce long-term contracts. Thus the mining authorities themselves 
pressed for the early pass laws of the South African Republic, which made 
the African subject to penal sanctions for desertion. The Chamber persuaded 
the Volksraad of the South African Republic to enact the first Pass Law in 
1895. (1) Efficiently administered the pass system made the enforcement 
of long-term contracts practicable and recruiting an economic proposition. 
Mr. C. S. Goldman, giving evidence before the Industrial Commission of 
Enquiry of 1897, said: 
"I may mention that the whole· intention of the law is to have a 
hold on the native whom we have brought down, be it from the 
East Coast, South, or from the North, at considerable outlay 
to ourselves .•••••••.•••• 11 (2) 
In practice the law was 'not effectively administered. Other laws, 
such as the Master and Servants Act, provided greater control over the 
movements of African labour by prohibiting strikes and providing a penal 
sanction for breach of contracL In so far as these measures discouraged 
the desertions, the attractiveness of recruiting was increased. 
(1) Law No. 23 of 1895. 
(2) Industrial Commission of Enquiry, (1897), p. 110, quoted by 
van der Horst, p. 133. 
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During the 'enforced holiday' of the Mine Managers in the Cape in 
1900, it was decided to reorganise and extend the work of the existing 
Rand Native Labour Associationo The Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association, Limited, (WoN .L.Ao), was formed under the auspices of 
the Chamber of Mines "to derive the native labour supply for the mlnes 
and {do) away with the system of touting and speculating in native labour. ,,(1) 
The organisation monopolised the recruiting of African labour, and thus , 
prevented the mines from competing with one another and raising wages. 
In correspondence with the Colonial Office in 1901, Milner "formulated 
the view that mineowners were entitled to combine in order to depress 
the level of wages~ while the Government was to ensure, and to enforce, 
labour contracts resulting from such combination of employers and disorga-
nisation of employeeso The formulation was hailed in the Colonial Office 
as 1 a most excellent despatch' and excellent both in substance and in 
toneo ,,( 2) The activities of the W.N.L.A. were initially limited to 
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), but later extended. A further 
recruiting organisation, the Native Recruiting Corporation, Limited, (N. R. c.) I 
was formed in 1912 to recruit African labour throughout the four provinces 
of South Africa and the three adjacent High Commission Territories. 
When war broke out in 1899, gold mining on the Witwatersrand was 
temporarily suspended and only maintenanQe work was carried ono The 
supply of black labour dwindled to 18, 000 in 1901 {
3
) and, although the 
supply increased after the Peace of Vereenigi.ng 0 the total num~er was 
still well below the pre-war level. The acute shortage of unskilled 
{l) . Evidence of the Chamber of Mines to the Transvaal Labour Commission 
{1904), Appendix II, Po 9090 
{2) Colonial Office Archives, C. 0 o 291/30 o 45 7 79 Milner to Chamberlain, 
6th December 1901; and notes by Lambert and Just, quoted by D.J.N. 
Denoon. 
"Capitalist Influence and the Transvaal Government during the Crown 
Colony Peri.od, 1900-1906", The Historical Journal, London, XI {1968) 
p. 3 05. 
{3) Evidence of the Chamber of Mines to the Transvaal Labour Commission 
{1904), Exhibit Noo 1. 
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labour was highlighted by the altered ratio· of white to coloured employed 
on the Witwatersrand gold mines o In July 1899 the ratio had been 8. 6 to 1, 
in June 1902 exactly half the pre-war ratio and in June 1903 and 1904 
5. 4 to 1. (1) 
(2) . 
D.J.N. Denoon has advanced several possible reasons for the 
(3) 
post-war shortage of black labouro During the war, wages were reduced 
· to well below their pre-war leveL Migrant labourers spread gloomy reports 
of conditions after the war and the African was able to choose employment 
on the railways, harbours or roaqs, as an alternative to that on the mines. 
Two-thirds of the labour supply usually came from Mozambique, and during 
this period difficulties were presented both by Portuguese diplomacy(4) 
and by African resistance to recruiting agencies. There were obstacles 
to opening up the rest of Africa to recruiters. The war had the effect of 
. engendering in the African "a spirit of independence and apparent aggressive-
ness which was a new and regrettable feature in relations between black 
and white. 11 ( 5) 
The Transvaal Labour Commissioh of 1904 attempted to estimate the 
extent to which demand exceeded supply a and found that the labour 
requirements of the mining ind us try were in excess of the number employed 
. (6) 
by 129, 000 labourers. Causes of this labour scarcity, according to the 
Commission, were all related to the fact that the "African native tribes are, 
(1) Annual Report of the Government Mining Engineer for the year ended 
30.6.1907, p.7. 
(2) Denoon, D. J. N., The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-1906, Journal 
of African History, Londona 1967a pp.481-4940 
(3) The W. N. L.A. simply stated that the African "returned home with 
considerable savings, bought wives and settled down." 
(4) The Portuguese took advantage of the fact that .the modus vivendi 
with the Transvaal had to be re-negotiated to insist on a larger 
share of railway traffic to the Rand. 
(5) Views of Sir Godfrey Lagdena quoted by Denoon, op cit, p. 488. 
(6) Transvaal Labour Commission (1904), p. 18, Para. 39. 
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for the most part, pastoral or agricultural communities, who possess 
exceptional facilities for the regular and full supply of animal wants, 
and whose standards of economic needs are extremely lowo "(1) 
A minority of two of the thirteen members of the Commission considered 
that the needs of the mining industry had been exaggerated. The existing 
shortage, according to the Minority Report, was "to a great extent, if not 
altogether, ..•.... the result of abnormal circumstances, some of which 
are direct consequences of the war; while for others such as the ill-
advised reduction in wages carried out in 1900, the Chamber of Mines 
must be held directly responsible. "(
2
) 
The South African Native Affairs Commission of 1903-1905 accepted 
the arguments of the Majority Report of the Transvaal Labour Commission 
but warned against attempting to increase the supply by raising wages. 
Any recommendation to this effect was 'quite out of place' as it would 
only attract labour at the expense of other industries and allow the men, 
because of increased earnings, to remain for longer periods at their homes 
. (3) . 
before returning to work. It was in this climate of opinion, therefore, 
that the basic working conditions of the African labourer evolved during 
the years of recovery. 
During the early post-war years, the British Administration introduced 
a series of economic changes to overcome the acute shortage of African 
unskilled labour. Payment by result, re-enlistment bonuses and productivity 
incentives were adopted. Productivity and the supply of men available 
for work increased slowly but not enough, however, "to assuage the 
impatient demands of both the mine-owners and of Milner himself." (.
4
) 
Whites were employed temporarily on unskilled work at 5s. per day. 
"The coincidence" of circumstances, a shortage of blacks and a large 
number of unemployed whites, "was the most unfortunate since ..•.... the 
industrial colour bar was ambiguous enough to make some advance of 
(1) Transvaal Labour Commission (1904), p. 33, Para. 70. 
(2) ibid, p. 59, Para. 62. 
(3) South African Native Affairs Commission 0 1903-1905 0 Cape Town, Para. 378. 
(4) Denoon; D. J. N., "The Transvaal Labour_ Crisis, 1901-1906", op cit, p. 488. J 
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African opportunities feasible. "(1) The first mining regulations of the 
Transvaal Volksraad in 1893 prohibited Africans, Asians and Coloureds 
from performing blasting operations. Amendments in 1896 and 1897 
permitted blasting by any person holding a blasting certificate, but 
excluded 'coloured persons' from other occupations. The possibilities, 
therefore, of using Africans on semi-skilled and responsible work which 
were available to the Chamber in 1904 were not taken advantage of and 
were lost in the controversy over the importation of Chinese labourers. 
The expedient of using whites on unskilled work on the mines which 
was attempted as an experiment, but not universally adopted, was rejected 
on cost grounds. The mining industry, rather than employ more whites, 
desired to replace its white labour force with blacks who were more 
-
attractive because they were cheaper employees, without political 
power and bound by contracts that were enforceable by criminal sanction. 
Sources of additional labour in Central and Southern Africa were thought 
to be limited with the result that the importati.on of foreign non-whites 
was considered. 
The proposal to import Chinese labourers to supplement the African 
supply of unskilled labour was finally agreed to by the Chamber in 1903. 
Although the Transvaal Government supported this decision, white public 
opinion had not been consulted and the Imperial Government insisted that 




"Since the Boers would almost certainly oppose a measure believed to 
be to the magnates 1 advantage, it was necessary to create a sem-
blance of unanimity in the English-speaking white community. 
The task was by no means beyond the Chamber's abilities, but 
the necessity for haste led them to make elaborate concessions 
in detail to their white artisan opponents. These concessions 
involved restrictions upon the use of imported labour: confine-
ment to compounds, compulsory repatriation at the termination 
of the three-year contract, and above all the prohibition of the 
Denoon, D.J,N., "The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-1906;' op cit, p.489. 
Denoon, D. J. N., "Capitalist Influence and the Transvaal, 19 00-1906", 




employment of Chinese in an enumerated list of capacities, 
which obviated the risk of their ever competing with skilled 
or semi-skilled whites, 11 (1) 
The proposal for a statutory colour bar was, in fact, suggested by the 
mine-owners themselves. The Chamber only publicly committed itself to 
the policy of importation in December, 1903; (
2
) several months before, 
Sir George Farrar, President of the Chamber of Mines, had spoken to the 
white miners of Boksburg: (
3
) 
"You i.n Boksburg are agitating agai.nst Indians coming into 
the country, and agai.nst them trading and holdi.ng land. 
I am absolutely at one with youo There are 5 0, 0 0 0 free 
Indians in Natal today; they are creeping in daily. We see 
them on the mines, we see them everywhere. I consider 
it imperative that the Government should legislate against 
their coming here, and, therefore, I entirely supported and 
voted for the resolution(4) in the present form, which was 
eventually carried. It means that if Asiatic labourers 
unfortunately have to be brought into this country, they can 
only be brought i.n under Government control, and only as 
unskilled labourers, prohibited to trade, prohibited to hold 
land, or compete with any white man; and that they should be 
carefully indentured, and be repatriated at the termination of 
the period of their engagement to the country from whence they 
came. In fact, to make the rules more stringent, it is advocated 
that the date of the expiry of the indenture should terminate in 
(1) Denoon, D.J.N., "The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-1906 11 op cit, 
pp.489, 490. 
(2) ibid, p.491. 
(3) Speech delivered at Driefontein by Si.r George Farrar, President of the 
Chamber of Mines, on the 3 lst March, 1903, Transvaal Labour 
Commission (1904), pp. 70, 71, quoted by H. M. Robertson, 
unpublished paper. 
(4) The resolution referred to was Resolution II on Immigration of the 
Bloemfontein Customs Convention in March, 1903: "That in the opinion 
of this Conference the permanent settlement in South Africa of Asiatic 
races would be injurious, and should not be permitted; but that if 
ind us trial development positively requires it, the introduction of 
unskilled labourers, under a system of Government control only, 
providing for the indenturing of such labourers and their repatriation 
at the termination of their indentures, should be permissable. " 
Transvaal Labour Commission (1904), p. 70, 
- 14 -
their own country. Now, you Boksburg gentlemen, who have 
been agitating so much against the introduction of the Asiatic, 
if you support this resolution, I think that legislation, if 
carried out in terms of this resolution, will meet all your 
objections, with which I have always been in entire agreement. 
Nowr I come to one of the most i.mportant parts of my speech, 
where I have to explain my views to the workmen on these 
mines, and also to all the workmen on the Rand. Now 0 I may 
ask, how have these fields been built up? What have been 
the conditions of labour? They have been these: White skilled 
labour at high wages has been employed in conjunction with 
unskilled coloured labour in the proportion approximately of one 
to eight. It is true that the wages of the skilled men have been 
high' and in my opinion they will always remain high, because 
the skilled labour we require ranks with the best quality in the 
world. Now, since the war we have been short of native labour, 
\ 
and owing to that shortage and in order to assist some of those 
who so gallantly fought in the war, a large amount of unskilled 
white labourers have been employed. This has been done as a 
temporary measure / with a view to assisting those, who are 
unskilled 1 to become skilled, and to find permanent employment. 
During the past six months there has been a great controversy 
on the question of unskilled white labour, and we have heard 
the usual cry of those who knowing nothing of this country 
come to teach us our business which has taken us years to learn. 
At first they tell us we must send all our natives on to the land, 
and use nothing but unskilled white labourers in their places. 
That would mean that only the richest mines on these fields 
would be able to work 0 even if the wages of the skilled workmen 
were. reduced by one halL Then we have the cry: "You must 
see what black labour there is in the country, and make up with 
unskilled 'white labour'". 
I think,. as a temporary expedient a certain amount of unskilled 
white labour can be used 1 but it will not solve the great problem 
you have in front of yoµ. Supposing for instance, unskilled 
white labour were to be largely used, it means that the price of 
your unskilled white labour is regulated by the price of your 
unskilled coloured labour, therefore, it means that we should 
I 
have to·find the cheapest class of unskilled white labour that 
would be prepared to compete. That means substituting labour, 
in other words, bringing it into this country from all the sources 
of Europe. What would be the inevitable result? Why, that 
this unskilled labour would very soon become skilled labour, and 
compete against you. For my part, I am absolutely against 
indentured cheap white labour. Many of you were here before 
the war, and bore the brunt of the very anxious times that we 
have been through I and I say that if white labourers are to come 
into this country, let them come in of their own accord. The 
whole country is open to the white man who wants to make this 
country his home, let him therefore come in, not subsidised, but J' 
L _________ _ 
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as a free agent, and compete in the open market for wages, 
which are always a question of supply and demand. You 
use today native coloured labour - and what are your special 
objections to bringing in unskilled Asiatic labour to make up 
the deficiency? They are these: that he might remain in the 
country, become a tradesman and compete against you, in which 
case you are afraid that you see Asiatic carpenters, fitters, etc. , 
in fact Asiatics in all the branches of skilled trade. Now what 
is my answer to this? My answer is, that it is quite possible 
fo bring in Asiatic labourers properly indentured, solely under 
Government control (for instance, take the Trinidad Ordinance) , 
and at the end of their contract to return them or repatriate them 
to the country from whence they came, not letting a single man 
remain behind. They must come here absolutely as unskilled 
labourers only, and, therefore, in order that your position may 
be absolutely secure, I would guarantee never to consent to any 
legislation on this question unless the following restrictions 
are embodied in that legislation: -
No mining, trading, spirit, or other licence whatsoever 
shall be granted to any 'immigrant or to any other person 
on behalf of, or as agent or trustee for any immigrant, 
nor shall it be lawful for any immigrant to hold any land, 
buildings, or fixed property, mijnpachts, claims, or any 
right to minerals or precious stones either in his own 
name, or in the name of any other person on behalf of, 
or as agent or trustee for him, or be registered as a voter. 
No immigrant shall be imported other"Wise than as an 
unskilled labourer in this Colony, nor shall any immigrant 
be employed in, or undertake on his own behalf any work 
other than work ordinarily done by unskilled native labourers 
on mines in this Colony, and in particular and by way of 
enumeration, and not by way of limitation, no immigrant 
shall carry on any of the following trades or occupations -
that is to say - carpenter, blacksmith, mason, electrician, 
bricklayer, fireman, amalgamator, assayer, miller, timber-
man, banksman, pumpman, platelayer, shipman, brickmaker, 
fitter, turner, or shopman generally, engine driver, wire-
splitter and rigger, boilermaker, patternmaker, sampler (mine 
and cyanide), cyanide shiftman, gardener, stoper or miner, 
drill sharpener, machineman, pipeman, trammer (underground 
and surface), millwright, sorting or crushing station overseer, 
hawker, shopkeeper, general or special trader, nor shall any 
immigrant hold a blasting certificate, or be employed in any 
clerical work on a mine or elsewhere. 
If such enactments become law, then I consider that your position 
could be rendered secure. Surely you do not imagine for a moment 
that I should be so blind as to advocate the possible eventual intro-, 
duction of Asiatic labour, if such introduction did not absolutely secure 
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to the merchants, and to you miners, perfect immunity from competition, 
and absolute freedom from the danger that these labourers would settle 
in this country afterwards." 
The opposition of the white artisans 0 and particularly the European 
Transvaal Miners' Association to the proposal to import unskilled Chinese 
was overcome by the suggested legislation preventing Chinese competition 
with whites for more highly paid work and by the bribing of anti-Chinese 
leaders to abandon their followers. ( l) The Labour Importation Ordinance 
of 1904, (
2
) which permitted the importation of indentured Chinese labourers, 
established legal barriers (
3
) against the employment of Chinese in 55 
occupations. 
l 
Both the scope and timing of the enactment were important. The legal 
restrictions went fair beyond previous legislation and as van der Horst has 
observed, "the occupations designated in the schedule have continued to 
be claimed as belonging exclusively to Europeans. "(
4
) Although not intended 
to be used against Africans, the effect of the measure was that the field of 
employment open to the black miner was permanently curtailed by the circum-
stances which prevailed in 1904. Denoon writes~ 
"The industrial colour bar was legally drawn so as to recognise 
the field actually occupied by white workers - with a generous 
margin added - as exclusively. theirs. And it was given legal 
(1) Denoon, D.J.N., "Capitalist Influence andthe Transvaal, 1900-1906", 
op cit, p. 316. 
(2) Ordinance No. 17 of 1904. 
(3) Apart from the colour bar restrictions, the treatment of Chinese 
labour left much to be desired and criticism seems to have been 
justified. According to Denoon, "The Chinese earned less than 
Africans and less than expected. During 1905 the average were 
37s. 7d. per month for Chinese and 5ls. 9d. for Africans" and 
"Confined to compounds socially, restricted to the least interesting 
and most arduous forms of work, and cheated of the wages they had 
b.een led to expect, it is hardly surprising that vice, perversion, 
drug-taking, compulsive gambling and occasional violence took 
place". 
Denoon, D.J.N., "The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-1906", 
op cit, pp. 490-2. 
(4) Van der Horst, p. 172. 
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sanction at a time when such a delimitation allowed the white 
workers an unusually large realm, since they actually occupied 
an unusually large proportion of jobs, and the magnates were 
unusually weak, Had the line been drawn either in 1899 or in 
1909, when the pro"portion of white workers was smaller, the 
number of reserved jobs would probably have been considerably 
smaller.;, (1) . 
In addition, the importation of the Chinese temporarily saturated the 
labour market and so undermined the bargaining position of the African 
labourer, Average monthly wages for unskilled work had been steadily 
increasing but began to decline shortly after the arrival of the Chinese. (2) 
In 1907 the Labour Importation Ordinance was repealed. More than 
63, 000 Chinese had been imported, Their numerical importance having 
reached its height during 1907. The following table (
3
) shows the proportion 





























By the time the last Chinese labourer left the Transvaal in 1910, large 
numbers of African recruits were arriving at the Witwatersrand because of 
the collapse of the post-war boom and recession in other sectors of the 
• (4) 
economy. 
The grant of responsible government to the Transvaal in 1906 had 
been on condition that no more licences were to be issued for the importation 
of indentured Chinese labour. 1907 was a year of widespread unemployment 
(1) Denoon, D. J. N., "The Transvaal Labour Crisis, 1901-1906", op cit, 
p. 490. 
(2j ibid, p.492. 
(3) Doxey, p. 63. 
(4) Van der Horst, p. 172. 
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and depression, but despite the colour bar and the subsequent return 
of these labourers to China, the opportunities for white employment 
. d (1) increase . 
Notwithstanding the repatriation of the Chinese, the depression and 
poor white problem reinforced the growing demand for the reservation of 
more mine work for white labour. The Transvaal Indigency Commission 
. 
of 1908 rejected such a policy as unfair / ineffective and 'repressive', 
while the Mining Industry Commission of 1907-8 regarded it as both 
practicable and desirable. As is evident from the concluding remarks 
of the Majority Report of the latter Commission, considerations of a much 
more far-reaching nature than the most economical operation of the gold 
mines were at the root of its recommendations: 
"Whether the mass of coloured labour, actual and potential, in 
South Africa· will encroach year by year upon the field of employ-
ment and the means of livelihood of white men, or whether the 
tide is to be turned so that white labour will enter into the entire 
field of industry in South Africa, and occupy it to a constantly 
increasing extent, is one issue. ypon this may be said to depend 
the other great issue, remote as it may appear to be today, namely, 
whether the vast expanses of South Africa, so eminently adapted to 
white occupation, shall be the home of a great white people or be 
the habitation and breeding place of masses of natives and other 
coloured people of mixed races, in all degrees of semi-barbarism 
and semi-civilisation. "(2) 
The Indigency Commission, on the other hand, supported its views on the 
following practical grounds: 
"The white man's prejudice against 'Kaffir' work, his inefficiency 
as an unskilled labourer and the higher wage which he requires, 
hav'e had the natural result that coloured labour inefficient though 
it is, is cheaper to the employer for unskilled work than white labour." (3) 
( 1) The number of Europeans working on the gold mines rose from 17, 513 
in 1906-1907 to 23,341in1909-1910. 
Annual Report of the Government Mining Engineer for 1909-1910, Table 2. 
(2) Report of the Mining Industry Commission, 1907-1908~ Pretoria, p. 132. 
(3) Report of the Transvaal Indigency Commission, 1906-1908, Cape Town, 
Para. 49, p .• 26. Unskilled labour was frequently referred to by 
witnesses as 'Kaffir's work'. 
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An added incentive for the advocates of a white labour policy was the 
ease with which Africans, as well as Chinese labourers, managed to keep 
the mines working during the strike of 1907, (l) without, for the most part, 
European supervision. 
It was as a result of this strike that the Transvaal Prevention of 
Disputes Act of 1909 was passed. (
2
) The measure made any strike or 
lockout illegal until a month after the publication of the report of a 
Conciliation Board appointed to investigate the dispute, and compelled 
employers to give employees a month's notice before altering wages or 
conditions of labour. (
3
) The Act was not successfully enforced, however, 
a new Conciliation Act being passed in 1922. 
The proposal to reserve a wide range of mining jobs was made 
repeatedly. The Mining Regulations Commission, which finally reported 
in 1910, on, inter alia, the protection of health and safety of miners, 
supported a white. labour policy on the pretext of safeguarding the health 
of the men working on the mines. It stated that "where the safety of 
life and limbs is concerned. only competent white men should be employed. "(4) 
Draft legislation drawn up by the Commission incorporated this proposal and 
served as a model for the Mines and Works Act of 191 L 
( 1) The strike had begun as the result of a dispute over the number of 
I 
rock drills each European should supervise. 
(2) Act 20 (1909). 
(3) Osborn, V. H. , A Critical Survey of Trade Unionism in South Africa, 
unpublished M.A. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1931, 
p. 5. 
(4) . Final Report of the Mining Regulations Commission (1908), Pretoria, 
p.274, Para.247. 
2, 




With Union, legislation which affected the labour market for black 
and white assumed a more definite trend. It has been argued that pre-
Union legislation tended to discriminate against the employment of 
Europeans. (l) If this was, in fact, the case then two Acts passed in 
1911 decreased the relative attraction of employing blacks as opposed 
to whites. 
In the years immediately preceding Union, Africans had gradually 
begun to replace Europeans in semi-skilled work, such as drill-sharpening, 
because of the urgent need to reduce costs. Public opinion and trade 
union pressure both worked in favour of legislation safeguarding the 
monopoly of whites over skilled work on the mines, as well as halting 
the penetration of blacks into the alleged preserve of civilised men. 
The first Union Parliament thus passed the Mines and Works Act as 
well as the Native Labour Regulation Act, which consolidated the laws 
for the Union along the lines of those already in force in the TransvaaL 
Although there was no mention of racial discrimination in the Mines 
and Works Act of 1911, (
2
) the law was administered as a statutory colour 
bar preventing coloured persons from occupying positions of responsibility 
on mines in the 0. F. S. and the TransvaaL (
3
) In terms of this Act, the 
Minister of Mines, General Smuts, made regulations which gave the 
Europ~an miners a monopoly over 3 2 mining occupations. (4) This 
measure (as later amended) will be referred to repeatedly during the 
course of this study. 
(1) See van der Horst, Sheila, T., "Some Effects. of Industrial Legislation 
on the Market for Native Labour in South Africa", S.A.J.E., 1935, 
pp.485-7. 
(2) The Act dealt mainly with the protection of health and the safety of the 
employees, though its ramifications were very wide indeed. 
(3) A petition presented to the House of Assembly in April 1914 by A. Jacobs 
and 1, 623 other residents of the Transvaal stated that they were prevented 
from earning their living becaus-e of the colour bar regulations made in 
terms of the Mines and Works Act (1911). 
Printed Annexures D Votes and Proceedings I House of Assembly I 1914 I 
Vol. IV, A-5, quoted by Ray Alexander and H.J. Simons, 
Job Reservation and the Trade Unions, Enterprise, 1959, p. 4. 




The 1911 Native Labour Regulation Act was enacted to regulate the 
recruiting, employment, accommodation, feeding and health conditions 
of the African labourer in the entire mining industry. Several features 
of the Act are significant. The Act provided for the control of recruiting, 
attempted to standardise contracts 0 and through salaried government 
officials tried to establish methods of ensuring that the African understood 
his contract and that he arrived safely on the Witwatersrand. 
Since traders in the African territories also often functioned as 
recruiting agents, some control had to be exercised over them exerting 
pressure on customers to accept recruitment as a means of liquidating 
their debts. This was done by the insertion of provisions in the Act 
limiting advances to Africans, (1) Penal sanctions were applied to 
contractual obligations; and, according to Doxey, trade unions of 
African mine workers were consequently "seriously hampered if not 
wholly prevented. " 
(2) 
The Act was thus a 'mixed bag'. Sections which regulated recruiting, 
compounds, hospital services, compensation, feeding, and contracts 
were obviously to the African miners' benefit, but the penal sanctions 
inhibited strikes and thus organisation as Well. This meant, of course, 
that the already hard pressed African mineworker was now legally debarred 
from competing on an equal footing with his white counterpart. 
There was considerable industrial unrest on the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand in the years which followed the creation of the Union of 
South Africa in 1910. This unr:est had, indeed, already become apparent 
in the years since 1904, which had seen the Chinese labour experiment 
and the bitter reaction of white mineworkers against the more extensive 
employment of non-white labour. When strikes occurred, they were 
usually by white mineworkers whose aim was to reinforce the application 
and extension of the colour bar 0 in order to make secure a privileged 
position for themselves. 
(1) In 1911 Advances were limited to £2 each. The law allowed this figure 
to vary, as in seasons of drought, to as high as £5. 
(2) Doxey, p. 130. See in addition, pp. 129 and 13L 
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A trivial incident in May 1913 soon developed into a general str~ke 
embracing all classes of European mineworkers, with the result that by 
July about 20, 000 men were involved. Demands had escalated to a 
general assurance that the colour bar on the mines would be maintained 
and that the white miner's trade unions would be recognised. Rioting 
broke out and police and troops were used to quell the disturbances. (l) 
A settlement was eventually reached with victory going to the strikers. 
Violence was again resorted to in January 1914, .with a strike 
spreading from the coal mines of Natal 0 to the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand and culminating in a general strike. This time the 
Government was swift to act and was well prepared. Martial law 
was declared and the leaders of the strike deported. (
2
) 
(1) The industrial unrest had a detrimental effect on the African labour 
supply and thus indirectly on the progress of the industry in the 
latter half of the year. The supply to the Witwatersrand gold 
mines increased gradually from 193,974 in December 1912 to 
197,685 in June 1913. A great exodus took place in the latter 
part of the year so that the number employed in December 1913 
was only 151 0 538. 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines, Annual Report for 1913 0 p.Lix 
(2) The Government's actions evoked considerable criticism and 
dispute especially as an Indemnity Act had to be passed to 
legalise the deportations. There was no doubt, however, as 
to the standpoint of the Chamber. Sir George Albu, in speaking 
to the Presidents' Address , said= 
" ...... the Government was forewarned, and forearmed, 
and averted the greatest calamity that the world would, 
in my opinion, have ever seen. What a sight the town 
would have presented if the Government had not taken 
these strong measures. The horror of two hundred and 
fifty thousand natives let loose, in spite of all precaution, 
would have been too terrible. I think most of you have 
read "Dante's Inferno." Well, the horrors of "Dante's 
Inferno" would have paled before the horrors of what 
would have happened here in January had not the Govern-
ment taken the strong measures it did." 
T. C. M. (1913), pp. Lxxi and L:xXii •. · 
/ 
- 23 -
After the successful strike by European miners in 1913, their African 
counterparts in four compounds refused to work without an increase of pay. 
During the European riots the African miners had been subjected to threats 
and actual violence. They had shown patience with the conditions they 
had worked and lived under for a long time. Although predominantly 
migrant labourers from a non- industrial background, with organisational 
. ability undeveloped by experience, and constrained by inter-tribal 
jealousies 0 the African labourers went on strike and only returned to 
work after troops were called in. The rioting was soon put down and, 
it appears, as soon forgotten. 
Although this industrial dispute failed to improve the conditions of 
employment of the African miners 0 it drew attention to their grievances. 
Mr. H.O. Buckle, Resident Magistrate of Johannesburg, was appointed 
sole commissioner in 1913 in order to ascertain the causes of disturbances 
amongst African mineworkers during 1913; and, in addition, to suggest 
'bl d' (1) poss1 e reme 1es. 
The report of the inquiry gives considerable insight into the 
conditions of the African on the gold mines during the early years of 
Union. Their complaints and grievances were thoroughly and systematically 
canvassed and all aspects were dealt with. If the strike served no other 
purpose it helped to launch the investigation which highlighted the habit 
of regarding the African labourer as an interchangeable labour unit - a habit 
which may have had hidden economic as well as social costs. 
Mr. Buckle's Report received an enthusiastic response from the 
Chamber of Mines. The President, Mr. E.A. Wallers, described it as 
"the most valuable document we have ever had to help us in studying 
this subject. " With the exception of one Group, all the members of 
the Chamber agreed with the Report {apart from a "few comparatively 
unimportant exceptions'? and therefore also the recommendations contained 
therein, many of which had already been implemented. (
2
) The Government 
(1) The Commission reported in 1914 and was issued as U.G.37 of 1914. 
(2) T.C.M . .(1914),p.Lxi. 
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came to the conclusion that, as a result of: 
"the present unsettled state of the country •••• the present I 
time is not opportune to make alterations to or introduce 
innovations in connection with the conditions under which 
native labour is recruited within the Union." (1) 
More than 50 years have now passed but apparently there has been no 
opportune time. 
The more important recommendations concerning the colour bar and 
the extension of piecework payments have even today (1969) not been 
adopted. The Report is so illuminating and informative about conditions 
of African mine labour half a century agou that it should be studied by 
everyone seriously interested in labour relations and their history. It 
is accordingly dealt with fully below. 
The report has been considered in the order in which it was originally 
,presented. Certain sections are touched on without elaboration. Others 
are dealt with in greater detail, since they appear to deal with issues which 
have persisted right up to the present day. Yet no attempt is made here to 
provide an exhaustive analysis of the extent. to which the recommendations of 
the Commission were either adopted or ignored. Occasionally subsequent 
developments are commented on 0 but this is merely to illustrate some point 
relevant to Mr. Buckle's Report. 
The complaints of the black mineworkers were divided into seven 
chapters dealing with working conditions, compound conditions, hospital 
treatment, pay, compensation, conditions of contract, and miscellaneous 
complaints. 
(1) Letter from S. M. Pritchard, Director of Native Labour, on behalf 
of the Acting Minister of Native Affairs to the . T. G. M. dated 
30th November, 1914. 
T.C.M.(1914L p.9. · 
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Working conditions and complaints arising therefrom were the matters 
to which the Commission first turned its attentiono Accidents, it was 
found, were mainly due either to negligence of the European mineworker 
or to the contravention of the Mining Regulations. The Commission's 
recommendation was "that there ought not to be (the) univeral option 
of a fine, .,(1) which is laid down in Act 12 of 1911, (2) and that 
imprisonment is not too severe a penalty for serious negligence. (
3
) 
This does not mean that the Commissioner accepted uncritically 
the necessity and desirability of every regulation which existedo In 
some cases their effectiveness as safety measures was jeopardised by· 
their inconvenienceo The Mining Regulation which required the inspection 
by a white miner of the working area as a safety precaution prior to the 
arrival of the black labourers was a case in point. (
4
) The problem was -
as, indeed it still is today - that the native had to wait (on some mines 
for as long as two hours) (5) fuefore the white miner descended to the working 
area and carried out his inspection. Full use could therefore not be made 
of the lo~ger period spent underground by the African mineworkers. 
Buckle found that the regulations were "habitually disregarded" and 
that, moreover, in some cases there was "no real attempt. o ...•• to enforce 
themo" Convictions for contraventions were frequent on some of the mines, (
6
) 
and the Commissioner suggested that modification of the regulations might 
be needed to overcome the difficulties. He wrote 0 inter alia, that "if 
(1) Report of the Native Grievances Inquiry 1913-14, U. G. 3 7 - '14, Para. 23. 
(2) Sections 16 and 17 o There was the further qualification that the fine 
ought not to be so high that the accused could not possibly pay it, 
which made even heavy fines unlikely. 
(3) N.G.I.(1913), Para.23. 
(4) ibid, Para. 25. 
(5) ibid, Para. 30. 
(6) ibid, Para. 25. Mr. Buckle quoted the case of the Crown Mines, 
where there were 21 convictions in one week and 41 in the following 
week. 
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selected bossboys were allowed to make the examination, these could be 
sent down first, and there would be little or no delay in letting the natives 
get to work. There is general, though not universal, agreement among 
mining men that no difficulty would be found in getting experienced natives 
who could be trusted to do this properly. " ( l) This proposal anticipated 
by half a century the experiment which was set afoot in twelve mines in 1964 
by agreement with the Mineworkers' Uniono This gave selected Africans 
the responsibility for declaring the working area safe before the arrival of 
the white minero (2) 
With regard to the influence of safety precautions on the supply of 
African labour, the Commissioner made the observation that "there is 
every probability that the mines will find the cost of any reasonable 
precautions against accidents well repaid by the increased popularity 
which will result from a reputation among the natives for scarcity of 
accidents", especially in the case of the "more advanced Cape Colony 
native." (
3
) This suggestion is in line with Adam Smith's thoughts on the 
influence of the net advantages and disadvantages of a given employment 
in determining the supply of labour to various occupations. For instance, 
Adam Smith argued, above-average danger must ordinarily be compensated 
with above-average remunerationo 
Assaults underground were experienced on all the mines. The 
Commissioner judged that a certain number of these were "inevitable" 
when full consideration was given to the conditions of work; "these 
(4) 
circumstances may perhaps be modiHed, but c~nnot be altogether removed. " 
(1) N.G.I. (1913), Parao 290 
(2) Although this experiment was welcomed by both the white miners and 
the blacks directly concerned, all of whom were enabled to increase 
their earnings, and by the mines which were able to save on working 
costs, it resulted in a crisis in the affairs of the mineworkers union 
anc;i the experiment was ended through government intervention. The 
episode is treated in the unpublished·Cambridge Ph.D. thesis (1967) 
by Dr. Francis Wilson entitled "Labour in the South African Gold Mines 
1936-19650 II 
(3) N .G.I. Para. 32. 
(4) ibid, Para. 33. 
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Other grievances with respect to working conditions ranged from the 
trivial to the important. Complaints about the provision of insufficient 
drills (l) and candles (
2
) were considered to have little or no substance. 
On the other hand, the hammerboys (who worked the jackhammer drills) 
complained that they were made to do "lashing" / work which was not 
included in their contract, and tha~ they received no pay for this part 
of their work. "Lashing" consists of cleaning the working place of 
the broken rock produced by a previous blast, and had to be completed 
before proceeding with the contractual work of boring holes for the next 
blast. The grievance even went beyond this. Hammerboys were paid 
I 
at piece-work rates (so much for every inch drilled). Unless they 
drilled a certain number of inches, they were not paid at all for that 
shift, and could not count it as one of the number of shifts for which 
they were under contract to work during their current period of employment. 
Time spent on lashing therefore not only meant that a hammerboy had less 
time to spend on his piece-work task of drilling, but also that, if he had 
not completed the·necessary minimum number of inches, he might receive 
"absolutely no equivalent in money" for "lashing for some hours ando ••. 
drilling for several more ... (3) It could also mean a prolongation of their 
period of service at the mine through cancelled shifts. An aggravating 
factor was the lack of uniformity, between one mine and another, in the 
amount of lashing expected of the hammerboys o (
4
) 
To this variation from mine to .mine may be ascribed the fact that 
the need to do lashing was not stipulated in the contract. This was .not 
an oversight. The Commissioner, H.O. Buckle, quoted a circular issued 
by the Native Recruiting Corporation to Managers on 8th November, 1913, 
which, after stating that the Director of Native Labour had agreed to' allow 
a maximum of two hours lashing to be done by hammerboys, proceeded: 
(1) N.G.I. (1913), Para. 97. 
(2) ibid' Para. 101. 
(3) ibid, Para. 65. 
(4) ibid, Para. 80,81,82. 
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"It has always been considered inadvisable to insert a clause in the 
native contract having reference to the shovelling work required of 
natives employed on hand drilling, as it is feared that it may needlessly 
alarm them as to what they may be called upon to perform, and so adversely 
affect our recruiting operations. "(l) 
These practices were found by the Commission to be "a distinct 
' b ' ' ' ' 1 d t b II ( 2) gnevance... . . . . • emg wrong in pnnc1p e .••..•• an open o a use. 
Compound conditions were investigated in some detail by the Commission. 
domplaints about insufficient food( 3) and firing materials (coal and wood),(
4
) 
disturbances caused by police raids in search of illicit liquor~ 5 ) and 
discontent over grievances which had not been redressed~ 6 ) were considered 
to have little basis in fact. Generally it was found that the compounds met 
the conditions laid down by the Mining Regulations and the contracts of 
the Africans. 
The Commission discussed the question of Married Quarters. "Many 
mines", it stated "have so-called married quarters, or locations, apart from 
the compound, for natives who have brought their wives with them." (
7
) 
These were not encouraged by the mines because they were "a source of 
liquor and other vice. "(
8
) The Commission felt that this argument was 
generally well-grounded as many of the women were not the wives of the 
men with whom they lived but mere temporary concubines. It was 
suggested that, space permitting, a location "carefully superintended and 
(1) N.G.I. (1913), Para.75. 
(2) ibid, Para. 9L 
(3) ibid' Para. 115. 
(4) tbid, Para.131. 
(5) ibid, Para. 139. 
(6) ibid, Para. 155. 
(7) ibid, Para.132. 
(8) ibid, Para. 134. 
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reserved for reputable married natives" (1) be established. Even at this 
early stage consideration was thus being given to the provision of 
facilities for the stabilisation .of a more permanent labour force. 
The only significant recommendations which arose from complaints 
about hospital treatment concerned the compulsory employment of full-time 
medical officers, (2) and the maintenance by regulation of an established 
proportion between medical officers and patients. (
3
) Other grievances 
arose out of misunderstandings obviously due to the Africans' general 
ignorance of "modern" methods of medical treatment. This emerges from 
remarks made by the Commissioner in several places in his Report. 
Buckle found complaints with respect to wages to be well-founded. 
Money wages in 1913, taking surface and underground work together, were 
lower than they had been in 1896. (
4
) In 1912 a new schedule agreed to by 
mines employing 80% of the total African mine labourers had quite recently 
resulted in a decrease in.the average rates paid from ls. 1 L 58d. per shift 
to ls. 1 L 075d. per shift. (
5
) - . 
It was the contention of the Economic Commission of 1914 that the 
productive powers of the African were being held in check by the device 
of the maximum average. (
5
) Buckle concluded that the maximum average 
clause was "unsound in principle" (
7
) as it penalised efficient work. (
8
) 
The lack of promotion opportunities were next considered by the 
Commissioner, "The real grievance" it was found was "the colour bar", 
(1) N.G.L (1913), p.1380 
(2) ibid, Para. 225. 
(3) ibid, Para.227. 
(4) ibid, Parao 254. 
(5) ibid, Para, 255. 
( 6) Report of the Economic Commission, U. G. 12 of 1914 o, 
Para. 540 
( 7) N. G. I. ( 1913) I p 0 2 6 9. 
(8) Further discussion on M.A. clause on pp. 73-80. 
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which blocks practically all., o •• o opportunities of promotion. "(l) Africans 
argued that they could do the same work as the white man and should therefore 
receive the same remuneration. Buc;:kle clearly accepted this. He saw the 
colour bar as one of the most important grievances of the Africans, so much 
so that he expressed grave doubts as to the superior competence of the 
"white" men in the Transvaal and Free State who, according to the colour 
bar mining regulations, filled certain positions of responsibility irrespective 
of ability. (2) 
The other complaints relating to pay mainly concerned the calculation 
of, the deduction from, and the method of payment, and were not regarded 
as very significant by the Commission. 
Compensation payable to Africans was laid down in Act 15 of 1911. (
3
) 
For the permanent loss of his trade, if he could still do other work (p:artial 
incapacitation), an African was paid from £1 to £20. The African who was 
totally incapacitated receiv~d from £30 to £50 and in the case of death, 
dependants, if any, were given £10a (
4
) 
It was complained that these provisions were inadequate. The Commission 
investigated whether they were really equivalent to the financial loss suffered 
and compared them with the compensation paid to Europeans in similar 
circumstances. It tried to ascertain whether, in cases of total incapacitation 
or death, they provided sufficient maintenance for dependants. (
5
) 
The Commissioner found that "the compensation for injury given to the 
native labourer is not an equivalent for his probable loss; it is, except in 
the case of temporary sickness, markedly less than that provided for the 
(1) N.G.I. (1913), Para.280. 
(2) ibid, Paraa 281. 
(3) Native Labour Regulation Act. Compensation was not paid in respect of 
an injury to a black labourer which was due to his own serious and 
wilful misconduct. N. G. I. (1913), Para. 3 61. 
(4) N.G.I. (1913), Pa'.ra.362. 
(5) ibid, Para. 363. 
- 31 -
European, regard being had to their respective earning power; and it is 
not, in the case of the Cape Colony natives, sufficient to support the 
dependants of a native killed at his work. In these circumstances, 
the complaints as to its inadequacy seems to me well founded. I do 
not see why natives should not be compensated on the same basis as 
Europeans, Le. probable loss of earning power. ,,(l) 
While individual African compensation had been "markedly less than 
that provided for the European·~ the inbalance between the two in this 
respect had probably been even greater than the Commissioner was aware 
of due to the higher incidence of accidents among non-white workers. (2) 
This came about because the possibility and frequency of incapacitation 
appears to have been greatest among those employed below the surface, 
where the number of non-whites was relatively large. '(
3
) The African, 
who filled all the unskilled classes of work, was employed underground 
in the ratio of 11. 8Africans to 1 European labourer, whereas, the overall 
ratio was 8 : 1. 
The same levels of compensation as those mentioned above (
4
) were 
paid for miners' phthisis. The Commission believed that there was a 
possibility that many Africans suffering from this disease were not detected 
and therefore recommended that every African about to be repatriated home 
be examined for miners' phthisis by a Government medical officer. (
5
) 
(1) N.G.I.(1913}o Para.384. 
(2) In absolute numbers, the total of fatal accidents on the Transvaal gold 
mines in 1912 was 54 Whites and 805 Africans and other coloured persons. 
For all mines in the Transvaal it was 5 7 Whites and 871 Africans and 
other coloured persons. Non-fatal accidents (all Transvaal mines) 
numbered 295 White and 1 0 962 non-white victims. 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines Report (1912), quoted in Appendix F of 
the Economic Commission of 1914. 
(3) On gold mines in the Transvaal the fatal accident rate per 1000 (all 
colours) in 1912 was 1. 53 on the surface compared with 4. 73 under-
ground. Annual Report of the Mines Department for year ending 
3 lst December, 1912, U. G. 40-1913, p. 111. 
(4) N.G.I. (1913), Para.386. 
(5) ibid, Para. 389. 
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Further information about rights of compensation which were not widely 
known was to be disseminated among the Africans. (l) 
It was not the general practice of the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association to engage Africans for work on a particular mine. A certain 
number were engaged for specific mines. (2) Although this number was 
limited by Article 11 of the Articles of Association of the W.N.L.A. to 
3 2t% of the total number engaged, (
3
) it was, in practice, raised by 
"the pressure of native opinion" to more than 50%. (
4
) The complaint 
therefore that the Africans' wishes with respect to their place of 
employment were not taken into account ~5 ) was not regarded as very 
important. 
Africans were engaged for a period of not less than 90 shifts (5) 
i.e. between three and four months. As many overstayed their period 
of contract (
7
) and all piecework blacks were allowed a probationary 
period during which they we re pa id whether or not they accomplished 
their task, (
8
) the length of contract was not considered an unnecessary 
restriction by Buckle. 
"The importance of the omission" of the amount of wages to be paid 
in the Native Recruiting Corporation contract was considered to be 
over-estimated by the African as "the rates of pay-forthe different 
classes of work are perfectly well-known to the natives generally. ,,(9) 
(1) N. G. I. (1913), ~ara. 400. 
(2) ibid/ Para. 406. 
(3) ibid, Para. 408. 
(4) ibid, Para. 412. 
(5) ibid, Para. 404. 
(6) ibid, Para. 420. 
(7) ibid, Para.423,424,425. 
(8) ibid, Para.429. 




Suggestions about methods of releasing the African from his contract ( l) 
and the alteration of the contract were made by the Commission. (2) 
The Commission, in investigating the second part of its terms of 
reference, described the potential for unrest among mineworkers in the 
following way: 
"There are normally about 200, 000 native mine labourers 
on the Reef. They are all male, practically all adults 
and the large majority in the prime of life. They are 
scattered over 50 miles of country in blocks of from 1, 000 
to 5, 000 in each compound. They can mobilise themselves 
in a few minutes 0 armed with such weapons as assegais, 
jumpers, axes, etc. A good many of them consider, 
whether rightly or wrongly, that they have grievances against 
the Europeans, and most of them are savages, whose only 
idea of reform is violence. All of them want more pay, and 
i most of them are under the impression that the employment 
, of force by European miners ••...•• resulted in the latter 
.1 obtaining their demands. It is not necessary to emphasise 
the possibilities of mischief which are latent in such a 
condition of affairs. "(3) 
The so-called safeguards (i.e. the personal influence of the compound 
managers, the native respect for European authority as personified in the 
police, the inter-tribal jealousies) (
4
) against the breakdown of the moral 
restraints of the African, had all shown "unmistakable· signs" of tending 
to break down. (5) 
The Commission advocated that "an alarmist view" of the degree to 
which these safeguards had broken down and thus of the possibility of an 
outbreak by Africans in the compounds should be avoided. (
6
) It stated: 
"With ordinary care and good government, no question of hostilities 
between natives and Europeans should ever arise. "(
7
) 
(1) N.G.I. '(1913), Para.431,432. 
(2) ibid' Para. 441. 
(3) ibid' Para.474. 
(4) ibid, Para.476. 
(5) ibid' Para. 477. 
(6) ibid I Para. 489. 
(7) ibid t Para.489. 
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As a matter of "prudence" the Commission thought that "serious 
provision for the possibility'' of such an outbreak should be made. (l) 
Recommendations to achieve this ranged from the organisation of a dormant 
force (only for use in emergency) on every mine (
2
) to the construction of 
compounds which could be cl_osed. (
3
) African intelligence departments 
should be organised(
4
) and compounds of any considerable size should 
always have .a European on dutyo (5) As intoxicating liquor supposedly 
provoked disturbances, it was also held that "it be made an offence 
in a compound manager that more than a negligibie quantity of liquor 
be found in his compound. "(
5
) 
In deciding upon the advisability or otherwise of the principle of 
recruiting, the Commission decided that "it (was) desirable from every 
point of view that the native should work; and (that) there (was) there-
fore nothing. improper in persuading him to do so. "(
7
) 
Recruiting, however, involved the mines in considerable expense 
and resulted in recruiters inducing Africans to contract by false represen-
tations or unfulfilled promises. (
8
) The~ Commission discussed the system 
at length and made detailed recommendations with regard to the curtailment 


























(9) This was to restrain traders in the African territories from encouraging 
Africans to get into debt and then bring pressure on them to accept 
employment on the mines, in order to recover the amount of the debt 
from the advances made by the N. R. C. 
(10) N.G.L (1913), Para.667. 
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The outbreak of the Great War put a temporary end to serious industrial 
unrest in South Africa. It brought about an increase in industrial activity 
and naturally therefore in the demand for labour as well, while the sudden 
prosperity created by the tremendous demand for goods for war purposes 
enabled employers to concede demands for increased wages and improved 
working conditions. Their attitude was thus essentially conciliatory, as 
is well illustrated by the policy of the Chamber of Mines, which, in 
! attempting to maintain maximum output, went to great lengths to avoid 
industrial unrest on the mines. 
Although it had been prepared to face a strike.over the issue of trade 
union recognition as late as 1913 and had consistently refused to recognise 
. (1) 
trade unions for over 10 years, the Chamber had by 1915 changed its 
attitude, largely in response to General Smuts' appeal for support of the 
war effort. (
2
) Thus in 1915 the Chamber recognised the Trade Union 
movement for the first time. 
From the beginning of the war, the colour bar had shown signs of 
breaking down. Specifically, it was not the formal but rather the customary 
colour bar upon which inroads were being made. Such inroads were not 
uniform, for on some mines certain kinds of work were performed by 
Europeans, whereas on other mines these same categories of work were 
carried out by Africans. However, in 1916 the South African Mine Workers' 
Union demanded that all semi- skilled work be reserved for whites and that 
all Coloured and African miners be discharged and their places filled by 
white men. The Chamber rejected these demands. Similar demands were 
made the following year with the same result. Eventually, however, in 1918, 
a compromise was reached when the Chamber of Mines and the S. A. M ~ U. 
agreed 
(1) The earliest trade associ.ation formed was the Transvaal Miners' 
Association in 1902. V. H. Osborn, A Critical Survey of Trade 
Unionism in South Africa, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Witwaters-
rand University, 1931, .. :P.: 4. 
(2) See Ould, C.R., General Smuts' Attitude to White Labour Disputes 
between 19 07 and 19 2 2, unpublished M.A. Thesis, Witwatersrand 
University, 1963, for a full discussion of Smuts' attitude in this. 
regard. 
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that the status quo as existing on each mine with regard to the 
relative scope of employment of European and Coloured employees 
should be maintained, that is to say that no billets which are held 
by European workmen should be given to Coloured workmen and 
vice versa.,·, ( 1) 
This 'status quo• did not affect any new mine opened after 1st September, 
1918, nor extensions of work in any of the existing mines. (2) It was a 
purely voluntary agreement, distinct and separate from the statutory colour 
bar. In so far as it prevented the advance of the African it constituted a 
legitimate grievance to the black worker on the mines. 
The African miners were, howevero concerned with more pressing issues 
during the early months of 1918. They claimed that their real incomes had 
" declined as a result of the appreciable rise in the cost of living during the 
war years. Action was taken against the mine storekeepers in the form of 
a boycott of the trading stores. The boycott proved short-lived, however, 
for it was called· off after the Government had promised to hold an inquiry 
into this grievance. 
Mr. A.H. Stanford was urgently requested to act as Special Commissioner 
to investigate the boycott of the Rand storekeepers. He found "that the 
natives are now realising that the purchasing power of a sovereign only 
equals that of 10s. as before the war, and on some articles even less than 
1 Os., and in the near future this may lead to a demand for increase of wages 
and possibly a strike if this is refused." Methods of trading .were deemed 
;'pernicious", for no fixed prices were chargedr except for a few lines so 
that in many cases profits were exorbitant. Stanford issued a stern warning: 
" .•.•• if existing conditions continue, I fear that a determined 
effort will be made by the mine boys to obtain increased pay. 
Such a thing is only mentioned in Johannesburg with bated breath, 
and even then in a whisper, as the consequences of such a demand 
might have serious results, but I am of opinion that it is an unwise 
(1) T.C.M.(1918), pp.122,123. 
(2) Report of the Mining Industry Board, U .G.39 of 1922, Para.18. 
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policy to close one's eyes to a possibility of this nature. 
A careful perusal of the Native evidence shows a steady 
trend of thought in this direction, witnesses repeatedly 
stating that at the present cost of goods they cannot come 
out on the existing scale of wageso ···(l) 
As a remedy for the discontent, Mr. Stanford proposed that prices be fixed 
and lists prominently displayed in the compounds. 
The Cost of Living Commission already appointed was given the task 
of investigating the suggestion and, further, of examining the accounts of 
Mine storekeepers o The Commission found that "real competition exists", 
lower profits being made during the war period than before it. (2) . The 
Commissioners could not agree on the question of fixing prices. The 
Chairman 0 Howard Pim 0 and another Commissioner, H.R. Eatori., did not 
concur with Stanford's recommendation, mainly because of the alleged 
impracticability of applying and enforcing such a fixed priceo As a palliative 
they recommended a small Board of Reference who "either through their 
position and personality, are well known to, and trusted by the Natives, 
whose duty it should be to address them in their compounds, explain the 
war position to them and investigate any complaints as to overcharges 
that might be made. "(3) 
The Minority Report of Mro Thomas Boydell on the other hand suggested 
that fixed prices were "essential if the present unrest is to be allayed and 
the goodwill and confidence of the boys secured" as the African miner had, 
unlike his white colleagues, not received any war bonuses or increases in 
pay to meet the higher prices which now prevailed. (
4
) 
(1) Report of the Special Commissi.oner appointed to enquire into the 
Boycotting of Rand Storekeepers by Natives, U.G.4 of 1919, p. 3. 
(2) The percentage of net profits on sales had dropped from 15% in 
1914 to 10. 6% in 1917. 
Report on investigati.on of accounts of Mine Storekeepers on the 
Witwatersrand and as to the Fixing of Prices of the Chief Articles 
of Native Trade i.n the Witwatersrand Area, U.G.4 of 1919, Para. 6. 
(3) ibid, Para. 180 
(4) ibid, Minority Report. 
He further recommended a reorganisation of the system along co-operative 
lin~s so that the Africans themselves would either participate in the profits 
of acquire their goods at prices which would cover the working expenses 
of the stores o 
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A representative set of accounts (1) was investigated and summarised 
as below: 
1914 1915 1916 1917 ··--
£ £ £ £ 
Sales 232,000 335,000 376,000 463,000 
Gross Profit 71,000 99,000 107,000 .126,000 
II % on Sales 30.7 29.7 28.4 27.2 
Expenses 37,000 53,000 59,000 77,000 
II % on Sales 15 0 7 15.8 15.8 16.6 
Net Profit 35,000 46,000 47,000 49,000 
II % on Sales 15.0 13.9 12.6 10.6 
Gross profits had increased appreci~bly from £71, 000 at the beginning of the 
period to £126;000 by 1917, but a significant part of this increase was 
absorbed by higher ex:wenses - from £3 7, 000 to £77, 000. Unfortunately, 
no breakdown of the expense figures were given although extremely high 
rentals were mentioned, £4, 000 to £8, 000 being the usual price for a stand 
and goodwill, (
2
) and increments in salaries. Net profits, although showing 
a steady upward trend from £35 0 000 in 1914 to £49, 000 in 1917, did not 
increase more rapidly because of the changes in remuneration paid to the 
landholders, leaseholders and merchants themselves. This aspect should 
surely have received more attention. While all sections of the community 
connected with the mine stores had improved their conditions by the end of 
the war, the material situation of the African miners was decidedly inferior 
to that of 1914. The magnitude of the added burden which the African had 
to bear by 1918 is illustrated by the price increases over 1914 for those 
commodities which he frequently purchased. Blankets had increased in 
price by 100 per cent. , shirts by 25 per cent. , lustre rugs by 150 per cent. , 
. (3) 
knives by 100 per cent. , etc. 
(1) Report on investigation of accounts of Mine Storekeepers on the Wit-
watersrand and as to the Fixing of Prices of the Chief Articles of 
Native Trade in the Witwatersrand Area, U.G.4 of 1919, Para. 6. 
(Figures to the nearest £1, 000). 
(2). Report of the Special Commissioner appointed to enquire into the 
Boycotting of Rand Storekeepers by Natives, Final Report, p. 3. 
(3) Report on investigation of accounts .•...• ,·op cit, Para.13. 
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After the boycott of mine trading stores in February 1918 and 
disturbances at the Smit Street Municipal Compound in May, African 
miners at the Crown Mines, Ferreira Mine and Robinson Deep Mine 
Compounds went on strike early in Julyo All the men had, however, 
returned to work and conditions had returned to normal by July 3rd after 
the Director of Native Labour had read a message to the African miners 
from the Prime Minister which promised an inquiry into the whole matter. (l) 
A deputation representing the Afri.can workers on the Witwatersrand 
presented a list of alleged grievances to General Botha, with the result 
that a Commissioner, Mro J.B. Moffat, was duly appointed to inquire 
into the unrest amongst Africans employed by the Johannesburg Municipality 
and the Mines o Many of the matters discussed did not affect mine workers 
to any extent and therefore do not concern us. 
The Commissioner's dictum showed a profound insight into the forces 
behind the colour baro He said~ 
"The existence of the regulations is, however, not the real bar 
to the employment of natives on skilled or semi-skilled work. 
The real power behind the throne in this matter is the white 
worker, who objects strongly to anything approaching encroach-
ment by black labour on what he regards as his own particular 
preserve, 
Apart from the employments from which natives are debarred 
by the regulations there is a good deal of semi-skilled work 
which natives are competent to do, but owing to the opposition 
of white workers in the Transvaal natives cannot be employed 
on iL" (2) 
These remarks are significant for it does not appear that the situation 
on the mines has changed appreciably o 
(1) Department of Mines and Industries, Annual Report of the Government 
Mining Engineer for the year ended 31st December, 1918, U. G. 3 8 
of 1919 I Po 103, 
(2) Report of the Commis·sioner appointed to enquire into the causes 
of the Native Disturbances in Johannesburg, 
Govt, Notice 1184, 4o 9, 19180, p. 386. 
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From the early years of mining on the Witwatersrand, the affairs of 
the coal mines in the area, as well as in the surroundings, were handled 
by the same Chamber which dealt with the operation of the gold mines .. 
Towards the end of 1918, there was a strike on the collieries of the 
Witbank area which is of special significance for our particular themeo 
We shall see that in the main the major grievances which sparked off 
the strikes of African miners were never rectified. Attention was only 
given very minor matters peripheral to the real cause of the strike. 
The African colliery workers' grievances were concerned with the 
period of contracto Seventy per cent of those employed were engaged 
by the W.N .L.A. to work for one year found that some collieries inter-
preted it to mean 360 shifts whereas legally, under the Native Regulations, 
the "year" was interpreted to mean 313 shifts worked. The main complaint 
was the system under which most coal mines closed down for indefinite 
times each montho This was largely due to difficulties of storing coal 
and the result was that the African worker was only credited with the 
fraction of time actually worked. Only when the fractions amounted 
to a full shift was the African credited with a day off his contract. 
The system prevented the African miners from completing their year's 
contract in less than 18 months, some taking even longer than two years. (l) 
The result of the strike was that the period of legal contract was 
henceforth more closely adhered to, for the Native Affairs Department 
now took more stringent measures to enforce its observation. The 
Inspector of Mines was moved to remark that "the marvel is that it should 
have survived so longo" 
It was in February, 1919, that in the words of the President of the 
Transvaal Chamber of Mines 0 Sir Evelyn Ao Wallers, "there was, for 
the first time, a native stri.ke in the true sense of the word. " He drew 
a contrast between previous occasions when Africans on the mines had 
(1) G.M.E., (1918), p.110. 
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refused to work, with the strike which broke out in February. 
Before, there had been riots (although this was not really so in 
1918), but now there was "an absolutely peaceful cessation of work. " 
/Once again the cause was the increased cost of living. According 
to Sir Evelyn the burden of increased costs fell not on the Africans 
but on the employers as the men were provided with free food and 
lodgings. He did however, concede that the African's burden was 
greater as far as his dependants were concerned. 
Closely connected with this grievance about the rise in the 
( cost of living were the limitations on Africans being employed on 
higher classes of work. The. Chamber had "no intention of trying 
to abolish the colour bar so long as that barrier is upheld by the 
great majority of Europeans resident upon the Witwatersrand. 
But the maintenance of that barrier constitutes an injustice; and 
public opinion always, sooner or later, discovers and denounces 
injustice. "(l) The Chamber was optimistic, if nothing else. 
A peaceful strike required organisation, a fact which was obvioµsly 
realised by Sir Lionel Phillips, who in seconding the adoption of Sir 
Evelyn Wallers' address, spoke of the "advancing intelligence and 
education" of the African. The strike showed "how much they have . 
advanced." While "not advocating any sweeping changes", he 
\ . . (2) 
~proposed a gradual relaxation of the colour bar. 
{l} T,C,M, I {1919), Po 69. 
(2) ibid, pp. 80, 81. 
THE AFRICA.N MINERS STRIKE ~ 1920, 
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Strikes of European miners have frequently been avoided on the gold 
mines of South Africa because the Chamber of Mines and white workers 
were able to reach a compromise before there was resort to the ultimate 
deterrent. (1) On other occasions the industry has not been so fortunate. 
In this regard, the most significant white strike occurred in March, 19 22, 
when, for a few days, the Witwatersrand experienced a bloody revolt 
which has had lasting effects. on the memories and actions of men 
connected with the industry. Although the white miners were defeated, 
their leaders arrested and prosecuted, they continued to make demands 
which would have passed unheeded in any country but South Africa. 
Although they lost the battle, in fact, they won the war. 
In contrast there has apparently been no compromise between the 
Chamber and the African mineworkers on any major is sue, yet they have 
very rarely organised strikes, mainly because the organisation of trade 
unions for black workers was prevented. Thus, although it would appear 
1 
that they have had ample cause, indeed, permanent cause, for dissatisfaction, 
the major strikes since the discovery of gold involving the bla.ck labourers 
on the mines number three, 1913, 1920 and 1946. 
Very little attention has been paid to the strike of 1920, although 
as an indicator of dissatisfaction, it was comparable with the strike of 
1946. 
It began on the Cason Mine on the East Rand in the early hours of 
Tuesday morning, 17th February 0 19 2 0, and soon spread to other properties. (
2) 
Five thousand Africans on the East Rand Proprietary Mine were reported the 
next evening to be on strike, "and reports fro111 further afield indicate th?t 
the disaffection is spreading." This was an understatement. On Thursday 
i.t spread to the West Rand, 33, 000 Africans being involved. (3) By Friday, 
(1) For example the Importation Ordinance of 1904 (see p, 16) and the 
status quo agreement of 1918 (see p.36), 
(2) Star, 18. 2. 1920. 
(3) Star, 19. 2, 1920. 
\ 
- 43 -
there were as many as 40, 000 strikers while nine mines were affected. 
The Government obviously regarded the situation as serious. Police 
and South African Mounted Riflemen were brought to Johannesburg and 
sent to the mines. The Prime Minister, General Smuts, also came to 
Johannesburg and spent Friday morning in conference with Colonel 
S. Pritchard (Director of Native Labour), Mr. H. 0. Buckle (President 
of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines), Colonel Douglas (Police), 
Sir Evelyn Wallers (Past President of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines) 
and others described as" representative men. ,,'U) No statement was 
issued after this meeting. 
The strike reached its peak on Saturday when the number of. mines 
r reported affected had increased to eleven and the number on strike to 
I 42 I 000. (2) 
Sunday is the traditional day for meetings among the African people, 
as for workers everywhere. A meeting was thus convened on Sunday, 
22nd February, by the Transvaal Native Congress (
3
) to discuss the strike 
action of the African mineworkers. About 2, 500 Africans, mostly house 
and shop "boys", and also a few representatives from the mines attended. 
The police and S.A.M.R. arrived in force but did not interfere with the 
proceedings. The meeting expressed its "heartfelt sympathy with the 
mineworkers in their struggle for increased wages, and hopes that they 
will be firm in their demands for more money." This expression of 
solidarity was not unexpected. A subsequent resolution urged the mine-
workers who had actually ceased work "to do nothing which might lead to 
violence." (4) If the presence of armed military men is considered, this 
was a victory for moderation. 
(1) Rand Daily Mail, 21. 2. 1920. 
(2) Star, 21. 2.1920. 
(3) The forerunner of the African National Congress (ANG). 
(4) .Rand Daily Mail, 23. 2. 1920. 
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The strike now became a "see-saw" affair, with some miners resuming 
work but others ceasing. By Tuesday there was "a more optimiptic feeling 
in official circles" (l) and by Wednesday a large number had returned to work. 
Violence of some kind was ultimately to be expected. The African 
mineworkers maintained their attitude of passive resistence despite being 
confined to their compounds and repeatedly searched for weapons. Troops 
of police and S .A. M. R. had from the beginning surrounded the compounds on 
strike, arresting strike leaders and protecting strike breakers. These 
actions antagonised and provoked the black miners. A local Johannesburg 
newspaper, (Z) in fact, drew attention to their patience and self-restraint: 
"The strikers on the whole have been quiet and amenable to 
discipline - probably much more so than the European strikers 
in similar circumstances. European strikers have their own 
way of dealing with "scabs" or "blacklegs" or with anyone 
who dares to oppose the will of the Strike Committee; it is 
not the way of peace or of the law, but the State stands aside. 
Whatever may be said in favour of the principle of protecting 
men who are willing to work, in practice this is never done during 
a European strike in Johannesburg. Why? Because police 
interference would at once result in bloodshed, and loss of 
lives would create a deep feeling of resentment and conster-
nation throughout the country. It is futile, and savouring 
of hypocrisy, to profess angry surprise when the imitative 
black worker follows the example of the white, " 
According to press reports, something in the nature of a pitched battle 
occurred in the compound of the Village Deep on Wednesday, 25th, when 
police entered for the reported reason of protecting those workers who 
wished to work. "The natives rushed at the police, and it was then 
necessary to open fire in self-defence. " Several rounds were fired and 
f (3) 
finally bayonets used. About a dozen policemen and members of the 
(1) Star, 24. 2, 1920. 
(2) Star, 26. 2. 1920. 
(3) Perhaps the experience at the City Deep influenced the miners reaction 
at the Village Deep. There the police, having entered the compound 
to protect the "boys" willing to work, took advantage of the opportunity 
to use a little "gentle stimulus" with the result that the Africans 
agreed en masse to go down. 
- 45 -
South African Mounted Riflemen were injured and about 35 Africans wounded. (l) 
The three fatalities were all on the side of the Africans. (Z) 
Similar riots an'd bloodshed were avoided on other compounds. At the 
Modder B police charged the Africans in order to get them to lay down their 
arms. Resort was not taken either to rifle-fire or bayonet. Police 
persuasion at the Turf Mine compound succeeded in getting the Africans 
to lay down their sticks, etc. Demonstrations of force by the S .A. M. R. 
along the West Rand and in the suburbs of Krugersdorp and Roodepoort 
proved effective in bringing about ~ peaceable return to work. (3) 
Strong police action at the Village Deep might have dissuaded miners 
on other compounds from considering resistance to the police or may have 
served to harden their resolve. The reported African "attack" on the police 
was without a doubt uncharacteristic of the action of the strikers. They 
may have reached the end of their tether and have been provoked by more 
aggressive police action. Reinforcements· of the police and S .A. M. R. 
were constantly being sent to the Witwatersrand for the purpose of breaking 
the strike. When it became evident that the Africans were in an uncompro-
mising mood, as it must have been when they refused to open the compound 
gates, the police and S .A. M. R. could have kept a watching brief outside 
without forcing an entry, No damage was being done to compound property 
and action could legitimately have been taken had the Africans broken out. 
Yet "severe measures" were resorted to, as "with so many raw and excitable 
(1) Star, 25.2.1920. 
(2) A Native Congress meeting at Vrededorp on Sunday, 29th, to decide 
on the advisability of the houseboys going on strike ended in a blood-
bath and eight African miners and one European policeman were kilJed. 
46 Africans were detained in hospital.. The police had charged with 
batons and, according to the report, European bystanders had used 
firearms. There had been no disturbances at the two previous meetings 
of the Congress held during the strike period. Indirectly, therefore, 
the strike claimed many more than three lives. 
Star, 1.3.1920. 
(3) Rand Daily Mail, 26. 2. 1920. 
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tribesmen on the Reef the authorities cannot possibly allow attacks on the 
police to go unanswered. ,,(l) There was in all likelihood a strong possibility 
that the reported motives of the police, in entering the compound, were 
misinterpreted by the strikers who may have believed that they were to be 
forced to resume work. (Z) 
A pamphlet was issued by the International Socialist League on the 
Tuesday. An appeal to white workers not to "scab" on the African, 
was denounced by the Star as being of "sinister significance. " In order 
"that the public throughout South Africa may be warned of what is going 
on and of the true character of the propagandist influences at work among 
natives on the Reef", the Star published the full document. (
3
) 
Edward Roux describes this Don't Scab leaflet as "magnificent" and 
a "moving appeal. " This it might well have been. To Socialists the 
"dodger" rang with sincerity and was based on the Marxist doctrine that 
the interests of all workers are fundamentally one. Most of the workers 
were not inclined towards socialism, however, and the "appeal fell upon 
deaf ears. 11 Roux(
4
) suggests that: 
"A realist, one not obsessed with Marxist doctrine, might have 
pointed out that the white miners earned ten times as much as 
the blacks, that many of them employed black servants in their 
homes, that a victory of the black miners would have increased 
the desire of the mineowners to reduce the status of the white 
miners, since any increase in black wages would have to be 
met either by a reduction in white wages, or by a reduction in 
profits. Such was the reality of the situation which the white 
workers, consciously or not, understood very well." 
(1) Rand Daily Mail, 26. 2. 1920. 
The "Star" commented that the riot was a "very regrettable occurrence" 
and called for an "official enquiry into the circumstances. " 
Star, 26.2.1920. 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 26. 2. 1920. 
Motion at Vrededorp meeting of Native Congress held on Wednesday, 
25th February, stated that the police had resorted to firearms and 
force to drive the African miners to work. 
(3) Star, 24. 2. 1920. 
(4) Roux, Edward, Time Longer than Rope, Wisconsin University Press, 
Second Edition, London, 1966, pp. 133, 134. 
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White mineworkers had, already, soon after the outbreak of the 
strike, initiated discussions with the Mine Managements on the possibility 
of "carrying on" o When the management realised that the strike might 
last for some time, even though it involved additional expense, consent 
was given to the Europeans to do the Africans' work. It was hoped 
that the African would thus be induced to work by the example of the 
European managing without himo "The action of the men is due to a 
desire to get things going, and set an example to the nativeo "(l) 
This "spectacle" (Z) of white men doing unskilled work had not been 
seen on the gold mines since 19050 
The Executive of the Mine Workers' Union met at the end of the 
strike and passed resolutions upholding the colour bar and recommending 
their members "to carry on operations on the mines as usual in case of 
native strikes on the mines, sectional or general, provided it is the 
wish of the management. "(3) 
The strike was now rapidly petering out and by Saturday, 28th February, 
all the labourers were back at work. It had lasted for eleven days and the 
approximate number of Africans who went on strike was 71, 000 which was 
approximately 37% of the total African labour force employed on the Wit-
watersrand gold mines during 19 ~Oo (4) The largest number of men on 
strike at any one time was, as stated above, approximately 42, OOOo 
At one stage eleven mines were affected. Throughout the period nearly 
9, 000 Europeans were affected as certain mines came to a standstill. 
as a result of the strikeo They did not, however, suffer any loss in 
wages and salaries as they were paid throughout the duration of the strike. 
(1) Star, 230 2o 19200 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 25. 2o 1920. 
( 3) Star, 2 8 o 2 o 19 2 0 . 
(4) Number of Africans employed on gold mines by members of the 
Witwatersrand Native Labour Association on the last day of 
February 1920 - lBS,185. 
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The African mineworkers were supplied with their food rations throughout 
the strike but lost the sum of £20, 5 7 5 in wages. Their return to work 
d 't' 1 (1) was uncon i iona . 
The "presence" of the police and S .A. M. R. in the surrounding areas 
of the compounds from the early days of the strike has already been 
mentionedo They took up their positions in close proximity to the 
compounds where African miners were involved, and as early as Friday, 
20th, had charged a group from the City Deep with batons in order to 
drive them back to the compoundo There appears to have been very little 
! provocation for these acts of intimidation as the African had shown no 
sign of r~sorting to violence. 
Further direct action was taken against the leaders of the African 
strikers on the mines. An African from the Crown Mine who went from 
room to room telling the men not to go underground was fined £10 or two 
months. (2) Africans from the Simmer East were also fined with the 
alternative of imprisonment with hard labour for refusing to work. (
3
) 
In some cases the magistrate gave the African miners the choice of 
returning to work or of being sentenced. A magistrate, Mro Bovill, told 
an African miner "if you can't work for money you can go and work for 
nothing for six months, "(
4
) 250 Africans from the Randfontein Central 
who were escorted to the Charge Office on the last day of the strike 
chose to worko (5) 
(1) Statistics in a letter from Wo Gemmill, Actuary and Labour Adviser, 
T. C. M. to the Inspector of White Labour, Johannesburg of 26th 
March, 1920 reproduced in the T.C.M. (1920), Po 9L 
(2) Star, 2302.1920. 
(3) ibid, 2702o19200 
(4) ibid, 10, 3o 1920, 
(5) Rand Daily Mail, 28. 2. 19200 
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The Chamber(l) recognised that the strike was not a riot but "a regular 
strike organised on the European model, obviously by persons who are 
acquainted with European practice in such matters." The African did not 
have free access to the mine compounds before the strike and once it had 
begun the compounds affected had been "closed" and surrounded by armed 
men. Yet on all mines the future of the mine had not been impaired as 
the pump "boys" had continued to work throughout the strike. Pickets 
had been organised on mines where the turnout of strikers had fallep. 
short of 100 per cent. Moreover, until the disturbances at the Village 
Deep on the 25th, the behaviour of the African miners had been peaceful 
with only occasional trouble - and then between black and black. The 
so-called "raw and excitable tribesmen" had maintained a disciplined 
and effective withdrawal of their labour in order to draw attention to 
their grievanceso 
Three main grievances underlay the strike. Firstly, because of the 
steady increase in the cost of living, the African demanded higher wages (Z) 
as he was no longer able to send the desired financial assistance (
3
) to his 
family at home. Then, coupled with this was the dissatisfaction with the 
colour bar, and finally the dis content with the trading methods of the mine 
, storekeepers, 
( 1) Star , 2 1. 2 • 19 2 0 , 
This was supported by the Native Affairs Department, which stated 
that "a marked degree of organisation exists, as also does considerable 
cohesion among the different native tribes, with the exception, perhaps, 
of the British Basuto, who in certain cases have held aloof. The 
strikers have adopted modern methods, including a system of picketing 
which has been sufficiently complete to prevent numerous peaceably 
inclined and satisfied natives from going to worko " 
Rand Daily Mail, 20. 2. 19200 
(2) An increase in pay for mine Africans took effect on the 31st January. 
It varied from property to property and was reported to bring average 
earnings to 2so 3d. per shift for underground and 2s. per shift for 
surface worko In addition, efficiency bonuses were introduced, 
Star, 18. 2. 19200 





The demands for a new minimum wage were largely uncoordinated and 
varied from 3s. to 10s. per day. (1) One of the major reasons for the 
African coming to the mines was not merely to improve his own material 
position but to support those dependants he had left behind. Increased 
costs may not have affected his own levels of consumption, but there 
• was then invariably less for those relatives he had to support. 
The Chamber(
2
) quoted Moffat's dictum, as follows: 
"The native 's standard of subsistence at his home, excepting 
the comparatively few who have adopted European style of 
living, is not seriously affected by the war. The only respect 
in which he is affected to any extent is by the rise in cost of 
clothing. This is an inconvenience that everyone has to put 
up with and cannot be regarded as a real hardship. Most people 
have to be satisfied with fewer clothes, and there .is no reason 
why the native should not do the same.- "(3) 
The Africans' own experience, however, may well have suggested reasons 
to them for they might have been unable to manage with fewer clothes as 
they already had too few - a logical supposition as the supply of food was 
inadequate. In his Presidenti.al Address, Mr. H.O. Buckle(
4
) stated that 
scurvy, caused by dietary deficiency, was "unusually" prevalent during 
1920. He attributed this directly to· the "unsatisfactory conditions of 
food supply in the Transkei. " At the height of the strike a "public man" 
made the following interesting observp.tion: 
( 1) Star , 18 o 2 . 19 2 0 , 2 1. 2 , 19 2 0 • 
(2) T.C.M.(1920), p.89. 
(3) Mr. J.B. Moffat (then Chief Magistrate of the Transkei) was appointed 
by the Government to enquire into the causes which led to the partial 
cessation of the Municipal Sanitary Services at Johannesburg in 
June, 1918. 
(4) T.C.M.(1920)u p.69. 
Mr. Buckle was the Commi.ssioner who wrote the Native Grievances 
Inquiry Report of 1914. 
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"If there was plenty of food to be obtained in the native locations, 
the matter would probably be more serious, as the natives would 
not at all mind going home for a whileo (1) But we know what the 
tposition there is. There is a shortage of food, so I don't think 
rthe natives will go home, and that the whole trouble will soon die 
down ... (2) 
As recently as 31st January there had been an increase of pay for 
African miners which, though varying from property to property, had 
brought the average of underground wages to 2s. 3d. per shift, and 
surface wages to 2s. per shifto A bonus system had been authorised 
by the Chamber in December 1919, whereby all underground Africans 
' 
who had completed or might complete 180 shifts on a mine were paid, 
· in addition to wages, a bonus of 5s. per month. (
3
) The total amount 
involved was approximately £650 B 000 per annum to the industry 0 (
4
) 
As the Chamber considered the position with regard to the cost of 
living "not very materially altered" since the Moffat Report, and as the 
I 
average rate of pay had recently been increased, it was decided to refuse 
to make any further advances in African rates of pay. (
5
) 
The second demand by the strikers concerned the colour baro They 
demanded recognition of their ability to carry out efficiently more responsible 
work than they had hitherto been allowed to doo They asserted that they 
were being wastefully used as the system in force put a premium on 
inefficiency o (5) 
(1) After a day or two the African Mine Workers who persisted in refusing 
to resume work were threatened with repatriationo 
Star, 19. 2. 1920. 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 24. 2. 19200 
(3) Rand Daily Mail, 200 2o 1920. 
(4) T.C.M. (1920), p.89. 
(5) ibid. 
(6) Star, 20. 2. 1920. 
The Star commented that "because he is unorganised and comparatively 
undeveloped in mind and method, or because of arbitrary restrictions 
such as the colour regulations in the Transvaal and Free State, he is 
deprived of the full benefit of his industry. " 
26. 2. 1920. 
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It was pointed out, however, with much tendentiousness, that a 
relaxation of the colour bar would only have affected a small number of 
semi-skilled Africans. (l) This would no doubt have been the immediate 
effect. Yet in the long run the removal of the colour bar would have 
improved the conditions of the total African mine labouring force as 
increasing numbers of Africans acquired skills and experience and 
as it would not have been necessary to pay skilled and semi-skilled 
miners a scarcity wageo 
The removal of the colour bar, moreover, was not a prerogative of 
the Chamber of Mines, Efforts had been made, and were again to be 
made only 10 months later, to effect a relaxation of restrictions 
maintained by custom, public opinion and the pressure of the white trade 
unions. 
The last cause of the strike, which was inseparably connected with 
the demand for higher wages because of the increased cost of living, 
was the discontent with the trading methods of Reef storekeepers. 
The practice of boycotting the stores had gone on for some weeks before 
the strike, but was more rigorously enforced during the strike. (
2
) 
It may be pointed out that this was not the first time the African 
miners had boycotted the stores o There had been a previous boycott 
in 1918 but it had apparently been ineffectual as compared with 1920. 
(1) Star, 21. 2. 1920. Statement by the Chamber. 
T.C.M.(1920), p.89. 
"There seems to be an impression in some quarters that the removal 
of the colour bar would meet the natives' grievances, but it should 
be clearly understood that the removal of the colour bar, even if it 
were possible, in opposition to the wishes of the great bulk of the 
European population of the Witwatersrand, would advantage only 
the comparatively small number of skilled or semi-skilled natives; 
to the great mass it would make no difference whatever. " 
(2) Star, 18. 2. 1920. 
I 
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' Subsequent to the strike, trading stores where the African was able 
to obtain clothes and other necessaries 11 at reasonable prices 11 were 
opened by the mining authorities on the unproclaimed lands near the 
mines, The result of this new policy of the fndustry was 11 an appreciable 
reduction in prices by native traders generally. 11 This statement by the· 
Chambers' President (l) appears to bear out the contention of the African 
miners that they were being unfairly treated and perhaps exploited, for 
as the private enterprise Mine Trading Stores, despite reduced mark-ups 
and turnover, continued to operate it could be concluded that prior to the 
new policy they had been making abnormally high profits. 
The African mine strike of 1920 thus ended with few positive results. 
Mine trading was put on a sounder and more equitable basis ·which served 
to alleviate the rising cost of living, but, at the same time, the African 
\was told that he had recently received an increment in wages and thus 
(should not expect a further increase. The Chamber insisted on viewing 
any increase as 11 an additional expense to the Industry, 11 purposely or not, 
treating a change in wages as an increase in the fixed cost of production. (
2
) 
( 1) T . C. M. ( 19 2 O)., p. 6 8. 
Initially the Chamber had instituted a Mine Trading Scheme whereby 
the African was able to make his purchases at cost price at stores 
in the compounds themselves. However, Reef Traders appealed 
successfully to the Supreme Court against this system and these 
stores had to be closed. 
(2) T.C.M.(1920), p.89. 
The Chamber estimated that the additional expense to the industry 
of meeting the minimum demands of 3s. per shift would mean an 
"additional expense to the Industry of over eight million pounds per 
annum, •.... the additional wages would mean that twenty-three 
mines, employing 9 68 0 Europeans and 7 5, 17 6 natives would be 
unable to continue. When the premium disappears, as it must 
do sooner or later, only eight of the mines could pay the increased 
wages; and these would be entirely unable to carry alone the 
burden of phthisis compensation and water charges; in short, the 
whole mining industry would be rendered unpayable. " 
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Possible productivity increases and changes in the organisation, (l) 
in order to utilise more fully the African labourer, were not taken account 
oL In addition, the Chambers' calculations ignored the fact that the 
rise in the cost of production after the war years were due in part to the 
shortage of black labou/
2
)whi.ch restricted the scale of operations and 
caused a corresponding decrease in profits o 
According to the Low Grade Mines Commission, (
3
) the mining industry 
resisted the upward movement of black wages as a means of increasing 
its supply because it was believed that the only effect of this would 
have been an increase in the general level of African wages throughout · 
the economy 8 because of the reaction of employers o The supply of 
African labour to the mines would thus have remained constant but at 
a higher wage rateo At this time the wage rates prevailing in the 
Witwatersrand did 0 in fact, tend to become the standard for other 
centres. (
4
) Wage rates for the African thus did not necessarily correspond 
to his marginal product but were set at the lowest possible rateo (
5
) 
(1) The industry, was, admittedly, restricted in its ability to employ 
Africans in skilled or semi-skilled jobs prescribed by the colour bar, 
both formal and informal, and would, according to the Low Grade 
Mines Commission, have willingly and very readily employed blacks 
in jobs reserved for whites because of the benefits which would 
have redounded to the industry as a result of relatively lower black 
wages. 
(2) L.G.M.C.(1920L Para~l5. 
Standing charges 0 being approximately constant, had to be borne by 
a smaller tonnage. The Commission estimated that the supply of 
African labour available at prevaili.ng wage rates in 1920 was only 
70% of that required for the full working of the industry. 
(3) L.G.M.C.(1920L Para.130. 
(4) Report of the Economic and Wage Commission, U .G.14 of 1926, 
Parao 140 0 141. 
(5) The Star of 2L 2. 1920 warned~ "The employer will have to make up 
his mind to pay his labour what it is worth, and not an arbitrary 
wage which puts a premium on inefficiency and slackness and offers 
the willing and intelligent worker little encouragement and little 
opportunity of advancement. " 
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Upon this the Commission commented: 
"Although the conditions under which natives are employed are 
continually being improved, as for example in such a large 
industry as mining on the Witwatersrand, it is clear that the 
well-being of the native in its full sense is not sufficiently 
considered by the white population of South Africa in the 
conditions under which they are employedo The chief 
consideration is the profit and convenience of the European, 
and the native is beginning to feel and to say, with considerable 
justice on his side, that he is being exploited. The sooner 
such a feeli.ng is eradicated the better it will be for all concerned. " (1) 
In addition, the industry contended that it could not "afford any 
substantial increaseo "(
2
) It was able to "afford" increases in the scale 
of pay of its European employees as well as substantial improvements in 
their condition of employment as well as other "privileges" (
3
) for whites. 
This difference in attitude by the Chamber is undoubtedly directly 
attributable to the inferior bargaining position of the black worker. 
The Chamber was already by 1920 developing a unique approach to 
strikes by blacks. Although the problem was complex, their approach 
was simple 0 to say the least. The Mricano "indispensable" to the 
development of the industry, (
4
) was bludgeoned back to work, his leaders 
arrested 0 his pickets broken, and if all this failed, threatened with 
repatriation back to the reserves if he would not return to work. (
5
) 
(1) L.G.M.C.(1920), op cit, Paraol37. 
(2) L.G.M.C.(1920), op cit, Parao 130. 
(3) For example, the European miners were paid in full during the African 
Mine Strike of 19200 The African did not receive similar treatment, 
however, for during a "white strike" he was not paid as the Industry 
could not risk attempting to maintain production for to do so was to 
transgress the sacred colour bar. 
(4) L.G.M.C.(1920), Paraol32. 
(5) The Star commented that: "A state of affairs 0 in which a worker 
remains at his job under economic compulsion and with a strong 
and growing sense of grievance, is undesirable from every point 
of view". 20. 2. 1920. 
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The effects of this ultimate threat were spelt out by the Star: (l) 
"If sent back to his own home he would almost at once have to look 
for work, and in most cases he would have to be satisfied with a 
lower wage and less satisfactory labour conditions than those prevailing 
on the Witwatersrand. " 
The attempt to restore a state of industrial peace or at least of 
truce was not made through the civilised method of negotiation but 
by intimidatiorl and police force. During the early stages of the 1920 
• strike, Mro Taberer and other "representative men" visited the compounds 
and spoke to the men. The leaders of the strike were not consulted nor 
did the Chamber subsequently attempt to establish negotiating machinery. 
They refused to accept that the African was able to take part in any sort 
of Trade Union activity. The Chamber did 0 however, take one positive 
step to prevent future industrial unrest among its African workers. The 
Government was requested to maintain a larger police force in the vicinity 
of the Witwatersrand. (2) 
The Chamber set the tone of its actions by its phraseology. When 
the whites went on strike, as they so frequently did, the industry spoke of 
the European "strike". The African who demanded more pay, however, 
was an "agitator" (
3
) who sought to bring down the Government by causing 
"unrest" amongst his fellows. Even if the whites were not regarded as 
paragons of virtue, nevertheless they remained industrial workers. 
( 1) Star, 2 L 2. 19 2 0. 
(2) T.C.M.(1920), p.90. 
It claimed that "if protection had been forthcoming, strikes would 
have been prevented. " 
(3) The Star pointed out that: . "Owing to the greatly diminished 
purchasing power of the money he earns, he is proportionately 
less able to provide for his dependants and to satisfy his wants. 
The desire for higher wages, therefore, is part of a universal 
movement - the normal expression of economic needs - and is 
easily explicable on grounds other than those of the sinister 
influence of 'agitators'. " 23. 2. 1920. 
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A short while before the 1920 strike the European miners on the 
Witwatersrand balloted in favour of striking in the event of their demands 
not being met. These were, in part, granted by the Chamber. (1) The 
1913 African mineworkers strike had also followed a successful strike 
by European miners. 
The black strike~ of 1913 and 1920 thus followed closely successful 
white industrial upheavals. (
2
) While the Europeans, however, constantly 
gained the ends for which they struck it was not so with the Africans. 
They also went on strike, but did not come close to achieving similar 
success. The "see-saw" pattern of the 1920 strike, some men going 
back to work as new men went on strike, suggests deficiencies in 
organisation, although the mere fact that 40, 000 men were involved at 
one time means that organisation was far from rudimentary. 
Although the African strikers in 1913 and 1920 were determined men 
and were convinced of the justice of their claims, they failed - for the 
simple reason that the Chamb~r had public support in its use of armed 
men and the Africans themselves were prevented from legally organising 
and from legally withdrawing their labour in protest against their conditions 
of employment.· 
(1) Star, 20. 2. 1920. 
(2) The Star suggested that "In so far as the native mineworker has 
become organised and is inclined to push forward unreasonable 
demands. the responsibility rests not with International Socialist 
eccentrics, but with those who, during the past few years have 
been giving the native an object lesson in the use and abuse of 
the strike weapon. " 
23 .• 2. 1920. 




The only time the gold mining industry of the Witwatersrand did not 
experience its usual chronic shortage of African labour during the early 
years of Union was from the end of 191S to mid-1916 when supply ranged 
from approximately 98 per cent to 100 per cent of all underground 
reg:uirements, ( l) Thus with the exception of 191 S and 1916, the ~ 
President of the Chamber of Mines conspicuously complaineQ. of the 
--
industry's difficulties in meeting its full complement needs of black 
labour."' 
The reasons advanced for the exceptional state of affairs in 19 lS/ 
1916 were threefold, Not having yet returned to full production after 
the uncertainty following the outbreak of war, the diamond mines were 
employing only a small proportion of the number of blacks needed during 
normal times. (
2
) The African miners who normally sought employment 
at Kimberley therefore went to the Witwatersrand instead and many ended 
up on the gold mines, The drought in many parts of the country and the 
resultant bad harvest increased the overall supply of African labour to 
the economy as tribesmen were forced to find employment in order to 
support themselves and their families, Again many went to the gold mines, 
It was finally suggested that "the economic condition of the native at his 
home constitutes the greatest incentive to him to leave his family and 
proceed to industrial centres in·search of work, 11 The African was 
gradually changing and was fast becoming "an ever-increasl.ng and 
reliable asset in the labour market", being influenced over the years by 
the fact that he was fed, housed and medically cared for while on the 
mines and because he had become accustomed to purchasing and 
consuming commodities whi.ch had formerly been considered luxuries. (
3
) 
(1) T. C. M. (19 lS), p, Lvii. 
(2) There were only 9, 32S men employed on the diamond fields in 191S; 
SS, 000 fewer than the 1913 peak leveL 
Katzen, p. 73. 
(3) T.C.M. (191S), pp.Lviii, Lix, 
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Thus when the industry was able to work at its most profitable level, 
at the point of full production, without the limitation resulting from an 
insufficient supply of African labour it was only because of outside 
factors and not because of any action, direct or indirect, taken by the 
Chamber of Mines itself, The suggested causes of the increased supply 
of black labour to the mining industry - favourable competitive conditions 
within the economy, adverse weather conditions, ~and the change in the 
attitude of the African labourer to employment generally - were not 
endogenous to the industry. The first was recognised as being transient 
and a result of the war. Climate is always a variable factor while the 
third stated cause, if correct, was merely a fortunate by-product of the 
process of industrialisationo 
The central theme throughout the present discussion is the mining 
industry's problem of obtaining an adequate supply of African labour~ 
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* The complement of a mine is the number of Africans required to run 
the mine at its full capacity. It refers in this case to underground 
work. It should be noted that these figures may have been inflated. 




T.C.M. (1919) p.223~ 
T.C.M. (1920) p. 67. 
T.C.M. (1921) p. 76. 
Mines forced to work below full production, because of an inadequate supply 
of black labour, had to bear fixed charges (administration, supervision, 
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pumping, etc.) which were more or less constant regardless of the rock 
crushed. Working cost per ton was increased and a higher grade of ore 
became necessary if the mine was to continue, 
The severe shortage of black labour raises the inevitable question 
of what measures the industry took to bring its demand for ·and the supply 
of black labour into equilibrium. 
The actions of the Chamber were apparently dictated by the belief ( 
that the supply of African labour within the borders of the country was ~ _, 
inadequateo In 1919 a conservative estimate was that the shortage 
amounted to more than a quarter million men for that year. A statement (l) 
by "a Departmental Committee of the Union Government" was quoted as 
evidence of the truth of the "shortage contention": 
"Natives are proceeding to work in very large numbers, but 
with the enormous growth of industries throughout the Union 
many are able to obtain employment without proceeding very 
far afield, 
In the consideration of the problem of labour supply, it must 
be borne in mind that the native population outnumbers the 
European by only five to one, Every European household 
employees from one to half-a-dozen, hotels and farms employ 
from half-a-dozen to ;a score, the larger estates and the ever-
increasing industries account for their quota, merchants, traders 
and municipal bodies absorb a very large number, while alluvial 
diggings, railways u harbours and mines between them employ 
many hundreds of thousands, in addition to which a proportion 
are employed in agriculture and otherwise on their own account -
many others necessarily remaining at home and attending to 
domestic affairs and the care of livestocko 
If due weight be given to these facts, it will be realised that 
the time has been reached when there is not sufficient labour 
to go roundo " 
The estimates by the Chamber were made on the assumption that the 
African was "mainly a pastoral, and agricultural people" and that a proportion 
of the able-bodied men therefore necessarily had to stay at home. This 
(1) ToC.M., (1919), p.89. 
Letter by Mr, D. Christopherson, Vice President for 1920-21, 
to the Press quoted after the Presidents' Address o 
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assumption was part of the belief that the supply of African labour to the 
gold mining industry was unresponsive to wage changes. It was stated 
that the "tendency of the native is to be an agriculturist, who reluctantly 
offers himself or one of his family as an industrial worker for just so long 
as the hut tax can be earned, and expects the industrial demand to expand 
to give him work when his crops are bad. He cares nothing if industries 
pine for want of labour when his crops and home-brewed drink are plentiful. "(l) 
According to the Chamber, therefore, the supply of black labour 
was both inadequate in quantity and virtually inelastic with respect to 
wages, or indeed negatively elastic. Within limits, the supply of Africa~-\ 
labour was regarded as being an inverse function of the level of wages. 
On the basis of these contentions an increasing supply could not be 
achieved by the usual expedience of offering higher wages because of 
the alleged desire of the African to maintain his tribal links and only work 
in the industrial sectors of the economy for a certain proportion of each year. 
In 1904, Sir Godfrey Lagden, at that time Commissioner for Native 
Affairs in the Transvaal, had given evidence that before the war of 1899-1902, 
"30s. per month was more or less a standard wage throughout South Africa 
for good workmen and for young men, less:· and the native had to work 
from six to nine months to realise what he wanted for the year. Now, 
at the present time, it is almost an exception to find natives working anywhere 
for less than £3 per month. This is the result, it has reduced the volume 
of labour one-half or perhaps more •...•... The actual volume of labour in 
circulation has been most mater:ially reduced by the high rate of wage ....•. 
because the native can, in half the time he used to work, earn, what he 
used to earn in a much longer time, to satisfy his wants. "(2) 
(1) T.C.M. (1911), p.Lxxi. 
(2) Reports of the Transvaal Labour Commission, Minutes of Proceedings 
and Evidence, (Cd. 1897) (1904), Q.1705. 
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NN which measures the number of hours 
worked in response to wage offers is 
drawn as a rectangular hyperbola. 
Any combination of hours of work and 
wage rate would equal 'target wage'. 
At wage rate of OA, labourer will offer 
OD hours of work in order to earn 
'target amount'. 
Increase in wage rate to OB (increase 
D of AB) will result in target labourer 
C only seeking employment for OC hours 
0 
___ ,,__, __ N of work (decrease of CD). 
______ _.. ________ X OAFD =target wage 
A B OBEC =target wage 
WAGE RATE 
While an increase in wage rates would tend to draw more men out of the 
subsistence sector; this increase would also mean that those who were 
already in wage employment would work shorter periods of time since their 
targets were more attainable at the higher rates. Elliot Berg suggests that 
"The potential migrant labourer balances the benefits to be obtained 
from income-earning outside against the inconvenience of a given 
spell in wage employmenL He decides to migrate when, given the 
rate of wages and his "leisure'' - income preference function, the 
anticipated satisfactions from his net expected income exceed the 
costs to him of mi.grating, "costs" being defined as sacrificed 
"leisure". Since the villager usually has non-wage sources of 
money income (Le, marketed portions of village output) his 
decision to migrate and the length of time he will stay in employment 
depends also on the level of his village income and the effort-price 
of income in wage employment as compared with the effort-price of 
income in alternative income-earning pursuits." (2) 
In modern parlance, the normal condition could be a backward-sloping supply\ 
curve of African labour as per capita earnings increased. \ 
(1) This diagram was first brought to my attention by Mr. I. Hume. 
(2) Berg, Elliot, "Backward Sloping Labour Supply Functions in Dual 
Economies - The Africa Case". Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1961, 
p,473, 
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It is difficult to predict a priori the aggregate supply curve of 
i 
labour since it depends on the net outcome of two contrary changes 
that may operate following a wage change: changes in the number of 
labourers in wage employment and changes in the average time each 
man spends at work. 
In 1904, one Barberton mine manager suggested a change of 
the slope of the African labour supply curve would occur round some 
"optimal" wage-rate: "If I paid a low wage he would not come, and 
if I pay a high wage I drive him away as soon as he has the money he 
requires. "(i) This idea was given a monetary scale by Sir Percy Fitzpatrick: 
"I do not think £1. per month would be enough (to elicit an 
adequate supply of African labour), that is why I objected 
to it myself, but I think round about the 40s. level is the 
right wage •••••• ·• and that the increase to 60s. was not 
only unnecessary and useless, but it is mischievous .••• 
if they get £3 per month, they may spend a little bit more 
than if they got £2 per month, but they will certainly work 
h t ' d II (2) a s or er per10 •••.••..•• 
Around the turn of the century, indeed, experiments were resorted to 
which involved a cut in African mine wages before and another at the 
beginning of the South African War, followed by increases in wages after 
the War. Evidence of the effects of these changes is somewhat equiv~cal; (3) 
the observations just quoted from Sir Percy Fitzpatrick reflect this. He 
stated, indeed, that: "There is much conflict of opinion as to what actually 
was the effect produced by the different rates of wage, varying from 30s. 
to 4Ss. ", but beyond that range, there was, he said, "No doubt about the 
last rise in wages from 4Ss. to 60s. It entirely failed in its obJect. 
Such extravagant rates not ·only failed to bring about the desired result, 
but actually defeated it by enabling the native to satisfy his ambition 
in the shortest space of time. It is no permanent solution of the question 
(1) Transvaal Labour Commission loc cit. (Cd. 1897) 1904, Q. 11, 649. 
(2) ibid, Q. 2653. 
(3) See pp. 10 and 11. 
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that the mines should have outbid the other industries of the country or 
draw out immediately for a few months an additional number of natives, 
who would otherwise and in the ordinary course work for a longer period 
or periods at some future time. It profits nothing to rob either our 
neighbours or the future ••..•. Cheap labour ••••• has been the basis 
of South African calculation. It fixes the limit of development, and 
d t • th II (1) e ermines e pace •....•.•.. 
Elliot Berg is rather more dogmatic in interpreting the evidence of 
the effects of the wage cut. He argues that "the aggregate supply of 
(African) labour showed itself not only positively related to the rate of 
wages, but quite elastic in response to wage cuts". The effect was 
"the most severe labour shortage in the history of the gold industry, 
which was not unrelated to the companies' wage policy". (2) 
The experience of the Premier Diamond Mine in the years before. the 
Native Grievances Inquiry would not support belief in a backward-sloping 
supply curve. The managing director, Mr. P. Ross Frames, testified 
before the Dominions Royal Commission in March 1914. In answer to 
a question whether in recent years the mine had found any difficulty in 
maintaining its full complement of labourers, he said: "At one time we 
were lulled into a rather false state of security in regard to recruiting, 
and there was also a cut in the contract price paid to these boys. Then 
we had to busy ourselves in getting the boys, but when we brought back 
the leading price we found no difficulty .••..• " Individual res pons es 
varied. He found "some eager to work and earn money, and others who 
are not - just like the white men", but, in general he agreed that "an 
increase in remuneration to the native acts as a powerful stimulus to 
recruiting". To a question in these terms he replied, "Yes, - he is 
very much like the white man in that respect. "(3) 
(1) ibid, Q. 2620. 
(2) Berg, p. 489. 
(3) Royal Commission on the National Resources, Trade and Legislation of 
Certain Portlons of His Majesty's Dominions: Evidence taken in .... 
South Africa in 1914, Part II (Cd. 7707), 1914, Qq.1035-36, 1079. 
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The finding that the theory of the backward sloping supply curve of 
labour did not have validity resulted from empirical study on this subject 
undertaken by Simon Rottenberg on the Island of Antigua (in the West 
Indies). (1) No similar study has been undertaken in South Africa. ·However, 
Leo Katzen in "Gold and the South African Economy" states that an important 
characteristic of the wages of African miners' has been its extreme stability. (2) 
He quotes S.H. Frankel's dictum, (
3
) as follows: "Nothing has changed so 
little in South Africa as the black man's rate of pay". During certain ~eriods, 
wag.e_increases~la9.g_eQ.Jar behind the increase in the retail prices of -- ---------~-- -~ - - -·· ~~--- ·- ...,__ 
.QQIDrno.dities. For example "between 1914 and 1920 wages rose by only 
_!JLp_er_ce-Ht-Gom.par:ed with a rise in retail gr.ices_oiji_§_per cent over the 
• ,.Jll (4) - -
same P_§lQ.u-.. 
If the supply curve of black labour to the gold mines had, in fact, been 
backward sloping then the result of this stab1lity_of_mo.ney-.w.age.s_and decline 
- ·~-.....--
~ea-1-wa-<je.s-ought-:-te-ha·ve-been-a-steady-increase-in .the-ag.gregate.supply_ 
of African }?_boucto_the __ m.ines. But Katzen did not detect a steady increase 
in this aggregate supply. He found, however, that the rigidity of wages 
le.Q_to.a -s horta ge-of-la·bour-in-a~pertod-of-price-increa ~ ;s-and _tlia t_African ,,..--- - -
~our_was_attracted-to-other-fields_where_price_c_om_p_ejj_!Lon_!or its services 
( ) -·- - . --
was stronger._
5 
Other extraneous factors were of importance - including, -----· -it is true, harvest conditions; but also population growth, the processes 
of urbanisation, strikes by European miners, and cyclical movements in 
(6) 
other branches of employment. He might have added the risk of accidents 
(1) Rottenberg, Simon, "Income and Leisure in an Underdeveloped Economy". 
Journal of Political Economy, 1952, p. 101. 
(2) Katzen, Leo, Gold and the South African Economy, A.A. Balkema, 
Cape Town, 1964, p. 22. 
(3) Frankel, S. H., Capital Investment in Africa, op cit, quoted by 
Katzen, p. 22. 
(4) Katzen, p. 23. 
(5) ibid, p.27. 
(6) ibid, pps. 27,28. 
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and their effect upon earnings, both immediate and long runo (l) 
There has, moreover, been a more than proportionate increase in 
the supply of black labour to secondary industry in which African wages 
have been increased more rapidly than in mining. (2) African labour has 
followed the possibility of higher wages. 
Harold Go Vatter admits the possibility of a backward-sloping supply 
curve for labour in a primitive economy where the working population lacks 
a sense of continuous industrial discipline and the experience of money 
income and of consumption as a more or less continuous flowo He doubts 
whether this is typical - if, indeed, it ever was - of countries emerging 
from economic underdevelopment today; and his argument might suggest 
that the influence which would most rapidly have eliminated the phenomenon 
from the South African labour market (if it existed) would have been the 
salutary experience of regular employment at wages which would have 
increased as the labour force grew more efficient. In societies removed 
from the primitive, he argued o three influences would render the actual 
existence of backwar~-sloping supply curves most unlikely. The 
demonstration effect would increasingly induce emulation of the spending. 
habits of those in receipt of higher incomes. Similar influences would 
(1) The Native Grievances Inquiry suggested that there would be a positive 
relationship between a decrease in the incidence of accidents (and thus 
an increase in earning potential) 0 and the supply of labour. Buckle thus 
indirectly lent support to the assumption that the labour supply curve 
to the gold mines was responsive to expectations of real earnings, i.e. 
forward sloping. 
N. Go I. (1913), Para. 320 
Africans were paid by the shift and contracted for a certain number of 
shifts. Mineworkers were aware that if they did not work owing to 
injury, they were neither paid nor was that day counted as one towards 
the completion of the contract. 
(2) Between 1915 and 1965 the number of non-whites employed on the gold 
mines rose from approximately 206, 000 to approximately 386, 000. 
In the same period, manufacturing industry increased its employment of 
non-white labour by eight-fold (from approximately 88, 000 to approximately 
628, 000). Union Statistics for Fifty Years 1910-1960, compiled by the 
Bureau of Census and Statistics, ·Pretoria. 
Statistical Year Book 1966, compiled by the Bureau of Statistics, Pretoria. 
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affect the marginal propensity to save, whilst leisure at a low level of 
income is not of itself necessarily especially pleasurable. "Leisure ••. 
is not particularly wanted without wealth 11 • He concludes that in a wealthy 
community backward-sloping supply curves for labour will exist only at the 
point where they are "not operationally significant". Most workers even 
yet do not have the opportunity of obtaining earnings within the ranges in 
which the backward-sloping effect is likely to be encountered. Even in 
a poorer community in which the d~monstration effect is able to operate 
powerfully, the backward-sloping curve is seen as a rather unreal case. (l) 
It was to increase its supply of African labour that the Chamber of Mines 
formed the }Iati-Ye-Recr.uiUng Corpora ti on in 1912 to operate in the Union 
and the territori.es of Bechuanaland, Swaziland and Basutoland. (2) 
By-1-9-1-9-,-w.he.n_t}].e Robins Qn_Gr:oup_f.i.D.fil..l.Y joined the Corporation, a virtual 
;,....mo.nop_oly_9f rec11Jjttn~g_in_B:r:ttJsh_.SDuth.Africa_was_aqhJexeJi". (3) The ever-
increasing cost of recruiting and the abuses of the independent recruiting 
system were alleviated by the Centralisation and organisation ensuing on 
the formation of the Corporation. In his annual address for 1912 the President 
spoke of 
"The cut-throat competition obtaining in the past, which continually 
increased the cost of our native labour 0 and the running after the 
native, which had a rather demoralising effect on him, had been 
practically put an end· to; the mine contractor 0 who for a long 
time past has been universally recognised as ·a great evil 0 has. 
been to a considerable extent eliminated already, and I have 
no doubt that within a comparatively short period conditions 
as regards costs must materially benefit from the combination -
in fact there are signs thereof alr,eady." (4) 
The Native Recruiting Corporation, as well as putting an end to the 
I 
cut-throat competition within the Industry 0 also further reinforced the 
(1) Vatter, Harold G. , "On the folklore of the Backward Sloping Supply 
Curve". Industry and Labour Relations Review, 1961, p. 580. 
( 2) T . C . M . ( 19 12) , p. ixv. 
(3) Van der Horst, p. 193. 
(4) T.C.M. (1912), p.ixviL 
j 
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industry's monopsonistic positi.on within the economy. However, the 
industry suffered a considerable setback in 19l~(l) with respect to its 
supply of African labour when the Union Government QL.Q.l}Jbited the further 
recruitment_o.f-..labourJrpm North of Latitude 22° South. It did so not on 
~·- - - -- - .~- -
grounds of public policy, but for humanitarian reasons, arising from the 
unduly high mortality rate amongst these- .men.(
2
) This had a marked 
effect on the labour position within the industry as almost 20, 000 men, (
3
) 
more than 11 per cent of the total African labour force in the service of 
members of the Witwatersrnnd,..Natiye Labour Association, (
4
) had been ---·-----
imported from those areas i~J.P_ In addition, the W. N. L.A. was 
~Et.c:Lfr.om...re.cr.utting_wit}li.n_the-Rrotectorate-of-British· Nyasaland-
from July, 1912. Approximately 2, 000 Nyasas had been employed on mines 
and works at the end of 1911. (
5TJ Despite the shortage of labour within 
the Protectorate itself, the Imperial Government was prepared to is sue 
travel passes to those wishing to proceed to the Witwatersrand of their 
own accord, (
6
) so that this supply of African labour was not entirely lost 
to the gold-mining industry. The number employed on mines and works 
from this source varied from approximately 900 to as little as 400 during 
the 1920's. The question of recruiting from North of Latitude 22° South 
and from Nyasaland had been under discussion for some years so that 
the N. R. C. may have been formed in response not only to the needs 
mentioned above but also the possible curtailment of the future supply 
through the W. N. L.A. 
( 1) T. C . M . ( 19 13), p. xLL 
(2) Interim Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission, para. 53. 
(3) T.C.M. (1912), p.xiii. 
(4) T.C.M. (1911), p.xi. 
Members of the Association included the Coal, Diamond and Tin Mines 
as well as the Lime Works. In 1911 the gold mines employed approxi-
mately 178 0 000 men out of a total of approximately 196, 000 employed 
by all the members of the Association. 
See T, C. M ~ (1912), p. xxxix. 
(5) T.C.M. (1912), p.xLii. 
(6) T. C. M. (1910), p.xLii. 
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The formation of the N .R. C. increased the supply of labour i.e. the 
quantity of labour offered at given wage rates (including allowances in 
kind). Morg_efficient use of a given labour supply, however, could, in ,.---. . 
effect, be equal to an increase int~at supply •. - Jmproved labour productivity 
--··~-- ··~ ---
is determined .by a. complex of factors such as technical progress, improvement 
in workers' qu~lifications, experience, better work organisation, improved 
.--- .-r__.-..~ r_ ~- - - • •• - •_ 
living standards and mat~rial incentives in the form of wages. Wages 
~-~-- --~L~,,..~--· - - ··~ - -••-•- " -
act_l!~ ~Jl i.nducement to work; a <?.ha~ge in wages may affect the labourers 1 
willingness. to workmore_or less intensively or for longer of shorter periods 
~--~=--"--- - -
_Qi.Jinte... The wage an employer"is prepared to pay - the price he is 
prepared to give - depends on the amount of work the amount of the 
commodity bought - he expects to receive in return. Other things being 
equal, a more efficient workman offers more 'work 1 than ales s efficient; 
d h . h' h . ..(l) an e receives ig er wages m consequence. 
The amount of work a man does is determined partly by ability, and 
partly by choice, by his relative demands for income and leisure, which 
in turn depend on what he receives for his labour. The substitutability 
and complementarity of income and leisure for the African miner have been 
discussed above. The African, moreover, was restricted in the category 
of work and thus the amount of work he did by the formal and inform colour 
bars. 
The impo_r:,t~nce of .'Wage rates as components of actual payments may 
•· 
__ vary. The African miners on the South African gold mines received food, 
housing accommodation, and medical and hospital treatment, in addition 
to cash wages. A,djustments to the cash wage by taking into account these 
(2) 
factors are therefore necessary. 
( 1) Hicks, J. R. , The Theory of Wages, Second Edition, .MacMillan & Co. , 
London, 1963, p.89. 
(2) See next page. 
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As we have seen, Buckle found the compJaJnts __ otAfr:iccaJl miners in ,-· ~---·-·--··-· -"·-··~-- -· - . ---~ 
1:.:.~ -, 
1913 about wages to be well-founded. Average money wages in 1913 ____ c;: 
~-~re l~~~;-~~~n~t.h~;--~~a~_b~~~·in 1896; (l)~~~r~-;a~~o;~o~;r b~~~-: 
~--~- ~---"-~- -~~--~ -- ---- r~-~---~--------
decrease in the average ratescpaid from _ls. 11. 5-8d. per-shift in 1912 
r-~ --- ~----- - (2) 
t_o_ls-.-l-1~013.d __ p_ec,sbJf1JI1 __ 1_~ 1~. The average wage decreased 
slightly during the War, but from 1918 there was an increase. Over 
this whole period wage rates actually varied very little. 
Average Earnings per shift of all African Miners on the 



















1 11. 7 
1 11. 4 
1 11. 1 
1 11. 1 
1 11. 5 
2 o. 3 
2 2.5 
2 2. 1 
2 3 
Sources: Figures for 1911to1919, L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.193. 
Figure for 1920, G.M.E. (1921), p.29. 
First figure for 1921, M. I. B: (1922), Para. 168. 
Second figure for 1921, G.M.E. (1922), p.16. 
*The bonus of 5s. per month has not been included. 
Footnote (2) from previous page: In 1911, the cost of food, housing and 
compound expenses, pass fees etc. for each black worker amounted to 
a little over 9d. per shift.* By 1921 the provision of free quarters and 
food cost the mines 14d. per shift for each worker** (13d. in 1920, 
10. 7d. in 1919). Average cost of recruiting, however, had decreased 
(comparing 1915 with 1922, when practically the same number were 
recruited by the N. R. C.; the cost was 83s. lOd. per African in the 
former year as compared with 62s. 7d. in the latter).*** The total 
fixed cost of employing an African worker had therefore increased by 
far less than the difference between 14d. and 9d. 
* T.C.M., (1911), p.Lxxii. 
* * G. M. E. I (19 2 2) I p. 17. 
*** M.I.B., (1922), Para.92. 
(1) N. G. I. (1913), Para. 254. 
(2) ibid, Para. 255. 
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During this period, and especially since the outbreak of war, there 
had been a significant and continuous rise in prices. Using 1913 as 
the base year, the wholesale price index of South African goods had 
increased to 192. 4 (1) and that of All Goods to 223 by 1920. (
2
) For 
the same period, 1913 - 1920, retail prices rose by 55 per cent. (
3
) 
These indices do not, however, accurately reflect the depreciated 
value of African miners 1 earnings. ALbest,._Jhe_pgce index is a rough --------
measure of th.e..x_aJue_QfJn_gney: since it only tells us that a certain 
--~-·-· --~- - - . ·-----""----- ____ ........, __ . _________ --
_Qerc_e~nta.g.e_chan.mLhQ,i:;.....taken_place. in~the-power_of_mon~y_j:_o_b,uy: a certain 
fixed ass orJment-0f-~-eods-in-certa in-fixed-propor:t-ions. 
The assortment of goods and the weight attached to each good 
to denote its proportionate importance in expenditure .had different 
degrees of importance for Europeans and Africans / depending on their 
respective spending habits 0 There is' therefore I no index available 
specifically for the black miner. Commodities generally purchased by 
them had shown a marked increase in price during the war years (
4
) but 
our knowledge of their purchasing habits, quantity and combination 
purchased in the average year, is still very incomplete. 
(1) Source: Official Year books of the Union of South Africa, quoted 
by Katzen, p. 74. 
(2) Source: Schumann, C. G. W., The World Depression. South Africa 
and the Gold Standard, Maskew Miller, Cape Town, 1932, p. 27. 
quoted by Katzen, p. 24. 
(3) Katzen, p. 23. 
This increase of 55 per cent should be compared to the increase of 
10 per cent in average African miners' wages. Retail Price Index 
reflects changes in the price of food, fuel, light and rent. 
(4) See p.3 8. 
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The Chamber(l) alleged that the African miners' expenditure on "necessary 
clothing is small". Being otherwise cared for whilst in the employ of members 
of the Chamber, the value of _hJ_s_earnings _yva3 affecte_? __ <:_?!11Y .E~ the chan9e in --- ---
the prices of the _.clothing-he. bought. ..------- - --
An idea of the "necessar-y: clothing" may be gauged by the needs, 
agreed to by both the Union and Portuguese Governments, of a black 
Portuguese minero Before the war a "sufficient" outfit - two cotton 
blankets, a•shirt or sweater and a loin cloth - cost 18s. while the same 
articles cost 38s. by 1918. As he required a minimum of two sets of 
this outfit each year, the additional expense to the Portuguese African 
was, by 1918, forty shillings over pre-war prices. The cost of living 
increase over the war years, which the Chamber conceded, was thus-inore 
---------~ ~---------~ 
than 100 per cent. During the same _I?eriod _!~er~ had _b_e~~~ 1!1~rg_iI1al 
~--
.decrease in average earnings. ---- - -- - ' - -
In addition, und.er~-round miners regµir_ed)2.oo_t~- ;which were made 
available t~ them at' cost pric~, (2) By 1918 a single pair cost 20s. as 
compared with 12s •. 6d. before the war - on the assumption again of a 
minimum of two sets, the price increase to the African underground worker 
over the pre-war years was 120 per cent. 
w:;:r.. - .... . - - ·- ' 
The Chamber was even more unsympathetic to the hardships, caused 
by war- time inflation, of the black mil].ers 1 de2ende_nts. Apart from the 
increased prices of clothing, the family were allegedly in much the same 
position in 1918 as in 1914 - the increased costs of mealie-meal and other 
foodstuffs were balanced by the increased prices received for the cattle and 
other produce of the rural areas. (3) 
(1) T.C.M. (1918), pp.90,91. 
Statement by E .A. Wallers, President, to the Commissioner appointed to 
enquire into the unrest amongst Africans employed by the Johannesburg 
Municipality and by the Mines. 
(2) This practice of issuing boots and leggings as an advance against wages 
was first suggested by the Government. 
T.C.M. (1910), p.28. 
(3) The Chamber: explicitly assumed no "landless 11 African mineworkers. 
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It was contended that "in the territories, as in the towns, the increase --- .. 
in cost complained of by the native is not an increase (except in the case 
----~ ---~~~ - -~ -- ~--- - . - - -~ - - -
of s:;lothing) in the cost of indispensable articles making up his cost of 
living, but in the priq__e_of_luxuries ". The African miner had "a very considerable 
margin of wages as compared with the wages necessary to enable him and his 
family to live in their ordinary condition". 
On the basis of this argument, the Chamber considered itself justified ---------- - ~ - -- - - -~- -
in refusing its black workers' del'I!_ands __ f~~ ~!:lS'_~a~~~-~~ges_o Further 
grounds were_that_the industry could not. afford an increase (a number of ·-- -~--·-- . - -----...-~ .~ - - -·----~~-- _......-· -
mines would be forced out oLproductionLand that the African_miner received ----------- -· - . - -------- - . - -·----- -- . 
higher wages_than_.his_fellows employed on comparable work in industry. ---- -- - -· .- -~ ~· -·- .,...... ~ 
Piecework enables changes in the supply of labour to be reflected 
directly and rapidly in the wages earnedo If wages are paid on a piecework 
instead of a time-rate basis - in proportion to the "pieces" done or "by 
results" - a special inducement will be given to the worker to increase the 
speed at which he works in order that he may earn more in a given timeo 
Thus a system of labour remuneration which differentiates between one worker 
and another in respect of the effort each exerts, tends to stimulate higher 
labour productivity. By directly linking workers' wages with the results 
of their work, the qualifications of employees as well as the intensity of 
the individual workers' efforts may be improvedo 
In 1913, pay on a piecework basis as a proportion of total black wages 
varied from 66 per cent in some mines to as low as 13 Q 8 per cent in others, 
the average being only 330 7 per cent per mine. (1) 
The principa 1 obs tac le l hoyv_eyer.,-to_the extension of the piecework _ .----
system was the "maximum-average!.'.....prov.ision_in the_Native Recruiting-
Corporati.on's schedule of pay rateso For example, the maximum average 
for the numerically most important category of African labourer(2) was fixed 
( 1) No G . I. ( 1913) , Annexure 15. 
(2) Those employed on tramming and shovelling. 
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at 2s. 3d. per shift in 1913 0 that is, fixed so that the average pay of 
that class of black labourer did not exceed 2s. 3d. per shift. (l) To 
enforce this system fines were levied on those mines where the "maximum 
average" paid was above the scheduled rate. 
The purpose of the clause setting a maximum average was to prevent 
mines outbidding each other for the available supply of African labour. (
2
) 
It was introduced in order to safeguard the interests of low grade mines, 
to prevent "one mine attracting piecework labour to the detriment of 
another 1 by practically paying higher rates of wages than the latter I 
and thus competing unfairly for a fuller supply of natives". (3) 
The rationale was that if the wages of certain classes of labourers 
were paid on a piecework basis, other classes, whose output could not 
readily be measured, (so that a piece-rate was impracticable) would find 
themselves at an increasing disadvantage compared with those whose 
work could be remunerated by piece-rates 1 e.g. hammerboys whose 
output could be measured in inches drilled. Those paid on time-rates 
would be dissatisfied without daily remuneration equivalent to that earned 
by fellow labourers on piecework. Should their requests for time-wages 
roughly on a parity with piece-rate earnings be met, the general labour 
cost structure of the mines would be pushed up. This would imperil the 
future of certain of the low grade mines. 
It ~o~uld __ .9J?Pear_ tpat _many~min_es _were dissatisfied with the clause as 
it prevented them from making maximum utilisation of their labour force. 
There were cases where mines had made severe cuts in piecework rates 
solely in order to keep within this clause. (4) 
(1) N. G. I. (1913), Para. 263, Annexure 12 and 13. 
(2) ibid, Para. 269. 
(3) L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.207. 
(4) N.G.I. (1913), Paras. 263, 265, 266. 
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It was the contention of the Economic Commission of 1914 that the 
productive powers of the African miner were "being held in check ....• 
. (1)-"- -- ·-- ---·-· 
by the device of the maximum average". The Native Grievances Inquiry 
of 1913 concluded that the maximum average clause was "unsound in 
principle" (
2
) as it penalised efficient work. As a compromise solution, 
Buckle suggested that the maximum average clause be replaced by an 
agreed maximum per ton,_(3) a change which, in effect, would have 
given more scope for rational utilisation of labour and would have meant 
that "the only limit on the native 's earnings would be his own efficiency". (
4
) 
The strictures of the Commissioner seemed to be justified and his 
views were supported by the Economic Commission of 1914 (above) and 
the Dominions Royal Commission of 1914. In the latter(5) it is stated: 
"The object of the arrangement is to prevent undue competition 
between the various groups and to obviate the possibility of the 
richer mines attracting an unfair proportion of the available supply 
of natives. But the arrangement framed to prevent one mine out-
bidding another is made at the expense of the black worker and 
restricts the daily wage which a skilful or industrious native is 
able to earn by his toiL Although his individual performance 
may entitle him to a higher daily amount, this is not paid him by 
the mine manager if its payment would involve the mine in an 
infringement of the "maximum average" rule and expose it, 
consequently, to a heavy fine. It is obvious that a complicated 
clause of this kind cannot be understood by the individual worker 
whose pay is thus curtailed, and it is not, moreover, in accordance 
with the understanding at the time of recruitment, which is that the 
native shall be paid according to his capacity. The native thus 
considers himself as being defrauded of a just reward and regards 
the curtailment as a breach of contract", 
(1) Economic Commission of 1914, Para. 54. 
(2) N. G. I. (1913), Para. 269. 
(3) ibid, Para. 270. 
"Each mine should be free to pay its boys whatever it liked, provided 
that it did not thereby increase its present cost per ton for each class 
of work." 
(4) N.G.I. (1913), Para. 271. 
(5) Dominions Royal Commission of 1914, (Cd 7505 of 1914). Third Interim 
Report of the Royal Commission on the Natural Resources, Trade and 
Legislation of Certain Portions of His Majesty's Dominions, Paras. 62, 63. 
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Th_e_.mQ.):{j.m..um_a.ve.r.a.ge-claus.ELWas revised in February, 1914, and 
again in October, 19180 The maximum average for tramming and shovelling 
on piecework up to the 31st January, 1914, had been 2s. 3d., irrespecti~e 
of the percentage employed on such worko From 1st February, 1914, it 
became permissable to pay the men as much as 2s. 9d. according to a sliding 
scale based on the percentage of all the blacks employed on tramming and 
lashing o The smaller the percentage, the higher was the permitted maximum 
h 'f ( 1) average per s 1 to 
The .amendment of 1918 established provisos before a mine became 
liable to a penalty for paying a black worker in excess of the rate prescribed 
in the schedule, The mine was only liable if the rate laid down was "on 
average exceeded during any two consecutive months". Even in such an 
event the mine was still not automatically finedo Representations about the 
details of underground work could be made to a Committee of the N.R.C., 
which would decide on the action, if any, which should be takeno (
2
) 
These discretionary powers granted to members of the Native Recruiting 
Corporation changed the clause, according to the Low Grade Mines 
,Commission, so that "it is not open to the same serious objections as 
were previously directed against it", (3) 
Turning to the possible repercussions on the industry of the abolition 
of the maximum average clause u one may conjecture that if the form of 
remuneration had been tied to productivity increases with no limitation 
on the earnings of the African, then the efficient, better-trained and 
experienced African would have earned more without an increase in t_he 
average black wage costs to the mineso For example, direct costs per 
inch drilled would not be higher because the assumption is that above 
average output would be rewarded at the same average rates o We have 
assumed that the supply of labour would not have become regressive had 
the maximum average clause been abolishedo However, this assumption 
(1) LoG.M.C. (1920) 8 Para.2030 
(2) ibid, Para.205. 
(3) ibid, Para. 2080 
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is not essentiaL If the maximum average clause had been relaxed and 
the form of remuneration as outlined above adopted (tying increases in 
wages to increased productivity), then the African who, was, in fact, a 
target worker would spend less time on the mines achieving his income 
"target" o Although the "target worker" might spend less time_on_the, ----- . --:------
mines, the total work compl'eted-by-him-woula not have decreased due 
to the fact that productivity had increased. Moreover, if he spent 
less time performing productive services as great as those previously 
performed over a longer period, the mines would have saved a certain 
fraction of food and shelter costs, and in spreading the interest charges 
on the now more intensively used machinery over a larger output. (1) 
The opportunity of higher wages on the mines would have tended to increase 
the quantity of labour supplied at the expense of secondary industry and of 
the diamond mines (decreasing differential) and tended, at the same time, 
to decrease the costs of recruiting o (
2
) Part, at least, of this decrease in 
recruiting costs could have been passed on to the African in the form of 
higher real wages, In addition, increased productivity per head would 
(1) This, indeed, is consonant with the evidence of Maurice S. Evans 
before the Dominions Royal Commissiono Evans gave somewhat 
equivocal answers to questions whether the ease with which supplies 
of African labour were maintained at Kimberley, where higher piece-
wages prevailed, belied the backward-sloping supply curve, and in 
the end spoke up for higher wages not having the same effect of 
inducing effort on the part of an African, as on that of a white man. 
Nevertheless he insisted that African labour was used wastefullyo 
If the maximum average were removed 0 and "that labour was used 
to better advantage, I think they could do with fewer boys and the 
native labour would be more efficient. " 
Dominions Royal Commission, loc ciL, Part 11 (Cd. 7707), (1914), 
Qq. 7 0 8 - 7 2 0 0 
(2) The amount spent by the Witwatersrand gold mines on recruiting during 
the year ended 30th September,1913,amounted to± £600,000, which is 
between Sd. and 6d. per shift worked, The expenditure of the Premier 
Diamond Mining Corporation came to much less (3~d per shift), this 
economy probably being the result of the greater opportunity afforded 
the capable worker of earning according to his value. 
Report of the Economic Commission, ( 19 14) , Para o 5 L 
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would have reduced the total labour requirements for a given output. (1) 
It is true that certain classes of work on the mines, by their very 
nature, could not have been paid for on a piecework basiso The aim of 
not creating an excessive differential between the earnings of labourers 
who had to be employed on a time-rate basis and those paid piece-rates, 
in favour of the pieceworkers, could have been achieved by setting piece-
rates lower than productivity rates, and, as opportunity offered, bringing 
time-rate earnings more closely into line by providing increases out of 
the residue. (2) In this way, the wages of all classes of African labourers 
could have risen with increasing productivity, at no cost to the mines 
beyond what was covered by the increase in productivityo (
3
) This would 
not have interfered with the centrali.sed recruiting of African labour through 
the Witwatersrand Native Labour Association and the Native Recruiting 
Corporation. A more extensive system of payment by results could have 
been quite compatible with the maintenance of what has been described 
(1) The·e-vidence of S.A.M. Pritchard, at that time Director of Native 
Labour, before the Dominions Royal Commission confirms this: "I 
believe that if the contract or piece...;rate system were to be extended 
the mining industry would have immeasurably better results from the 
native labour force than they have today. There can be no doubt that 
the efficiency of the native labourer has increased of recent years, 
but there is plenty of room yet for improvemenL If the opportunity 
is given to them, their efficiency will further improve and the mining 
industry will be enabled to rely upon a much more contented and 
efficient force of native labour, with the probable result that they 
will be able to do with less labourers than they employ in normal times". 
Loco cit, Part 11 (Cdo 7707}, (1914), Qq 2483. 
(2) This might, in fact, tend to nullify the abolition of restrictions on piecework 
rates b.ecause the incentive to additional labour might not be high enough. 
If this is so then no harm is done although it is difficult to imagine 
circumstances where no advantage would be taken of the incentive to 
greater effort, however, small that incentive might beo 
See example of Nourse Mines, N.G.I. (1913), Para. 265, and Crown 
Mines, N.G.I. (1913), Parao 2660 · · 
(3) The Director of Native Labour made a suggestion along similar lines to 
the Mining Industry Board of 1922, (Para. 154): 
"The extension of piecework and devising of means whereby natives 
working in gangs may share with their European supervisor in any bonus 
earned by the gang, no restrictions being placed on the earnings of a 
native" o 
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as the monopsony of the mines in respect of African labour. What is more, 
should the supply of labour have, in fact, proved to be non-elastic, then 
the quota.="sysct:emJ.l)_could have been applied to ensure that the low-grade _;..----
mines did not suffer from a relative labour shortage, without necessitating 
the maximum average system to protect them against the competition of the 
better-situated mines where it would have been easier to achieve higher 
piece-rate earnings. 
Since the fixed cost of employing each African formed a high proportion 
of the total cost, it was much in the interests of the mines to secure maximum 
productivity from them. On the average, the cost of recruiting, (2) as 
estimated by the Economic Commission of 1914, was "between 5d. and 6d. 
per shift worked". (
3
) Cost of providing,Jood amounted to approximately 
8d. per shift. (
4
) Food costs plus recruiting costs therefore were - - - - -- - -· 
approximately ls. L 5d. per shift per African worker. The statistics 
available in 1913 did not permit the calculation of the costs of housing an .. -----~ ..... -- - ............ 
African mineworker, nor of the ,fixe_d~pl..tal charges, costs of supervisJQil 
. ---:-:-_ -- .. 
underground, administrative expenses and so .on. Neglecting these 
_. ---~- ~-------------- - ---
important components, the variable (wage) cost, which in 1913 averaged 
(1) Under the centralised system of recruiting African labour for the mines, 
a quota system had been adopted for distributing the available supplies 
of African labour. 
See N.G.I. (1913), Para.405. 
(2) Not all the African miners were recruited. During the year in question, 
of the 244, 343 blacks engaged for service, 95, 140 were voluntary 
workers, i.e. "natives who presented themselves at the mines for 
employment, and who were not enlisted through any agent". 
N.G.I. (1913), Para,526. 
(3) Although Africans recruited by the N.R.C. (57,109 in 1913), worked for 
an average of 171 shifts (N. G. I. Para. 534) while those recruited by the 
W.N.L.A. (42,680 in 1913) were contracted for one year (313 shifts 
vide Para, 528, N. G. I.) so that their recruiting costs were spread over 
a larger number of shifts than the N. R. C. Africans / the figure of 
approximately 5~c per shift (Report of the Economic Commission of 1914, 
op cit. , Para. 51) appears to be an average for all Africans employed 
on the mines whether they were recruited or voluntary workers. 
(4) An African labourer fed for 6 weeks full-time work Le. 30 shifts, costs 
the mine about £L 
N .G. I. (1913), Para. 350. 
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ls. 11. 075d. per shift, (l) was not more than abou~~%_of the total. 
If these other elements of cost were included, it is clear that fixed costs 
would emerge of equal importance, if not more important, than the direct 
wage-costs of black labouro 
The Native Grievances Inquiry ventured that an increase in the use of 
piecework pay as a proportion of total pay would probably increase the 
average wages of the African labourers without any ensuing "cost" per 
inch drilled to the Mine Companieso (2) This hesitation to be more categorical 
suggests a rather cautious approach as the three experiments which the 
Report quoted, where mines had substituted piecework for day's pay, were 
all favourable. In all the cases, the mines were "satisfied that they (were) 
getting value for money" o ( 3) A spokesman for the Native Recruiting 
Corporation, Mr. Taberer, suggested to the Economic Commission of 1914 
that the African be paid "wherever possible according to his capacity". 
He said: "I think the mine natives on day's pay do not, naturally, over-
exert themselves, provided they do sufficient to justify its being marked 
on their tickets. This is about all you can get out of themo If you pay 
them according to their capacity, I think you will get very much better 
work out of them, and therefore you will be able to do with fewer natives". (
4
) 
.__ _______ . 
This suggestion was supported by the Departmental Committee on 
Underground Mining Contracts of 1917 ~ and by the Low Grade Mines 
Commission of 1920. "An extension of the piecework system" the former 
Commission stated, "would tend to more fully develop the capabilities of 
the natives and promote greater contentment amongst them" (5) The Low 
(1) N.G.I. (1913), Para.255. 
(2) ibid, Para. 259, "Probably .....•• " 
(3) ibid, Para. 260, 261, 262. 
(4) Report of the Economic Commission (1914), Para. 54. 
(5) Departmental Committee on Underground Mining Contracts of 1917, 
Parao 110, quoted by L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.200. 
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Grade Mines Commission recommended the extension of the piecework 
system - "efficiency would be improved and the effect of a shortage of native 
labour reduced". (1) 
The conditions of production under which the incentive effect of piece-
·- - - -- - - - - - --- ' (2)-
yvork-remuneration--pro_duces maximu~b_our productivity are twofold. --The first is the "existence of quantitative output indexes which correctly 
show labour input by the workers". Such an index may exist for "production 
workers" and not for "auxiliary workers", however, in so far as increases 
in productivity depend on the co-operation of large teams" ~ 3 ) the relevant 
piecework rate me'7lsurement is the group rather than the individual. And 
the..e_econd i§.. that there be "a practical possibility of higher output by the 
workers with the particular machinery and technology applied" without 
conflicting with the interests of productiono For where "the worker has 
attained the planned productivity or output and he cannot exceed it because 
of the specific conditions of work, there is no longer any reason for 
stimulating a rise in output". 
As we have seen the African miner on the South African gold mines 
fulfilled both these requirementso 
The African who came to the gold mines was a migrant labourer who . 
returned home after a certain period of worko The provision of married 
quarters was limited in number and available only to those black workers, 
such as clerks, mine police and other semi-skilled men, whom the mines 
did not want to loseo The employment of migrant labourers, however, ---· 
(1) L.G.M.C. (1920), Paraol99-. 
(2) Ka pus tin, E. I. 0 Wages as an Important Condition for the Growth of 
Labour Productivity in the U.S. S. R., pp. 288 and 289 in Labour 
Productivity, edited by John To Dunlop and Vasilii P. Diatchenko, 
McGraw Hill, 1964. 
(3) Maksimilian Pohorille, "Productivity and the System of Labour 
Remuneration, pp. 223 and 225, in Labour Productivity, edited by 
John T. Dunlop and Vasilii P. Diatchenko, McGraw Hill, 1964. 
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~QosJ which the industrY. recognised as early as 1911. The 
Executive Committee Report of that year spoke of the "process of continued 
replacement" of the unskilled labour force and of "the factor of the training 
of raw recruits which means an increase in the working costs necessitated. 
by the employment of a greater number of natives than would be necessary 
if more permanent conditions of employment prevailedo In addition to 
this drawback there is the greater risk of accidents through the training 
of novices at the work, and the extra cost involved in the prevention of 
accidents" 0 (l) The mines did not, however, encourage married quarters, (
2
) 
despite the advantages of a permanent and stable labour force, because 
they were "a source of liquor and other vices" o (
3
) It is unlikely that 
the government of_the_day-would have opposed an extension of the system 
- -- (4) - - - -
of married quarters o The industry, therefore, because of its reluctance --- .-- - -. 
to. experiment, lost the OPI::>Ortunity (which it was in the later years denied - ~· ------ -- .. 
on grounds of policy) of stabilising its labour forceo 
The supply of labour is not merely the number of men available for 
work at a given wage rate during any given period, but, more accurately, is 
measured by the amount of work these men wi.11 be able to achieve. The 
productivity of labour 0 which is not unrelated to the duration of time spent 
continuously at work, is a factor of prime importance in determining the 
supply to an industryo 
As we have seen, the gold mining industry recognised the truth of this 
argumenL Although it appeared to have made little effort to encourage the 
(1) T.C.M. (1911), p.XLii. 
(2) By 1930 only some 1, 500 out of nearly 200, 000 Africans employed on 
the gold mines of the Witwatersrand were accommodated in the married 
quarters. 
Native Economic Commission of 1930, Typescript of Evidence, Po 9123, 
quoted by Sheila van der Horst, "Some Effects of Industrial Legislation 
on the Market for Native Labour in South Africa", S .A. J.E., 19350 
(3) N.G.I. (1913), Para. 1340 
(4) Under the provisions of the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911, 
the sanction of the Native Affairs Department was required for the 




stabilising of its African labour force by providing facilities (married 
quarters) for the men to become permanently resident on the Witwatersrand, 
the indust_ry _saw the value of employing men of experience, In pursuit of 
this goal the industry adopted a "graduated" scale in December, 1919, to 
induce African miners to remain longer at work and to shorten their period 
of absence at home. Every African who continued to work after having 
completed 180 shifts received a bonus of 5s. per month; the bonus was 
continued if he returned to work after an absence from work of not 'more 
- than four IIlQil.ths ... _ ----
Another factor which influences the productivity of labour is the 
.... - . - -,,- -- ___....,.- - - -- - - . - -· -
extent to whi_ch capital is combined with labour. Any productivity increases 
resulting from a change in this combination should be partially attributed to 
the co-operation of other factors of production; nevertheless,an increase 
in the input of capital per labour unit would improve the productivity of labour 
and thus indirectly decrease the demand for this labour. Hicks states: 
"IJ_ capital increases e or technical knowledge improves I the direct benefits I 
- ""--- --=----- -'~- "--.-o- ~ ~'---
of this imp)'."ovement will be increased by an indirect effect through the 
efficiency of labour". ( l) 
The advent of the rock drill meant that with a far smaller number of 
Africans employed in breaking rock, not only was more broken than with 
the same number of men formerly working on hammers, but the adoption 
of labour-saving methods also tended to overcome the difficulty of the 
shortage of black labour. (Z) Two machine-boys were reported to break 
as much ground as 12 hammerboys (
3
) so that the large increase in the 
number of rock drills in use, from 3,587 at the end of 1910 to 4,596 at 
the end of 1911, an increase of approximately 28 per cent in one year, (
4
) 
must have considerably eased the supply problems of the gold mining industry, 
(1) Hicks, p. 96. 
(2) T.C.M. (1913), p. Lvii. 
(3) N.G.L (1913), Para.257. 
In addition, as hammerboys averaged 2s,4d. per shift in 1913 as 
against 2s. 0. 5d. per shift by machine-boys in that year, the rock 
drill also effected a big reduction in underground working costs. 
(4) T.C,M. (1911), p.LxxiiL 
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A considerable proportion of the time spent underground by the African 
----~--------- --
labour force was (and still is) not fully utilisedo_ Under the Mining 
Regulations, the working area had to be "examined and made safe" by a 
white ganger before the black labourer could begin worko Again, at the 
"conclusion of the shift the black miner had to cease work in sufficient time 
to allow charging and blasting by the white workmeno This was aggravated 
by the fact that the African descended underground before the European, 
and, in addition, only came up after him. {l) These regulations, being 
"habitually disregarded", were the cause, on some mines, of frequent 
convictionso (
2
) It is evident that these Mining Regulations were in urgent 
need of amendmenL Full use was not made of the long period spent 
underground by the time-rate_worker - several hours more than were necessary 
for the shift to be marked on his tickeL The pi.ece-rater's problem was 
more complexo Paid by the result, the wasted time waiting for the white 
ganger to arrive and carry out his inspection severely restricted his earning 
capacityo The pieceworker, such as the hammerboy, was not paid unless 
he completed a certain minimum work and the shift was not included towards 
the completion of his contract unless he had been paid for iL The delay 
in being allowed to work could 0 therefore 0 not only cost the pieceworker 
the opportunity of increa_sed pay u but could result in him receiving no pay 
at all for working for several hours and having, consequently, to prolong 
his period of service on the Witwatersrando 
The hours of work underground "at the face" for the European workmen 
were limited by the Mines and Works Act of 191L By 1917, the white 
miners finally succeeded in obtaining an amendment to the Mining Regulations 
- --·-- ---- --
to restrict their working time to a 48-hour__yv:eek0 -'!.bank-to ·bank", with a short 
shift ~n ~turdays. (3)· This curtailment in the hours of work of the white 
(1) Interim Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission, Parao 32. 
(2) N. Go L (1913) / Parao 250 
(3) T.CoM. (1917), p.45. 
Alsou according to the Low Grade Mines Commission, on Sundays there 
was a short shift as well as on Saturdays. Bank to bank included the 
time occupied going to the working place from the surface of the mine, 
and returning from the working place to the surface. 
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supervisor aggravated the problem and accentuated the need for a re-
arrangement of underground work as the effective working time of the 
African was "estimated to amount to no more than an average of about 
5 hours" 0 (l) although he frequently spent as much as ten hours underground. (
2) 
To this end the Low Grade Mines Commission recommended that the 
"existing Mining Regulations and the methods of working should be 
.. 
altered so that a larger proportion of the time spent underground by natives 
could be rendered available for work". (
3
) This "would help considerably 
to counterbalance the shortage" of African labour and "enable them to earn 
higher wages .•..•... without in any way increasing the time spent 
underground by the natives". (
4
) The Regulations were subsequently 
amended (
5\0 permit "natives to en:;;-;-~e~~:~orking plac-:-prior~t;-th~ --- - - - ~- --- - -- -- -- - -- - . - - --- - - -
arrival of the white miner, who has charge of them, provided these places --- -- -- - --·------ ------ - -- -- -
have been p~e~iousl; examined and made safe by another_competent_miner". (5) ---- ------ -
This was usually done on the night or early morning shifto 
The level of compenscation-is indirectly an aspect of remuneration for 
work and in an industry such· as mining, where deaths and accidents are 
frequent, it is a very real variable. Buckle investigated the African 
claims that their rates were insufficient and found 6 indeed, that complaints 
as to their inadequacy were well-founded. He said: "I do not see why 
natives should not be compensated on the same basis as Europeans 6 i.e. 
probable loss of earning power". (
7
) An African miner permanently unable 
(1) - Interim Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission, Para. 32. 
(2) M.I.B. (1922), Para. 108. ~ 
(3) Interim Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission 6 Para. 33. 
(4) ibid, Para. 36. 
(5) The regulations were promulgated in July and further amended in 
November, 1921, 
See G. M. E. (1922), p. 49 for the full amended regulations. 
(6) M.I.B. (1922), Para. 108. 
The amendments to Regulations 102 and 106 also increased the 
number of places which one "competent miner" could deal with by 
providing that, unless he deemed it necessary, his African assistants 
could continue their work without his actual presence. 
(7) N.G.L (1913), Para.384. 
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to resume work which was the same or similar to that which he was engaged 
upon at the time of the accident or illness received from £1 to £20. (l) 
The Chambers''. defence for this disparity between black arid white levels 
of compensation was that the Africans "are unskilled labourers, and when 
prevented from underground employment are not debarred from any unskilled 
occupation, especially farming, to which they are accustomed". (
2
) 
Total incapacitation, that is permanent inability to perform any class 
of work, entitled the African miner to receive from £30 to £50. If a 
miner died because of an accident not due to his own "serious and wilful 
misconduct" or because of illness, his dependants received from £30 to £50. 
This sum had been increased by £10 by the Workmen's Compensation Act of 
1914 and was the only change in levels of compensation which followed the 
severe criticism of the Native Grievances Inquiry Commission • 
..... --
A possible argument for these disproportionate rates of compensation 
for total incapacitation and death paid to Africans may have been that the 
kinship system and the social obligations it defined differed from that of 
the urbanised European. In time of incapacity or old age, the African 
was more fortunate than the European in that he and his family were 
ensured collective support through tribal custom, while the European 
generally would have to fend for himself. 
Despite this mitigating influence of the extended family structure 
of tribal life, it would have been in the interests of the mines to rectify 
the disproportionate rates of compensation paid to its black workers to 
compensate them more generously on the basis of their probable: loss of 
(1) Compensation to be paid Africans was laid down in Act 15 of 191 L 
See N.G.I. (1913), Para,362, 
Also T.C.M. (1918), p.93. 
(2) T.C.M. (1916), p.69, 
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earning powero Improved rates of compensation could have made mine 
employment more "attractive". (l) 
Even on the assumption of the backward sloping supply curve of 
labour (as well as of a normal supply curve) the low scales of accident 
compensation might well have been a factor which tended to keep down 
the supply of African labour. Indeed this tendency could have applied 
especially in the case of the target worker who might have felt that he 
would be prevented from achieving his target because of an accident 
or illness. 
We have seen that the industry did not always act in its own best 
interests with respect to increasing this supply as it was not consistent 
in taking every opportunity of improving the productivity of its black 
workers. Mechanical devices were developed specifically for this 
purpose, yet other avenues stabilising the labour force and the use of 
incentives (extending the piece-rate system) - were not fully explored. 
In m~ny respects the._Chamber~s-actions_s.erye.d to de:i;>ress its supply of 
African labour • .....__,_ ____ - ' 
It is evidence to the Low Grade Mines Commission of 1920, 
the Chamber suggested(
2
) two methods for increasing the suppfy of 
~---------~~--- --------·----·~ 
black labour to the industry: - - - .. 
"(1) The elimination to some extent of the present restrictions 
.imposed by regulation, and by agreement and custom arising 
I . 
therefrom, which together comprise the "colour bar", on the 
employment of natives on those classes of work at present 
largely monopolised by Europeans. 
(1) Efforts to reduce the death rate were made in order to improve the 
image of the mines. On the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, the 
fatal accident rate per 1, 000 for whites was 3. 59 in 1910 and L 87 
in 1921. For coloureds the rate was 4. 29 in 1910 and 2. 33 in 1921. 
This gradual .downward tendency must have had some effect on the 
supply of both black and white to the mines. 
G.M.E. (1922), p. 29. 
(2) T.C.M. (1919), p.223. 
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(2) The removal of the prohibition of the entry into the Union of 
natives from north of Latitude 22° south." 
The second proposal mentioned above had been made frequently for 
(1) 
some years. The history of the embargo derives from the years prior 
to 1909, when small numbers of Africans had come to the Witwatersrand 
from the areas in question. In 1909,the W.N.L.A. opened recruiting 
offices in the tropical areas of Nyasaland, British Central Africa, Mozam-
bique, Quilimane and Tete so that the numbers increased, the largest 
number on the Rand at any time being 23, 785. In 1913 it was discovered 
that the death rate of tropical Africans from pneumonia and similar diseases 
was unusually high so that the Union and Portuguese Governments prohibited 
the entry into the Union of further "tropicals". 
High mortality was apparently the only reason for this restriction. 
However, the vaccine discovered by Dr. F. S. Lister "and the great 
efficiency in reducing the pneumonia rate amongst mine natives, (
2
) as 
well as the considerable improvement of hygienic conditions of natives 
in recent years ..••...... convinced the Chamber that it is most unlikely 
that the rates of mortality which previously prevailed would be found still 
to prevail. "(
3
) The Chamber suggested that the Government should 
allow the importation of over 15, 000 "tropicals" for work on the Rand. 
The Low Grade Mines Commlssion of 1920 (4) u~animously recommended 
the temporary modification of the prohibition of the employment of blacks 
from the north of Latitude 22° south. (
5
) Lister's vaccine and the advance 
(1) See T.C.M. (1917), p.67. 
(2) The mortality from pneumonia had decreased from about 13 per l, 000 
in 1910 to 2. 04 per 1 0 000 in 1920. 
T • C . M . ( 19 2 0) , pp. 6 8 and 6 9. 
(3) T.C.M. (1919), p.226. 
(4) Interim Report of the Low Grade Mines Commission, Para. 45. 
(5) L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.126. 
The recommendation was "dependent on the condition that the native 
labour obtainable in the Union should be used to the greatest advantage 
by utilising more fully the time spent underground by them, and by the 
extension of the piecework principle wherever practicable". 
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in general hygienic conditions had entirely altered the problem so that 
the Commission suggested the importation of about 5, 000 tropical Africans 
as an "experimental batch" so as to arrive at a definite conclusion as to 
the effects of the drug. (l) Permission might be granted for the introduction 
of a larger number if the results of the experiment were satisfactory. 
With regard to the first proposal (i.e. the partial elimination of 
the colour bar), it was suggested that with the removal of restrictions, 
the Union African would more readily come to the mines for work and would 
perform his work .more efficiently because of improved opportunities to 
advance in status and earning power. 
The Chamber did not recommend the complete elimination of the 
~ 
colour bar, for to do so was not "within the bounds of practical politics". 
Attention should be given instead to those directions where increased 
scope of employment for the black workers would not "seriously or even 
detrimentally" effect the whites. 
In fact, the Chamber only went so far as to recognise that there 
"are employed on the mines a certain proportion of natives who, by reason 
of their long mining experience, character· and ability, could be much 
more usefully employed than they are at present, were it not for the 
restrictions referred to". (2) Its suggestions were limited to ways of 
giving these "more expert natives" increased opportunities of exercising 
authority and responsibility, mainly in the capacity of authorised assistants 
to white supervisors. In this way the Chamber hoped to increase its 
supply and improve the efficiency of its black workers. 
It would have been unwise to give the impress inn that, if permitted, 
the Chamber was in favour of a general supplanting of white labour by 
' black. This would have had severe repercussions on the industry and 
would have antagonised the white miners into refusing co-operation on 
(1) L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.56. 
(2) T.C.M. (1919), p.224. 
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the limited proposals put forward. Thus, the proposal to relax the colour 
bar and not abolish it, was probably what was most practicable and not 
what was desired by the industry. 
Custom, public opinion and trade unions were "at least as powerful" 
as the Mining Regulations in maintaining the colour bar. (l) That the 
industry had a healthy respect for these forces is evident from the Chamber.'s 
statement to the Moffat Commission (2) that "much more important than the 
Government Mining Regulations is the force of custom. Public opinion is 
not prepared to see the substitution of coloured or native workers for white 
· skilled and semi-skilled workers, and any attempt to employ the non-white 
workman in mining work at present occupied by white men would cause a 
strike of the white employees on the mines, who would be supported by 
the great bulk of the white population of the Witwatersrand". 
The Chamber did apparently believe, however, that very few Africans 
were capable of skilled or semi-skilled work. In refusing the demands of 
the black strikers of 1920 for the removal of the colour bar, the Chamber 
warned (3) that "it should be clearly understood that the removal of the 
colour bar, even if it were possible, in opposition to the wishes of the 
great bulk of the European population of the Witwatersrand, would 
advantage only the comparatively small number of skilled or semi-skilled 
natives; to the great mass it would make no difference whatever". 
j 
There was, admittedly, a divergence of opinion amongst mine managers 
as to the advantages of employing Africans on certain semi-skilled work. 
In August, 1917, before the introduction of the status quo agreement, only 
73 coloured men (25 on the surface and 48 underground) were employed 
in sharpening drills. (
4
) When the status quo restrictions were terminated 
(1) L.G;M.C. (1920), Para.165 •. 
(2) T.C.M. (1918), p.92. 
(3) T.C.M. (1920), p. 89. 
(4) T.C.M. (1918), p.92. 
Africans were included under coloured men. 
"' 
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by the Chamber after the European strike of March, 19 21, many of the 
managers adhered to their previous practice of employing whites even 
(1) 
though they were now able to employ blacks. Nevertheless, by 
March, 1922, over 500 white men had been .replaced by blacks and, of 
this number, 157 were employed as drill sharpeners on the surface and 
none underground. It was estimated that a further 100 whites would be 
displaced(2) when the industry was again in "ordinary working order;', 
This apparent disparity in the number of Africans employed on drill-
sharpening - 157 after restrictions were lifted for one year, and only 
73 (48 underground) before the restrictions had been imposed - may be 
attributed to the joint pressures of public opinion and custom. 
The quantitative comparative importance- of the legal and non-legal 
' 
forces maintaining the colour bar have been estimated by the Low Grade 
Mines Commission. By 1919, 7, 057 persons were employed in 32 
occupations prescribed by the Regulations for white men. In addition, 
as a result of custom, public opinion and trade union pressure, another 
19 semi-skilled occupations (in which 4, 020 persons were employed) 
were also effectively reserved for whites. (
3
) 
The Commissions of the day did not equivocate in their views on the 
colour bar. The views of the Native Grievances Inquiry of 1913 have 
already been quoted. (
4
) The Economic Commission of 1914 was of the 
"opinion that there should be no legal barriers to prevent natives, or 
others of the non-white population, from engaging in any work above 
the grade of unskilled". (5) Similarly, the Low Grade Mines Commission 
held "that the legal restriction now in force should be abolished", as 
(1) M. I. B. (1922), Para. 22. 
(2) ibid, Para. 21. 
(3) L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.164,165. 
(4) See pp. 29 and 30. 
(5) Report of the Economic Commission ( 1914), Para. 57. 
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"From the point of view of abstract justice as between man and man there 
is nothing to be said in their favour". (1) And finally the Mining Industry 
Board of 1922(2) said: 
"There would, in our opinion, however, be no justification 
for closing to natives of the Union the door to the semi-skilled 
occupations which, as already pointed out, are the only ones 
in which there is any likelihood of their being able to compete 
with white labour. They are already shut out by the colour bar 
regulations from certain occupations, and we cannot recommend 
that any further statutory restrictions should be placed upon them. 
We agree with the views expressed by the Relief and Grants-in-Aid 
Commission of 1916, paragraph 73, that -
'such artificial methods will do more harm than good. 
So far from remedying the evil they aggravate it. They 
encourage the white man to rely upon artificial aids 
rather than on his own resources. They also interfere 
with those economic principles on which alone a true 
and lasting solution of the problem must depend'. II 
After the status quo agreement was terminated in 1921, the Mining 
Industry Board concluded that "its abolition after the strike was fully 
justified" (
3
) because "many of the Europeans, who were employed at the 
end of 1921, were redundant, and others were inefficient . .,(
4
) Its basic 
(5) 
approach was, indeed, that much of the semi-skilled work could 
"be done almost, if not quite as efficiently, by the native, so that, 
in view of the great dis parity in the wage, there will necessarily be 
a strong inducement on the part of my managers to make use of black 
rather than of white labour 6 " 
Between 1914 and 1918 the figures for 44 mines show that while the 
average number of black and white employed had increased by approximately 
the same percentage, the total remuneration to whites had increased by 
24. 5 per cent and of blacks by only L 4 per cent. Also, the additional 
(1) L.G.M.C. (1920), Para. 178. 
(2) M.I.B. (1922), Para. 30. 
(3) ibid, Para.32. 
(4) ibid I Para. 46. 
(5) ibid, Para. 23. 
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expenses incurred in employing Africans - recruiting, feeding, hospital 
charges, etc. -had only increased marginally (1. 1 per cent). (l) A 
comparison of the cost structure between 1914 and 1920 is even more 
illuminating. While the share of stores of the total costs had remained 
approximately the same, African and coloured wages had decreased their 
share from 23. 5 per cent in 1914 to 19. 0 per cent in 1920 and European 
salaries and wages had increased by a similar proportion, from 31. 5 
per cent in 1914 to 35. 9 per cent in 1920. Over this period African 
wages had increased by 12 per cent as against the 58 per cent increase 
in European wages. (2) In addition, the white miner collected an impressive 
amount of side benefits. (3) 
The increased wage bill was not at the expense of dividends which 
showed remarkably little fluctuation over the period 1912 to 1920 in spite 
. (4) 
of the industry's heavy war burden. Only for three years, 1917 to 1919, 
were total dividends below £7 million and only during 1918 below £6 million. 
For four of the remaining 6 years, dividends were £8 million or over. (5) 
(1) T.C.M. (1919), p. 233. 
(2) T.C.M. (1921), p.151. 
(3) Additional privileges ranged from a paid holiday of at least two weeks 
per annum to the establishment of an 8 hour day. Special war 
allowances which were consolidated into an addition of 8s. per day 
were only decreased during 1921 to 4s. per day. 
(4) From 1914 to 1918 the industry paid a special war levy, increased 
prices for mine supplies and charges for the realisation of the gold 
mined as well as war bonuses to certain European miners and 
allowances to workers on active service so that its burden of costs 
for these years amounted to approximately £16, 500, 000. 
(5) G.M.E. (1921), Para.86. 
5, 
TlJVO DECADES OF. EXPERIMENT AND 
INNOVATION" 1920~ 1940, 
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By the time the Nationalist - Labour Pact Government took office 
in 1924, labour relations on the Witwatersrand gold mines had jelled 
into the pattern we are familiar with today. Important rec"ommendations 
by Government-appointe9 Commissions which had been aimed at ameliorating 
the position .of the so-called Low Grade Mines (and indirectly the conditions 
of employl\lent of the black worker) had, with one notable exception, been 
ignored. Even this exception, namely an amendment of the Mining 
Regulations, to enable underground work to commence before the arrival 
of the white miner, became the first term of reference of the Mining ------Regulations Co_I!lEJ.i_s~_i.Qn,_appointed within a few months of the new 
Government's coming into power. The second term of reference, the ratio 
between European and African employees, was also a matter which had 
been discussed by previous Commissions. The Mining Regulations 
Commission's views were diametrically opposed to those of the Low 
Grade Mines Commission of 1920 and the Mining Industry Board of 1922. 
The 1925 Commission recommended a return to the strict underground 
--------~- ~:.........--- - -- -
conditions before the Regulations were relaxed, and the re-enactment 
....---._- - -- ------ - - (1) 
of the colour bar regulations by amending the Mines and Works Act of 1911. 
-------- ~ - - - - - ---
Both these important recommendations were acted upon. In respect of the 
implementation of its recommendations, therefore, the Mining Regulations 
Commission of 1925 differed from its predecessors. 
The Low Grade Mines Commission was appointed in June,1919,to - . -- -- - ~ . . 
report upon the position of the marginal gold mines of the Witwatersrand, 
the effect of the possible closing-down of these mines and the increased 
utilisation of the available African labour force. It reported that, since 
it had been appointed, the position of the low grade mines had been materially 
altered by the restoration of a practically free market for gold bullion, (2) 
(1) Regulations made in terms of the Act had been declared ultra vires 
in 1923. 
(2) During World War I gold was sold at 85s. to the Bank of England. 
In July, 1919, a new arrangement·was made under which the gold 
output was sold on the best possible market in London. 
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which, together with the depreciation in the value of the South African 
pound, had resulted in gold being sold at such a substantial premium 
that most of the formerly marginal low grade mines were now able to ----- ---~- ----- -- -·-- -- -
mine at a considerable profit. If the premium on gold had not come --- --· -- ~. --
into effect, it was estimated that 25 mines would have worked at a loss 
• - -· r • •• ~ -
or at a working profit of 2s. per ton or less during the three months . - (- --- - ------- - --- - . 
September to November, 1919. l) From an employment and expenditure 
point of view these comprised more than half the industry. 
As a result of the war there had been a great rise in the costs of 
~----------
production, due mainly to an increase in the price of stores and materials, 
and higher European salaries and wages. The "chronic shortage of 
native labour" (
2
) - the number available being estimated at only 70 per 
cent of that required for the full working of all the mines (
3
) - meant that 
the industry was unable to operate at full capacity. These factors had 
all contributed to the crisis within the industry 9-nd the calling of the 
Commission. Although the urgency for remedial measures had largely 
disappeared, the Commission's recommendations were made on the 
assumption that when the price of gold returned to normal the position 
of the low grade mines would be worse than they were prior to the. appoint-
ment of the Commission. 
In pursuance of this goal the Commission recommended, (
4
) inter alia, 
- -
the abolition of the legal colour bar, the re-arrangement of underground - ---·. ---
(1) L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.11. 
(2) ibid, Para.70. 
(3) ibid, Para. 15. 
(4) The Commissioners were very cricial of the treatment of the black 
worker in South Africa, and their recommendations were primarily 
aimed at providing increased opportunities for their self-improvement. 
"It is clear", they wrote, "that the well-being of the native in its 
fullest sense is not sufficiently considered by the white population of 
South Africa in the conditions under which they are employed. The 
chief consideration is the profit and convenience of the European, and 
the native is beginning to feel and to say, with considerable justice 
on his side, that he is being exploited. " 
L.G.M.C. (1920), Para.137. 
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work in order to increase the effective working time of the African miner, 
the temporary employment, as an experiment, of Africans from North of 
.Latitl1de 22° South, the extension of the piece-work system in work 
performed by Africans and the shortening of the African contract period. (1) 
The only recommendation acted upon was for the re-arrangement of 
:1~d_ergr,cn,md work, when certain amendments were made to the Mining 
Regulations in November_, 192L Although the legal colour bar was 
, declared ultra vires in 1923 this was not at the instigation of the Government 
but __ as a result of the action~- of a Mine Manager. (2) 
' --~------- - ' -
The amendments to the Mining Regulations which increased the 
~ . 
effective working time of Africans underground were, furthermore, 
enacted only after the difficulties foreseen by the Low Grade Mines 
'··· - . 
Commission had become a reality. The price of gold had dropped (from 
130s. in February,1920,to 95s. per ounce in December,1921), while working 
costs (
3
) had continued to rise. 
The Chamber of Mines nevertheless claimed that, while the 
ame~dments to the Mining Regulations had brought some relief, it 
was essential to 1'.1odify the status quo agreement of 1918(
4
) in order 
to prevent marginal mines from closing down. Negotiations between the 
South African Industrial Federation (representing the European mine workers) 
and the Chamber of Mines failed. The white miners went on strike, beginning 
in January, 1922, and ending on 17th March, 1922. 
(1) L.G.M.C. (1920),Para.232. 
(2) The point at issue in the test case was the refusal of Hildick-Smith, 
underground manager at Crown Mines, to dismiss an efficient African 
driver engaged on rock haulage. 
(3).! Working costs which averaged 17s. lld. per ton for all mines in 1913 
'-'had increased to 25s. 8d. for 1920 and 1921. 
--M.I.B. (1922), Para. 6. 
(4) See pp.35,36. 
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After the collap~>e of the strike _th~ amended regulations were 
implemented and the status quo agreement abolished. According to 
"'·~ ----e ---· -= ' ---- - ·- ~ 
the l,-9~-~Gra_g~ ()re_ Commission of 1930, the results of this reorganisation
1
/. ~ 
were an increase in the scale of opera tlons (from 23 , 43 7, 19 6 ton milled <\( 
in 1921 to 26,765,126 in 1923), the mining of lower grade ore (reduced /\ 
/ \ 
from an average 6. 762 pennyweights per ton in 1921 to 6. 651 in 1923) 
and a considerable reduction in costs (working costs per ton milled in 
19 21 were 25s. 8d. , iri 1923, 20s.). The average number of whites 
employed decreased from 20,825 in 1921to17,666 in 1923.(l) 
I) ( 
l ~\ 
The strike and the way the strike had been suppressed caused 
considerable bitterness amongst the white mineworkers on the Witwaters-
rand. In order to placate those who felt that the European miner was being 
unfairly treated, the Government appointed yet another Commission in 
April, 1922. 
The Mining Industry Board of 1922 was charged, inter alia, with an 
t~-- ·- -:__---_-:::-::--- - -- --·=---- --
investigation into all aspects of the abolished status quo agreement of 
1918 and the desirability of regulating the ratio of white to black labour 
on the gold mines. The 1?29..L<:t's_ views .. rm_tl::l~ J~l-~_c:i.gre_ement were 
unequivocal. Its abo~ition had_b_e_e_IJ.5ully,~justifiedJ' (i)_as·-~t ~.ispensed 
~-i;h "~edundant a~d in·e;f~~i~~t ~e~. "(3) Similarly, .the Board. did not see 
its way clear to recommend,ing the establishment_ of.a legal ratio between 
the- white and black miner. (4) 
In addition, although it made no suggestions as to how economies 
could be affected, the Board reiterated certain of the Low Grade Mines 
Commission's recommendations for the promotion of efficiency, such as 
the extension of piecework amongst African labourers. (5) 
(1) The figures were for the large mines of the Witwatersrand (excluding 
Sub-Nigel). The number of white employees was exclusive of medical 
officers. 
Report of the Low Grade Ore Commission, U.G.16 of 1932, Para. 9. 
(2) M.I.B. (1922), Para.32. 
(3) ibid, Para.24. 
(4) ibid, Para. 48 
(5) ibid, Para. 153. 
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Another suggestion on similar lines was that the bonus for long 
..., - --'- ---'" -~ 
service, first introduced in 1919, should be substantially increased. 
The Board stated: "Men of experience are of more value to the industry 
than raw hands, and should be remunerated accordingly. " ( l) The bonus, 
however, was not increased, but, on the contrary, from lstJanuary,1924, 
onward, became more difficult to earn as it was made payable ohly after 
the completion of 270 shifts, instead of 180 as before. 
--~-------=-L-~----< ••• •- -
This was in keeping with the decision to institute nine month 
,-_ --
contracts Jor all recruited black labour from the Union and Basutoland, 
~~-=--=-=~-
even though the Low Grade Mines Commission had explicitly recommended 
a shortening of the contract periodo The longer contract ironed out 
seasonal fluctuations in the labour supply and meant a reduction in the 
average cost of obtaining labour. The saving in 1924 as a result of 
this change was £103, 000 - a reduction in recruiting cost of 22 per cent. 
The cost.s of recruiting by the Native Recruiting Corporation had, in fact, 
been progressively and considerably reduced during the ten years of its 
,~xistence. Comparing 1915 with 1922, when approximately the same 
number of Africans were recruited, the cost was 83s. lOd. per man in the 
.former year as compared with 62s. 7do in the latter. (2) 
This re-organisation was undertaken with a view to reducing the costs 
of mining gold, and the full benefit of this lowering of costs per head per 
African recruit by more than 30 per cent was not apparently passed on to 
the black miner, His share was comparatively modes to Over the same/ 
period his average cash earnings per shift had risen by approximately \ 
14 per cent (from lso lL 4d. to 2s .. 2o 2d.), an increase which was not 
excessive when the rise in the cost of living and possible productivity 
improvements were taken into accounL 





However, in its evidence to the Ec_onomic and Wages Commission of 1925, 
(1) M.I.B. (1922), Para.169. 
(2) ibid, Para. 920 
\ 
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the Chamber did cite improvements in productivity on one mine (1) and 
suggested, moreover, that this was not an isolated instance. 
On the Simmer and Jack Mines (2) the results for September, October 
and November, 1924, compared with those of the corresponding months of 
1921, showed an increase in the tons milled per European underground, 
of 42. 8 per cent; and per African underground, of 19. 2 per cent. 
Working costs per ton milled had furthermore been reduced by nearly ( 
33 per cent. 
The reasons given for this "startling" improvement - the Company having 
~ - - ............... ~ 
converted a working loss, excluding the premium on gold, of over £90,000 
r --· --
for the year ended 30th June, 1921, to a working profit, excluding the 
- - -- - - -- - ~ ·- - - - - - - - > - - ( ) 
pr~miYE1. on gold, of a similar amount for the_ ~~~n_ded_ 30th June, 192~ 3 
~- .-~ -~--- -
- were the introduction of the "overlapping shift"; the increased efficiency 
,,__ ....... ___ - -
in the use of jack hammers; the amendments to the Mining Regulations ---r --- -~ - - --~ ~ 
already discussed; and the general reorganisation and rationalisation of 
underground work. 
The ·~verlapi;;ir1~9".,)W.ift~.~:), introduced in late 1922, would, according 
to the Manager of the Simmer and Jack Mines, have been opposed by the 
European Miners' Union before the strike. Its main advantages were that 
it eliminated the night shift and made possible a working time which 
continued uninterrupted for 13. 3/ 4 hours o 
(1) Evidence of the Gold Producers' Committee of the Transvaal Chamber 
of Mines to the Economic and Wage Commission, 1925, Statement 
No. 5, Para. 4 and Annexure "A" o 
(2) The Simmer and Jack Mines were apparently chosen because the 
number of whites employed underground on these mines decreased 
by 1 per cent between 1921 and 1924 (from 273 to 270), while the 
percentage decrease for the industry over the same period was 
12 per cent (from 9 , 3 7 6 to 8, 2 85), 
(3) If the gold premium for 1921 (£212,000) and 1925 (£48,000) were 
taken into account, the Company's total profits increased from 
119, 000 in 1921 to £139, 000 in 1925. 
(4) The shifts worked were from 6 a.m. to 2.15 porn., bank to bank, 
and from 11. 3 0 a. m. to 7. 45 p, m. , bank to bank. 
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With the same type of jack hammer and steel as were used in 1921, 
but working in narrower stopes, i.e. stopes producing 14 tons per fathom 
broken as compared with 19 tons in 1921, the tons broken per jack hammer ---
shift had increased by 242 per c_ent_fr.om~l.9._2) to 1924.. This marked change 
was thus mainly attributable to productivity improvements of both black 
and white miners. 
The general reorganisation of work, together with the effective 
extension of the black miners-1-working-time underground, (l) also 
contributed to the improved stopfog figures for jack hammers. The 
Chamber of Mines attached "great importance" to the amendments as 
they extended the hours available to the African labourer for actual 
drilling by up to 40 per cent. (2) 
The discussion above of the effect of change brought about on the 
Simmer and Jack Mines between 1921 and 1924 would seem to prove the 
contention of the Chamber of Mines that they were long overdue. However, 
,.-~-- .... ,.._ 
the spirit of innovation,..20_i_ch_had begun tq_filter_down to_ the African_ 
labourer, was not to be allowed to continue. 
Ti;ie_P._act Government_~hich_assumed office in June, 192_4, did not 
waste time in honouring its election promises. -------- ____..- - ........... _. - A Commis~ion was . . 
appointed in November, 19 24 0 to inquire into the effect on the accident 
rate and health conditions of the Amended Mining Regulations dealing 
with the supervision of underground working places, as well as into the 
respective spheres of work of white and black. 
In its Report, the Mining Regulations Commission summarised the 
~ . --- --· 
essential differences between Regulation 106 and the amendment, Regulation 
102, introduced in November, 1921, as follows: 
" •.•.• whereas the former required the ganger or miner in charge 
of a gang of natives previously to commencing work himself to 
examine and make safe the working-place before admitting his 
(1) The direct result of the Amendments to Regulation 102. 
(2) T.C.M. (1924), p.55. 
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natives to it, the latter allows any competent person other than 
such ganger or miner to examine, make safe and admit the native 
to, the working-place before the latter's arrival, and .•....•.•• 
though under the old regulation the work of making safe was 
required to be done under the ganger's or miner's direct supervision, 
which was interpreted to mean in his actual presence, the existing 
one permits the ganger or miner if he thinks such work does not 
require his personal attention to leave his natives to do it, in one 
place, while he himself may be working in another. " ( 1) 
On the basis of statistics for fatal and general accidents on the 
Witwatersrand Gold Mines for 1913-1924, the Commission concluded that 
'<;. - -... --- ... ------ ~ - -· .... ~ ... 
"the recent tendency_to.entrust nati~es with work formerly confined to 
~ - (2) 
European workers (had) had an adverse effect upon safety conditions. " 
- .. ------ --· - . 
There was the qualification, however, that the statistics could "easily 
-- ----- -~· -·· -
be overestimated as a means of accurately gauging safety conditions 
UJ?..2.-nJhe.mines, "(:3)---;~ite_this important res~rvation, the Commi~sioners 
favoured the amentjment_oLthe_existing Regulations in order to ensure greater 
(4) 
safety for the workers. -............. 
It was argued that at about the same time as the introduction of the 
Amended Regulations in November, 1921, there had been "a startling break 
in the downward tendency" (
5
) of the accident death rateo As is evident 
from the following table quoted by the Commission, (6) the fatal accident 
rate per 1000 persons on the Witwatersrand gold mines did decline gradually 
until 1921 and then began to rise: 
(1) Report of the Mining Regulations Commission, U.G.36 of 1925, Para. 6. 
(2) ibid, Para, 59. 
(3) ibid, Para. 60, 
(4) ibid, Para. 10. 
(5) ibid, Para. 8. 
(6) Report of the Government Mining Engineer for 1923, quoted by the 
Mining Regulations Commission, op cit, Para. 59. The year 1922, 
during which mining operations were largely disorganised owing 
to the strike, was left out of consideration. 
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Year Fatal Accidents per l, 000 Total Accidents per 1, 000 
1913 3. 81 11. 08 
1914 3.22 10.55 
1915 3 0 17 10.41 
1916 3.16 10. 19 
1917 2.64 9.89 
1918 2.55 9.94 
1919 2.43 11.89 
1920 2.45 13. 60 
1921 -2. 28 23.21 
1923 2.59 16.94 
1924 2.63 18.08 
Although the fatal accident rate per 1, 000 persons had increased by 13. 1 
per cent between 1921 and 1923, and again by 1. 1 per cent between 1923 
and 1924, the causal relatio:rg;J:i-J:_p_ J:>~t'V"!~~~t_he amended regulations and . 
the accident death rate was not conclusively proved. The figures above _______ ..__-, ....... ~~-- -- ------ _ .. 
were apparently for the "coloured" workers only. The total accident 
death rate for all workers, black and white, on the Transvaal gold mines 























This table shows a sharp increase (13 per cent) in the rate from 1921 to 
1923, then a gradual decrease from 1924 until 1926. Between 1926 and 
1927 the rate shot up by 30 per cenL After 1927 there was no discernible 
trend and the rate fluctuated. Indeed the fluctuations in the death rate 
over this whole period were so great that it is difficult to come to any 
definite conclusion about their causes. 
(1) T.C.M. (1931), Pol22. 
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The fact that the total accident rate had, furthermore, shown a significant 
and prolonged tendency to rise since 1919 could hardly be attributed to 
the Regulations which were amended in November 1921, and adopted only 
after the strike of 1922. The argument, therefore, that the employment 
of Africans in work formerly reserved for_ Europeans_ had an adverse effect 
:~on safety an;~:a~th_-;o~~-i~~~~-~:s_ both specious and flimsy. (1) -------- - .. 
Just as evidence about inadequate enforcement was difficult to 
substantiate, similarly there is a lack of evidence that more rigorous 
enforcement followed the Report. There is, however, a prim a facie case 
that there was, in fact, some tightening of the Regulations, for there was 
once m.2~~ a 90I}J!:.9.,ve__rsy in 1943 about t~- nee_~_}_o !e}_cix _!he_IE_ <:-~~~)) ~ 
the sc_ope of_l\.frt9an employment. (2) _ ~ t ) 
.. --...,. ---- - ---
As_ a result of the reorganisation of employment upon the mines after 
(" . --
the 1922 strike, European workers were eliminated at the expense of 
---........ ---~ ~ _..,,. -·=-- - - - ... 
Africans. According to the Chamber oLMines., _this_ was because of the 
improved efficiency of machines and the discharge of "redundant and l ( 
in~ffi~~en-t me_n. '.' (3) T,!:~ -t~~qLnum~e~-of European men-employed decreased / , 
from 20,542 in 1921to17,357in_19~3.,(4) Africans employed increased from\\ 
- - . - - . I 
1~O,365 to 176, 1_8_0,,_while-the-t-ons-mHled-rose-from 23 million to 27 million ( 1 
ov~r_ the same peri~d. The decline in the number of European employees, {i 
however, was seen as a "deliberate policy" of favouring "cheap coloured 
(1) The lowest accident rate did not correspond with the highest ratio 
of white to black nor was the reverse true. It is impossible,therefore, 
to say with any certainty what the causes were of the increase in the 
accident rate since 192L 
(2) Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission, U. G. 21 of 1944, 
discussed above. Also see Evidence of African Mine Workers' Union, 
Friends of Africa. 
(3) Mining Regulations Commission (1925), Para. 91. 
(4) The ratio of blacks to whites employed had increased from 8. 3 : 1 
in 1921 to 10. 1 : 1 in 1923. During 1924, however, the number of 
whites employed increased markedly so that the ratio was 9. 7 : 1. 
The ratio had fluctuated over the years and had been as high as 9. 1 1 
in 1916. 
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labour", (l) as the Commissioners were "unable to conclude either that the 
Europeans in question had become redundant or that their dismissal was 
justified. "(2) 
The African had displaced the European in certain semi-skilled 
occupations because of his "almost phenomenal advance in efficiency 
during recent years" and "the enormous economic advantages the former 
(3) 
(possesses) over the latter. " These "advantages" were the compound 
system, the sanction of criminal prosecution on desertion, the lower level 
of compensation for injuries and phthisis, the ability to live on a far 
lower wage than that required by the European, etc. (4) 
To avoid " .•..•• the elimination ••..... of the European worker from ( 
the entire range of mining occupations," (5) the Mining Regulations Commission 
......,,_._ ""i - ~ _...,. __ - -.-......_.,__ --
recommended the re-enactment of the legal colour bar by the amendment 
\. 
of the Mines and Works Act of 1911. (5) This would affect safety conditions· 
and also "(counteract) the force of the economic advantages ••.... enjoyed 
by the native". (7) 
There was disagreement as to whether the Chamber of Mines had, 
in fact, taken advantage of the Hildick-Smith judgement. The Mining 
Regulations Commission was sceptical of the Chamber's "avowed intentions" 
not to encroach upon the colour bar. "We have very little doubt", they 
wrote, "that the vast majority of such employers will in the absence of 
legislative prohibition, continue their policy of replacing European by 
native workers, whenever economic considerations appear to call for such 
substitution and those of health and safety are not glaringly opposed to it. "(8) 
(1) Mining Regulations Commission (1925), Para. 98. 
(2) ibid, Para. 97. · 
(3) ibid, Para, 115. 
It is surely strange that disabilities should be referred to as "advantages". 
(4) Mining Regulations Commission (1925), Paras. 100-103. 
(5) ibid, Para. 119. 
(6) ibid, Para. 127. 
(7) ibid, Para. 129. 
(8) Mining Regulations Commission (1925), Para. 123. 
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Yet the ultra vires decision, according to the Economic and Wage Commission ---- -~ ~ --- - - - - ·-
of 1925 ,_'..'..h<3-_d not ma_9e any significant differe~ce in th~ actual_ practice of 
--the mines. Changes in the ratio of Europeans to natives in employment have 
taken place, but these have been due to a reorganisation of work which the - - - -- - -- ( ) 
colour bar regulations would not have prevented." 
1 
The views of the 
Nati~e Economic Commission of 1930-32 were even more emphatic: "The ---------- -- - - -
force of custom was sufficiently strong to prevent any change in the existing 
position after that judgement. "(2) 
In spite of the contrary advice of former Commissions, the Mines and 
Works Act was dul~ amended along the lines recommended by the latest 
Commission, by the Mines and Works Amendment Act No. 25 of 1926. 
--~---~ . -· . ·.. -
- - ' 
It stated that the Governor General could, by way of regulation, restrict 
the is sue of certificates of competency in any province or area. Africans 
and Asians (3) were excluded from those entitled to certificates. The full 
scope of the Act is· summarised(4) by the Native Economic Commission of 
1930-32: 
"This Act authorises the Government to make regulations providing 
that certificates of competency in the occupations of mine managers, 
mine overseers, mine surveyors, mechanical engineers, engine drivers, 
miners entitled to blast, and of such other classes of persons employed 
in, at, or about mines, works and machinery as the Governor-General 
may from time to time deem it expedient to require to be in possession 
of certificates of competency, shall be granted to the following classes 
of persons only: (a) Europeans, (b) persons in the Cape known as Cape 
Coloured or Cape Malay; (c) persons in the other Provinces who, if 
they were in the Cape would be regarded as either Cape Coloured or 
Cape Malays; (d) the people known as Mauritius Creoles, or St. Helena 
persons, or their descendants born in the Union. The Act also provides 
that regulations under any other paragraph of section 4 of the main 
Act of 1911 may restrict particular work to, and in connection therewith 
impose duties and responsibilities upon, the classes of persons 
mentioned above, and may apportion particular work as between those 
(1) Economic and Wage Commission (19 25), Para. 211. 
(2) N.E.C. (1930), Para.843~ 
(3) The term "colour bar" is a misnomer as competent Cape Coloureds, 
Cape Malays, Mauretian Creoles and persons from St. Helena are 
included. 
(4) N.E.C. (1930), Paras. 838a839. 
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classes and other persons and may require such proof of efficiency 
as may be prescribed. 
The occupations covered by section 4 of the main Act are mines, works, 
buildings, roads, railways and other structures and enclosures on or 
above the surface of the ground. The term "works" include mechanical, 
metallurgical 0 reduction, dressing, petroleum, salt, drug making, lime, 
and pottery works; sugar, flour, and saw mills, and any places where 
machinery is erected or used, and dams, reservoirs, and other 
appliances for conserving water or for producing or transmitting energy, 
or for transporting water or material over the same, with the exception 
of dams or reservoirs outside proclaimed fields and used solely for 
agricultural purposes or for a public service. " 
The Regulations made in terms of this Act were one of the major issues 
discussed by the ;Low 9rade Ores Commission of 1930. The Gold Producers' 
Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines proposed that the policy 
determined by the Mining Regulations be reversed so that the number of 
European underground workers should in future be kept "as low a figure as 
is consistent with the safe conduct of mining operations. "(l) The Committee 
alleged that African underground labourers, who returned home for long 
periods, did not contract silicosis to the same extent as the European 
workers. (2) Its proposal was justified both on humanitarian and cost 
grounds. The Gold Producers' Committee estimated the effect of the re-
organisation that would be possible underground on two mines if the 
~. -- -~·· ~. T 
Regulations were relaxed and the scope of African employment extended - the 
( - .. - - -
number of whites underground would. have been reduced by 44 per cent in one 
r -- (3) 
case and 50 per cent in the other. 
- -·~---------
The-Mines-and-Works· Act had-thus been amendetjJn 1926 partly on the 
-~--- -
pretext of safe_guarding _the European miner from accidents. The Regulations - ·- .. ~ ~ 
were promulgated for reasons of social policy, being measures to prevent 
accidents, leading to invalidity and premature deaths, by restricting the 
issue of certificates to competent miners ... The Gold Producers'· Committee_ 
was now adyocaJ_i_ri.g._a_relaxation -9f.-. t~e . .:n~asures~ga~i:i for similar.reasons;_ 
(1) Low Grade Ore Commission (1930), Para. 90. 
(2) N.E.C. (1930), Para. 833. 
(3) Low Grade Ore Commission (1930), p. 54. 
I 
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i.e. to reduce the incidence of invalidity and premature death consequent 
upon exposure to the constant hazard of underground employment upon the 
gold mines, viz. silicosis and its sequelae. 
The issues at stake were summed up in the following statements made 
in evidence before the Commission: 
"In reply to the contention that the Regulations referred to 
(Mines and Works Regulations) hamper freedom or organisation 
by imposing a colour bar, we admit that if the Mines are to be 
run purely in the interest of profit taking without any national 
consideration, it would be well to accede to the Chamber of 
Mines' desire and remove the words 'scheduled person' from 
the Regulations. If on the other hand it is considered that 
the Chamber of Mines represents interests which work national 
property on licence under conditions carefully devised to protect 
the white civilisation of South Africa then it would be well to 
retain the words 'scheduled person' in the Regulations • .. (1) 
The latter argument was not accepted; and the Commission aided with the 
Chamber in recommending that the Mines and Works Regulations be amended 
"in such a manner as will permit trained natives to perform such operations 
underground as they are capable of performing without detrimentally affecting 
the safety and health of all underground employees. "(
2
) As with a.11 the 
~ ---~ 
other Commissions-which had-fa-voured-the relaxation of the legal colour 
- .... - -· ---- - - .:.. , 
bar, the Low Grade Ore Commission might, for all practical purposes, 
never have discussed the issue . 
..,.__ ___ ............... ~ ................ I ·-r· 
Nothing had as yet been done to implement the recommendation of 
the Low Grade Mines Commission of 19 2 0 that the embargo upon the impor-
tation of blacks from North of latitude 22° South should be removed. Since 
the Commission's Report, moreover, the problem of supply had become more 
acute. 
(1) Evidence of Mr. R. Tennant, General Secretary, S.A.A. Engine 
Drivers' and Fireman's Association quoted by Donald R. Reich. 
Low Grade Ore Commission (1930), pp. 91,92. 
(2) ibid, Para. 104. 
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An analysis of the African labour employed on the gold mines of the 
Witwatersrand shows a regular seasonal movement. (1) Portuguese 
~C...illl.S~,i:) recruited for a comparatively lengthy period:7erved as a 
steadying factor. The average period of service of Portuguese men was 
' -
approximately 18 months, while the period of service of the other Africans 
was approximately 8 months. In addition, the East Coast miner was 
numerically of considerable importance to the industry. .Approximately 
4_~_Rer cent of the_ black Jabour force of the Transvaal mining industry 
for the years_l9.20.-22~~) came from th~ East ~~a~t. 
During 1923, the industry restricted its engagement of Portuguese 
-- --.. ---. ~ - ____... - ~ - - ~ - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
labour on representations by the Union Government. This was to provide 
employment for the Cape Colony Africans temporarily out of work because 
of the depression in that area, and also, apparently, to increase European 
employment by diminishing the black labour supply. __ ~_!_the 1?_~9inning of 
F§bruary:,) 9 24 ,-recruiting· was-temporarily suspended in Portuguese Ea st 
_Af~~ca ,-( 4~ but was continued ~gain in 19 26 ,. the industry only being allowed 
to employ those_engaged_by_the-W. N .. .L.A.~The supply _was again limited 
__ ...;.._-c ---- ' . - - - -
by the provisions of the Mozambique Convention of 1928. Under that --- ---- - y-----· -'--
convention, the maximum number of men from Portuguese East Africa North 
of latitude 22° South that could be employed by the gold and coal mines 
of the Transvaal was reduced from 107, 000, employed before the convention 
came into force, to 100,000 on 31st December, 1929, and by reductions 
of 5,000 each year, to 80,000 by 31st December, 1933. (
5
) 
(1) Low supply in December which rose and reached a peak around April. 
(2) South of latitude 22° South. 
(3) T.C.M. (1922), p.79. 
(4) Report of the Inter..: Departmental Committee on the Labour Resources 
of the Union., An. 89 of 1931, Para. 37. 
(5) Interim Report of the Low Grade Ore Commission, U .G.16 of 32, Para. 24. 
The Convention was revised in 1934, an additional 10,000 men being 
consented to in 1935. In 1940 the maximum was raised to 100, 000~ 
the minimum remaining at 65, 000 as in the Convention. 
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1'~51mber. claimed compensation by asking for relief from other 
restrictions for the disadvantages imposed by the Convention, on the 
grounds that there was no prospect of the mines maintaining a labour force 
---~_........,. - ·--- - - --- ~ - ........_.. ____ _ ~ ...._ - - - .. 
from the Union and Protectorates large enough to make good the loss in .------ - - -~- - - ~· .... ... - - ~ ....- . - - . .,.._ --~ 
Portuguese workers. In 1,.931., th~Jntes-_Dep~IJ!~t.,?l Committe~on the 
Labour Resources of the Union found, in fact, a distinct shortage, mainly 
of a seasonal nature, in mining areas. The analogy of a reservoir with 
an "outlet at a certain level" was used. This level was variable and 
could be temporarily raised or lowered according to the seasons. "A 
larger total outflow (could) only be procured by permanently lowering 
the position of the outlets ••.••....•• the stimulation of the desire on the 
part of the tribal natives for more of the material benefits of civilization 
will have the effect of permanently lowering the level of the outflow and 
thus increasing and stabilising the labo~r supplies. ,,(1) The analogy led 
to the conclusion that the detribalised African would not work for longer 
spells if offered higher wages. Wages did not act as an inducement in 
the usual sense to the African. "Leisure (was) ••.....•... a real 
constituent of welfare and he only (broke) away therefrom when it (was) 
' 1 II (2) essentia to earn money. 
With these views of the Inter-Departmental Committee before them, 
the Low Grade Ore Commission of the same year discussed the Chamber's r - -
r~r_:i.~wed proposal for the removal of the restrictions on the employment of 
the so-called "tropicals". Although the supply of African labour was 
·--(3) - -
"ample" at that time, the position was only temporary. It was primarily 
due to the general economic depression which reduced the scope of employment 
for Africans with other employers, to an influx of applicants for employment 
out of the reserves, due to the realisation by Africans of poor prices for 
(1) Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Labour Resources 
of the Union, op cit, Para. 80. 
(2) ibid, Para. 52. 
(3) The President said that the industry had been "embarassed by its 
abundance. " 
T.C.M. (1931), p.38. 
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their produce by those who might otherwise have stuck to agriculture, as 
well as to the improved organisation, and thus recruiting, of the Native 
Recruiting Corporation. 
Recruiting had taken place in Nyasaland as early as 1903 but had 
been suspended owing to the high mortality rates at the end of January ,1906. 
During that year it was decided that the men who wished to proceed to work 
independently should be assisted. After August, 1906, the W. N. L.A. was 
allowed to operate in Portuguese East Africa, North of latitude 0 22 South. 
However, the mortality returns for these men were so high during 1911 and 
1912(l) that recruiting in those areas was stopped under the provisions of 
the Immigrants Registration Act of 1913. --- ----. 
Since then there had been such important medical advances that the -----·---
Low Grade Ore Commission_of-1930· supported-the-views _of both the--Lo~ 
Grade Mines Commission of 1920 and the Mining Industry Board of 1922 -- ----:..........- ----------that the restrictions-on the mines employing Africans from North of latitude 
---------- ' - 2 -~ ' -
22° Soutb~should_be~r.emoved-.i.J · The maximum number to be employed 
was determined by the recruits lost through the application of the Mozambique 
Convention, i.e. a maximum of 5,000 during 1931, 10,000 during 1932, 
15,000 during 1933, and 20,000 thereafter. (3) It was recommended that 
permission to the gold mines to employ men from these areas be granted on 
condition that special health precautions were taken and that the men be 
allotted primarily to the marginal mines. 
Soon after the Low Grade Ore Commission reported the recurrent 
recommendations vis-a-vis the employment of "tropicals" were given 
(1) Death rates per thousand per annum for "tropical" Africans were 64. 8 
and 47. 6 in 1911 and 1912 respectively. Amongst "non-tropicals" 
the corresponding rates were 23. 0 and 19. 9 for 1911 and 1912 respectively. 
Interim Report of the Low Grade Ore Commission, op cit, Para. 34. 
(2) ibid, Para.39. 
(3) ibid, Para.45. 
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Government approval. In Novembero 1933, the Government gave authority ,..--- - -
for the employment of an experimental batC:l]_ o!,2, 00_0 Africans .. from North 
of latitude 22° South. (1) The experiment(2) was judged to be "very 
--- - ----~3- - • -· -· 
satisfactory .....••••• the Tropical Native (who was) unaccustomed to 
industrial life would a priori be expected to be much more prone to 
disease as well as accidents ......•. results (were) up to any reasonable 
• II (3) expectation. By 1935 the maximum was increased to 5, 000. --. ___ -~-~ ____.-~~ - . As the 
accompanying chart indicates, the-supply-to_the_ipdustry increased 
. - -- ---- --- ---~· 
progressively especial!y: from 1937 onwards, largely due to declines 
---.:;___ ----- --- --- - ~ 
. i11 the disease and death rates (~and to i_mproyed hygienic co~~i-tio-ns. (5) 
- . ~ -
The only subsequent limitations placed on recruiting were those imposed 
by the authorities in the relevant areas themselves. (
6
) 
(1) Employment of these men began in January, 1934. 
(2) The mortality for all respiratory diseases during the course of the 
year long experiment was 6. 14 per 1, 000 for Bechuana "Tropicals", 
5.29 per 1,000 for Rhodesian "Tropicals", 3.24 per 1,000 for 
Bechuana "Non-Tropicals" and 3. 54 per 1, 000 for East Coast Africans. 
The death rate per thousand was 14. 74, 10. 58, 10. 92 and 9. 26 for 
the above groups respectively. 
T.C.M. (1935), p.25. 
(3) T.C.M. (1935), p.56. 
(4) For example, the disease death rate during 1939 amongst all 
"tropical" Africans was 5.27 per 1,000 per annum as compared with 
8. 60 in 1938. This decrease was largely accounted for by the 
reduction in the pneumonia death rate from 3. 41 per 1, 000 per annum 
during 1938 to 1. 00 per l, 000 per annum for the following yearo 
T.C.M. (1939), p. 22. 
(5) The treatment of Nyasa Africans on the mines was referred to in 
enthusiastic terms by J.C. Abraham, Senior Provincial Commissioner, 
Nyasaland. He wrote: " .....• no expense is spared, and whatever 
science can do is being done, to ensure the maximum degree of health 
for tropical natives employed by the Rand Mines Group, which employs 
all the Nyasaland natives engaged under the experiment. " 
Report on Nyasaland Natives in the Union of South Africa and in 
Southern Rhodesia_ by J.C._ Abraham, 193 7, Para. 16. 
(6) See Chapter 7. 
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By 1940 the_ ~~n:1Ee~ __ eip:ployed from North of latitude 22° _South was 
nearly 23, 000, accounting for over 6 per cent of the total African labour 
~--"--- - -0- '!"" ~, --~- ~T -&-- - "" -- ... .-• .. "• ""a " .. T .... 
on the gold mines during that year. However, by then the new Mozambique 
....... - --- .._ _____ -"' -- -- -...... -- ......-.=..-~- _, _ _.,..... -- -~-- -"""-- ~ ... 
Comze)1tion 9f 1934 pefffiitted the employment of up to 100, 000 men from 
Portuguese East Africa. Originally recruiting of "tropicals" had been 
advocated in order to compensate for a decline in the availability of 
Africans from the East Coast. The industry thus had approximately the 
same number of East Coast blacks that came forward in 1930, as well as 
a considerable number of "tropicals'.'. 
The_p_olicy_ of allowing recruiting in are?s. North of latitude 22° South, 
therefore,made available a larger supply of African labour to the gold 
--------.. - T - -· --- " --- - -·---- -· - - - - - , 
mining industry than was originally intended. Instead of resorting to 
..___ --------- - -
wage increases to add to its total supply of black workers, the mining 
.L~dustry was able to expand its sources of recruitment and so rely on its 
old standby, "cheap native labour". 
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I The Lansdown (l) Commission was not formed as a result of the Union 
I 
Government's spontaneous desire to improve conditions of the black workers 
dn the mines, but was rather its response to demands by the African miners 
and by other organisations which took a special interest in African affairs. 
Whilst the Government might have preferred to shelve domestic issues to 
cloncentrate upon the war effort, the smooth running of the gold mining 
itdustry formed an important part of this effort and the efficiency of its 
b~ack labour force could have been imperilled by a too marked deterioration 
ii real wages under wartime conditions just as surely as the industry could 
+ve been Injured by too steep a rise in labour costs. . 
I 
i 
An organisation claiming to represent the Transvaal African Congress (Z) 
ahd calling itself the "Committee to Organise African Mineworkers" 
' 
! 
approached the Government towards the end of 1941. rwo significant 
c~tegories of African workers - ~he minework~rs and agricultural lab~urers 
-1had been excluded from the provisions of the ~ost of living allowance (3) 
and the organisation now requested the Government to extend its provisions 
t - - - - -- -
tJ the former group. (4) 
I - -
'I This request was not, however, successful. Indeed, there is no 
record of the Government Is reply, or I in fact' if a reply of any substance 
hld been sent. The Comm~t:e: under the title of the "African Mine Workers' 
uh ion", subsequently requested-the··Minister-of-Labour, Mr. W. B. Madeley, 
I - ---------~ 
(1) Report of the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages Commission on the 
Remuneration and Conditions of Employment of Natives on Witwatersrand 
Gold Mines and Regulation and Conditions of Employment of Natives 
at Transvaal undertakings of Victoria Falls and Transvaal Power Company, 
Limited, U.G. 21of1944. 
(2) A forerunner of the African National Congress (A. N. C.) 
(3) Promulgated under War Measure No. 28. 
(4) Evidence of African Mine Workers' Union toW.N.W.C. (1943), 
Annexure "B". 
Letter to the Prime Minister, Field Marshall J.C. Smuts, of 12th 
September, 1941 signed by G. Radebe (Chairman) and A. Msitshana 
(Hon. Secretary). 
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on the 9th January, 1943, to order the Wage Board to investigate the 
- -~ - -•-T - •" ----~-- ... . - ~--(Ir--
Mining Industry. 
The activities of the Wage Board, constituted under the Wage Act, , - ... .... ... - ... - ~ - -- ·--- -~ 
No, 44 of 1937, had had a substantial effect on the wage levels of .... _ 
unskilled workers within the Union. In terms of Section 2 (2) of the 
Act, farm labourers, domestic servants in p~ivate households, and 
Government employees (including the Provincial Administration and 
Railway Service}, were excluded from its operation and consequently 
from any of the wage determinations. (
2
) Thus under Section 4 (l)(a) . 
-91!J-nvestiga!io~ into the conditions of African Mine Workers and a 
wage determination for the industry did fall within the scope of the 
Y{~ge~Board. Shortly afterwards, -on the l?th-Februar)r;-1943, the 
Government appointed the Witwatersrand Mine Nati'!es' Wages Commission. (
3
) 
In addition to the African Mine Workers' Union, several representative 
bodies had agitated for an improvement in the conditions of service of 
mine labourers. The men themselves_had .s-hown--..-Signs_of_losing patience - .,. - --1-- . ·- -- -- ... 
with the prevailing conditions - unrest was being experienced on. several ------ - -~ - ~ ~--..... ..,... ·- - ~ - -~~-- --- .. -
mines, The strike of §OO_urrciei:gr.ound workers which broke out on 
!~January, 1943,.,. on the Langlaagte Estates gold mine was symptomatic 
~- -
of the general feeling of dissatisfaction, The strike lasted nine days. 
(1) Evidence ofA.M.W.U. toW.N.W.C. (1943), Annexure "C". 
Letter to the Minister of Labour, Mr. W. B. Madeley, of 9th January, 
1943, signed by James Majoro (Hon. Organiser/Secretary}. 
The advantage of a Wage Board enquiry was that the Wage Act made 
provision for the appointment of a representative of the workers_' 
trade union to the Board. 
(2) There were certain further exceptions of a minor character under 
this section. 
(3) The Minister had replied to the request of 9th January on the 18th 
of the same month to the effect that "he was keeping the matter 
in mind". 
Evidence ofA.M.W.U. toW.N.W.C. (1943), Annexure "G". 
Letter to the Resident Director, New Consolidated Goldfields Ltd. , 
from Col. A. E. Trigger, Manager, Mines Police Department reporting 
on a meeting of the African Mine Workers' Union held on 7th February, 
1943. 
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All 500 were arrested and 48 later sentenced for contraventions of War 
Measure 145. (1) 
At the announcement of the Government's proposal to appoint a 
Native Mine Wage Commission, several bodies urged that the personnel 
should include a person capable of understanding and speaking authoritatively 
on the relevant issues from the point of view of those workers involved. 
The South African Trades and Labour Council was~ however, approached 
to nominate a representative and their nominee, Mr. A.A. Moore, President 
of the Council, was appointed to the Commission. Mr. Justice Lansdown, 
Judge President of the Eastern District Local Division of the Supreme Court 
was appointed chairman, the additional members being Mr. H.P. Smit 
(Controller and Auditor-General), Mr. H.S.H. Donald (Government Mining 
Engineer) and Mr. H. G. Scott (acting President of the Native Appeal Court 
. (2) 
for the Cape and the Free State). 
Moore was anathema to the African miners' cause, (
3
) for in addition 
to being head of the Trades and Labour Council, a body not always 
sympathetic to African labourers, he was Secretary of the Reduction 
Workers' Union. This Union was closely allied to the South African 
Mine Workers' Union whose avowed p~licy was ~he maintenance of the 
colour bar. Telegrams __ and~e.tters~wh.i-Gh-po.in.tg_d out the inequity of --2'--:: ___ _ 
appointing a re_p!~_sent_ative of the European w?rke::~ Y? __ th: C~~mf~8,1on 
and granting no repre_s_~lJ.tati.P11. _t9_Jhe~lj.frj.J.;:C'lJ1 _wor.kers elicited no change 
=--~ -- -.. • --·------~--- - -~- -·-·--~~---,.·---. -·. ------' 
(1) Cape Argus, 13. 1. 1943., 15. 1. 1943. 
Rand Daily Mail, 16. 1. 1943. 
,~~also reports of strikes on Luipaardsvlei(Rand Daily M3il, _ _§._Ll943), 
anci,Nourse~Mi-ri.es~(Ra-ndd)a.il:y=:t2Ifill, 23. 1. 1943). 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 18. 2. 1943. 
(3) See Evidence of Native Representative Council (p. 2.), 
African Mine Workers' Union (pp. 1 & 2), Society of Friends of 
African (pp. 2 & 3), to W.N.W.C. (1943). 
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in the personnel. (l) Smuts replied that the inquiry was to be as "judicial ---- ~- -- . 
and impartial as pos,sible". "It is true", he wrote, "that a prominent 
member of the Transvaal Trade and Labour Council has been included, but 
that was in fulfilment of an old standing undertaking by me, and this 
particular representative has also been selected for broad national 
. (2) 
rather than sectional reasons". 
It may be assumed that Moore was influenced by the policy of his 
Union and that his appointment was a concession to a vested interest. 
It would be difficult indeed to classify him as "impartial". A wholly 
"impartial" enquiry might have been more successfully undertaken by 
a commission consisting solely of disinterested persons - i.e. representatives 
of neither employers nor employees should have sat upon the Commission 
itself, but should have been given every opportunity to present their 
arguments before it. However, since General Smuts seemed to have 
been obliged to appoint a representative of one vested interest, it would 
have been logical for a representative of the African labourers themselves -
whose conditions were the Commission's major concern - also to ha\.~ 
been appointed. 
Mr. Justice Lansdown, however, commenting on the omission of an 
African representative, said that Mr. Scott "had devoted a lifetime to the 
welfare of the African people, and he himself (Lansdown) had had much 
experience of their problems, (3) 
(1) Telegrams of 13. 2. 1943 from Majoro (Secretary) African Mine Workers 1 
Union, Makabene (Chairman) and Gosani (Secretary) Council of non-
European Trade Unions, and Scheepers and Sacks, members of the 
South African Trades and Labour Council. 
Letter of 15. 2. 1943 from Mrs. M. Ballinger. 
Ballinger Papers. 
(2) Letter of 19. 2. 1943 from J. Smuts to Senator Malcomess. 
Ballinger Papers. 
(3) Star, 9.7.1943. --
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Briefly, the Commission made an exhaustive analysis into the 
, arguments for and against an increase in the wages of black mine workerso (1) 
In so far as it provides a considerable amount of factual information in 
respect of these men, the report is an important document. It was, 
however, guilty of special pleading in several important places and 
again,in others, of adding weight to long standing misconceptions o The 
justification for the preceding statement will emerge from the following 
discuss iono 
In pursuance of its mandate to enquire into and report on the 
economic requirements of the African labourers, the Commission investigated 
conditions in the Native Reserves a~d the extent to which these areas were _ ... --
. able to supplement earnings of the mine worker. Any recommendations to 
-- ...... ______ ... - . . 
be made were to take account of their effect upon the Mining Industry and 
country generally, as well as upon the extent and conditions of employment 
of whites and non-whites, again both in Gold Mining and in other industries 
throughout the Uniono (
2
) 
The Commission's terms of reference were thus in themselves 
Although African conditions and wages were to be investigated, ~ 
the interests of the industry and more specifically the white labourers, 
were never below the surface. 
significant o 
(1) The Commission concerned itself with the African mine labourers 
employed by members of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines on the 
gold mines of the Witwatersrand (which was interpreted to include 
all gold mines eastwards as far as Nigel and westward as far as 
Klerksdorp). The total number of Africans employed on the non-
Chamber mines was small relative to the total black labour force 
on the gold mines of the Witwatersrand (only ·approx. 2 per cent), 
and although the policies and practices of these non-Chamber mines 
were influenced by the Chamber there were significant differences. 
For example, the non-Chamber mines did not recruit but employed 
the men who presented themselves at the compound gates. 
(2) Thus the extremely wide field which the Commission was required 
to cover under its terms of reference was far wider than that usually 
entrusted to a Wage Board enquiry - the form requested by the African 
Mine Workers' Uniono 
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This bias-was further reinforced by the Commission'.s ,first 
conclusion that it was in "complete agreement" with the view "that 
the true interests of the Union demand the prolongation of the life 
of the gold mines by all reasonable means". (l) The importance of - - - -------- -
the industry as a source_of_ P.urchasing power - both for external payments 
"----.------ --~~~ ~ ~ -
and for the maintenance of the income level - was undoubtedly very great. 
'----
For the calendar year 1942, eighty per cent of expenditure on stores and 
----~ . ---·- . 
equipment (total of £30, 200, 000) was on articles of South African origin 
(2) 
or manufacture. Wages and salaries, both for whites and blacks, 
~ ~- - "\ 
accounted for a further £33, 100, 000 out of the total working costs for 
1942 of £70, 800, 000. (
3
) By 1942 less than 50 per cent of total dividends 
(£16,900 0 000) went outside the Union.(
4
) The income generated by the 
industry was therefore considerable and it is likely that the multiplier-
accelerator effect referred to by the Commission had a very significant 
effect on the economy at large. In his book, Capital Investment in 
Africa, ProL S. H. Frankel }?.as suggested that about a half of the Union '.s --- - - .... - - . - ·--- - .. - - -
population owed their livelihood, either directly or indirectly 0 to the 
gold mining industry. (5) 
The State ~was recognised as "the senior beneficiary from the industry". --
Mainly through taxationo gold realisation charges and the Government 
share of lease mines, the industry contributed nearly £28 million in the 
calendar year 1942 to the State Revenues. ( 
6
) Other indirect contributions 0 
such as personal tax on shareholders, miners and others earning a part 
or the whole of their incomes from the gold mines,must have greatly 
expanded the total benefit to State funds. (
7
) 
( 1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para. 11. 
(2) ibid, Para. 14. 
(3) ibid I Para. 12. 
(4) ibid, Para. 15. 
(5) Frankel, p. 76. 
( 6) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.12. 
(7) Frankel, op cit, p. 115. 
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In view of the above, it was often assumed that the interests of the 
mining in_9_u~!:fy_9oin_cideq with the interests of the country as a whole. 
To act against the industry in 1943 and reduce its life was to slow down 
- -
the expansion of all sectors of the economy and adversely affect total ____ __,_ ____ -~ - ·~ -
employment and national income. In short, this was equivalent to 
undermining the well-being and prosperity of the country. 
- ' ~ •• ~ - ---<- ~- -· -
This implied that the industry would continue indefinitely to play 
a major role and that the part it did play was automatically beneficial 
because it had been the mainspring of industrial development in the 
Union. Neither of these assumptions is however necessarily true. _ 
~e goltj_):pines were Jn_l943 ,- and still are, a wasting asset, 
4 
The 
Social and Economic Planning Council in its Report on the industry said: 
"The long-term problem arises from the fact that all the payable gold ore 
of the Union must, at some future date, be worked out 0 and that before 
that date the exhaustion of the ore will entail a drastic reduction in the 
activity of the industry". (l) The Lansdown Commission indeed re~erred 
to an estimate which indicated that there would be a very marked decline 
in tonnage milled between 1950 and 1965. (
2
) The Government Mining 
Engineer also estimated that on the basis of the prevailing cost and 
revenue conditions prevailing in 194 7, the total tonnage milled would 
remain fairly static until the early 1960's and thereafter would decrease 
'dl (3) rap1 y. 
This fact itself .suggests a conflict between the interests of the 
gold mines_ and_the. interests of the community, since the gold mining 
_.,...,.- - - ~--
--i~dustry might (from the community's point of view) be tempted to utilise 
(1) Social and Economic Planning Council, Report No. 11, 
Economic Aspects of the gold mining industry. 
U.G. 32 of 1948, Para.17. 
(2) Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, October 1941, 
Third Interim Report, Para. 151 quoted by W. N. W .C. (1943), Para. 24. 
(3) Social and Economic Planning Council, op cit, Para. 19 and Chart IV, 
p. 17. 
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resources for the rapid profitable exploitation of a wasting asset, which 
might with greater long-run advantage have been devoted to the creation 
of more lasting sources of income. This is not a clear-cut question 
to which positive answers can easily be given. Yet, despite the --general coincidence between the interests of the gold mining industry - -- - - .. 
and those of the community as a whole, it cannot be assumed that they -
completely coincide. 
The possible effects_oJ~ge increases on the gold mining industry 
which were usually considered relevant were costs to the industry in 
.----~------------
relation to the scale of its operations and its anticipated profits. There 
~(ana, of course, still are) additional costs, both private and social, 
which are also incurred. 
There are certain collective social services which should be 
provided by the community in its own interests and which are usually 
met by the state out of its revenues collected from the community. The 
community cannot escape the social costs by refusing to meet the monetary 
costs of these services. If, for example, the community allows urban 
areas to develop without providing public health services it pays the . 
cost in disease and the physical and moral deterioration of a portion of 
its population. The community must either collectively meet the expense 
of ameliorating the conditions or allow its poorer members to bear the 
consequences of not doing so; and part of the cost of this spreads 
throughout the community. 
Some social costs can, however, be most effectively met by the 
community through collective services but there are others which are 
most effectively dealt with by the industry itself. 
i 
Clearly, however, 
there were many social costs incurred by the gold mining industry of 
South Africa which were neither met by the industry nor by the community. 
~..tr.iking of these was the c_osLof-empfoyin-g-Affican-migrant-
--(1)----
labour at low wage rates. The deterioration of the reserves and the 
(1) See Social and Economic Planning Council, Report No. 9, 
The Native Reserves and their place in the Economy of the Union of 
South Africa, U.G.32 of 1946, Paras. 98, 101-103. 
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virtual destruction of the African mine workers' family life were mani-
festations of such co.sts, which were in the first ·instance borne by the 
workers themselves. The mining industry had a relatively short-period 
interest in labour, as the effect of the migratory labour system was very 
largely to depress the value of one of the Union's most important 
economic resources in order to exploit another. We will later discuss 
the migrant labour system and the reserves in greater detail. 
The volume of employment offered by the gold mines did not 
necessarily benefit the community as a whole. Employment at a low 
wage level was in the interests of the mines, but it did follow that it 
was not of net benefit to other industries. It was often assumed that no 
alternative forms of employment would exist if wage increases in the mines 
were to occur and the volume of employment to falL However, this 
neglected the possible effects of an increased standard of living' and 
consequent shift in effecti.ve demand, amongst many Africans. The 
interests of secondary industry and of the community could thus have 
been to raise the standards of living of the African miners by raising 
wages even though this might have had an "employment effect" on the"" 
gold mining industry. (l) In addition, it was during the period undFfr/ 
discussion that total employment of all races in secondary industry 
(2) 
overtook the gold industry. 
The tendency_for __ gold-.min-i-ng-to-become-relatively_less important 
,.___ ---- -~· -"'"-' •• -·-. -&~ 
within the South__African e_conomy_was.,_in_fact_,_cle_a_t:lY. discernible 
during the 1940!5-.___. __::__---· 
(1) This is assuming no increases in productivity or relaxation of 
the colour bar. 
(2) For example secondary industry (all manufacturing industries) 
employed nearly four times as many Europeans (166, 000 to the 
average of 42, 000 in the service of the large gold mines) and 
as many non-Europeans (323, 000 to 321, 000 on the gold mines) 
as gold mining in 1944-45. 
Twenty-Eighth Industrial Census, Press Release, quoted by the 
S.E.P.C., Report No. 11, op cit, Para. 6. 
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£ Million 
Gold Mining Tax 









1912 1917 1922 1927 1932 1937 1942 1946 
Gold Mining Taxation and Lease Revenue Credited to Revenue Account, 
and Total Union Revenue, for Financial years ended 31st March 0 1912-1946. (1) 
As can be seen from the chart, the contributions of the ind us try 
were of major importance to the public revenues of the Uniono However, 
although its contribution had increased markedly over the years because 
of discriminatory taxation, it had declined in relation to the total revenue 
of the Union. This was particularly evident after 1940. 
(1) S.E.P.C., Report No. 11, U.G. of 48, Parao 11. 
This does not include licences and mynpacht dues, supertax paid 
by shareholders, non-resident shareholders tax, pass fees, etc. , 
as well as lease revenues since 1938 (credited to the Loan Account) 
and gold realisation charges (also credited to the Loan Account). 
A breakdown of the total government revenue from the gold mines 
is given as Appendix "D", W.N.W.C. (1943), Po47. 
See also The Outlook for Gold Mining, Gold Producers' Committee, 
Transvaal and Orange Free State Chamber of Mines, p. 30, for a 
graph showing the sources of State Revenue from 1936-1965. 
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Similarly / with respect to the gold mines and national income, the 
percentage of the total national income attributed to all mining remained 
greater than that of manufacturing until 1942. Gold, with the exception 
of the depression years, 1925-1931, and 1937-1938 contributed a 
greater percentage to national income than manufacturing. The water-
shed was again in 1942-1943 when the gold mining industry's share of 
national income was 14. 9 per cent and that of manufacturing 19. 4 per cent. (1) 
The Lansdown Commission could thus have referred to several key -- . indicators which showed that despite the continuing growth of the gold 
- -------- _.......- - -~ - - - -- - --' - ~ .. . -~-~ -~ mining industry, its-pos1tion~in.relation-to~other··sectors-of the-economy 
~ - --- .. 
~as declining. However, the Commission readily accepted the views 
-·~----- . 
of earlier Commissions, such as the Industrial and Agricultural Requirements 
Commissions, (
2
) which said: 
"Since the gold mines are of the utmost importance to 
the National economy - both for the maintenance of the 
income level and for making overseas payments - the 
desirability of postponing the inevitable exhaustion of 
the industry for as long as possible is self-evident". 
Although the industry was, as Prof. de Kiewiet has suggested, the fly-
wheel of the economy, by accepting the principle of prolonging its life 
by "all reasonable means", (
3
) the Commissioners adopted an objective 
which might not have been justified - no effort being made to measure . 
the opportunity costs of doing so. 
(1) Frankel, S.H., assisted by Herzfeld, H., "An Analysis of the Growth 
of the National Income of the Union in the Period of Prosp~rity before 
the War," S .A. J.E. , June 1944, Appendix B. 
(2) Industrial and Agricultural Requirements Commission, October 1941, 
Third Interim Report, Para. 240. 
(3) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.IL 
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It was, for example, only certain costs that were considered when 
the Commission stated that: 
"having regard to the circumstances of the Witwatersrand 
gold mining industry, the migratory system of peasant 
labour must continue. Any other policy must bring about 
a catastrophic dislocation of the industry and consequent 
1 prejudice to the whole economic structure of the Union 11 • 
The cost to the African miner o his family life and "homelands 11 ~l) were 
admittedly seen as matters demanding attention. The migrant labour 
system could continue if 
11 
•••••• the combined income of those labourers from 
wages and their Reserve production should provide them 
and their families with a proper livelihood, not only for 
the period during which the man is at work on the mines, 
but for such a period of stay in the Re serves as will enable 
him to maintain his tribal association, keep in reasonable 
touch with his family 0 preserve his health, and retain an 
adequate control of the interests of his allotment. 11 (2) 
The Commission, therefore, recognised that this was indeed a problem, 
but apparently it was not one that concerned the mining industry. 
The Chambers' policy with respect to African labour was outlined by 
the Gold Producers' Committee in evidence to the Commission: 
"The basis of the employment of native labour by the mines 
is in complete accord with the balanced South African Native 
Policy laid down practically unanimously by Parliament after 
thorough investigation and discussion in 193 6/3 7, and 
embodied in legislation (in particular the Native Trust and 
Land Act, 19 3 6, and the 19 3 7 amendment to the Urban Areas 
(1) Raising the wages of mine labourers would "improve the condition of 
the families in the Reserves. In itself, however, it would do nothing 
to save the land of the Reserves from destruction, for it would leave 
the old men, women 0 and children to continue their disastrous use 
of the soil and the veld 11 • 
Evidence of South African Institute of Race Relations of 9. 7. 1943, 
toW.N.W.C. (1943), Para.35. 
(2) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para. 211. 
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Act) and re-affirmed by the Minister of Native Affairs in 
the House of Assembly on 26th February, 1943. In brief, 
that policy is the enlargement and planned development 
and improvement of the Native Reserves, and the concurrent 
restriction on the number of natives permitted in the towns, 
coupled with the proper housing of those so permitted .••..• 
, The ability of the mines to maintain their native labour force 
:by means of tribal natives from the Reserves at rates of pay 
1which are adequate for this migratory class of native but 
. inadequate in practice for the detribalised urban native is 
1 a fundamental factor in the economy of the Gold Mining Industry!' ( ) 
More succintly stated, "the Gold Mining Industry has been rendered 
possible on its existing scale by the ability to obtain an effective unskilled 
native labour force from the Reserves at ruling rates of pay". (Z) Less 
euphemistically, however, "ruling rates of pay" meant low rates of pay. 
Our central theme is, however, an assessment of African labour 
conditions on the gold mines so that, in the following chapters, we will 
more fully discuss them as they were in 1943 when Lansdown and his 
fellow Commissioners met. Relevant information from other Commissions, 
as well as additional authorities,are included. It is clear from the 
foregoing policy statement of the Chamber that it is not only the conditions 
of the African while on the mines which are to be discussed" but also the 
position in the reserves and the African's opportunities for bringing about 
improvements. 
(1) Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p.33, Para.9. 
(2) ibid, p.32, Para.8. 
AFRICAN LABOUR CONDITIONS : RECRUITMENT 
AND CONTRACL. THE BLACK WORKERS' 
OBLIGATIONS TO THE INDUSTRY, 
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The Lansdown Commission unequivocally accepted the Chambers 1 
policy "to employ cheap native labour" (l) and noted that the Witwatersrand 
had been fortunate in securing "native peasants who have been prepared 
to come to the Witwatersrand for periods of labour at comparatively low 
(2) 
rates of wages 11 • The ortly criterion advanced for this view was that 
the policy was "in general accordance with the native policy of the 
(3) 
country". Great "economic pressure 11 was the reason given for the 
African offering his labour to_work underground at a cash wage of 2s. 
h
'ft (4f . . _· .. · . -
per s_ -~~-·~ 
..,..,,--="'7"""--~·C 
Cash wages in the gold mining- industry were not competitive with 
those in other departments of unskilled labour. A complete analysis of, 
the factors which affected the supply of African labour for the mines 
would involve an account both of the Native Policy of the Union and of 
other territories, as well as a description of the economic and social 
conditions in those areas from which the supply of labour was being 
/ 
/ 
drawn. We will begin by discussing the recruiting system, for the ,i 
supply which was forthcoming to the industry must in part be attributed 
to the provision of advances and the efficiency of recruiting. 
The importance of recruiting to the gold mining industry was very 
(5) ~ 
great. As we have seen, the raison d'etre for the Chamber's formation 
was to depress the level of African wages by providing the required labour 
force and thus to eliminate competition between the mines. 
The two organisations which had been established, the W. N. L.A. 
and the N. R. C . , operated under the same directorate and management. 
(1) W.N.W.C.(1943), Para.67. 
(2) ibid, Para. 70. 
(3) ibid, Para. 72. 
(4) ibid, Para. 73. 
(5) See W.N.W.C.(1943), Paras.41-62, 308-310. 
Evidence of the G.P.C. toW.N.W.C.(1943), pp.70,71. 
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Their geographical spheres of influence differed, the N. R. C. recruiting 
within the Union and High Commission Territories, (l)·the W.N.L.A. 
outside these areas. (
2
) On the Witwatersrand all matters relating to 
r----
the care of the worker_other_tha~_I_.!__ ~the mine, such as medical 
examination, reception anrl repatriation fell under the ambit of the-· --- -------- . -
W.N.L.A. SupervisiC?n of conditions on the mines themselves was 
_carrie_d out by_the N.R.~.. Thus, these sub-committees of '.the Chamber, 
within the restrictions of the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 and 
the regulations of the Governments outside South Africa, controlled 
the life of the African miner. 
Recruiting by the W.N.L.A. was subject in all cases to .. special 
--conventions or permits. ---- The Governments of the Union and Portugal 
from time to time revised the quota of East Coast Africans who could 
~ " ______ , ~ - - --· -- (3) 
be employed on the gold and coal mines of the Witwatersrand. 
In 1940 the maximum number was raised to 100, 000, the minimum 
remaining_ at 65, 000. Similarly, the number of "tropicals" that could ----- ..__ __ _ 
be engaged by the W.N.L.A. was greatly restricted by the Northern 
Rhodesia and Nyasaland Governments. Nyasaland only permitted 
the annual recruitment of 8, 500 and Nort;:rn Rhode~ia of 3..1 500. (4) 
....... ~-' ------ --- ~ ... -
The recruiting of African labour in areas outside the Union was not 
the monopoly of the W. N. L.A., with the exception of Mozambique. 
Nyasaland, for example, granted permission to the London and Blantyre 
Company during 1935 to engage up to 2, 000 men for employment outside 
(1) Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland. 
(2) Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique), Northern Rhodesia· (Zambia), 
Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland (Malawi). 
(3) See N. E. C. (1930), Para. 809. The supply was regulated on the 
basis of the Transvaal guaranteeing a fixed percentage of traffic 
,,p 
through the port of Lourenco Marques. 
Duffy, James, Portugal in Africa, Penguin African Library, 1963., p.137. 
(4) W.N.W.C.(1943), Paras.52, 53. 
_J 
- 129 -
the Territory. (l) However, the total number recruited for work outside 
the mines was small relative to the efforts of the W.N.L.A. The Africans 
from the territories in which the W.N.L.A. operated, who were in possession 
of passports on the Witwatersrand on 3 lst December, 1931, numbered over 
74,000 on the mines and only 4,738 in other employ. (2) This gives an 
indication (
3
) of the relative importance of non-mine recruiting. 
The rates of pay of labourers employed by the W.N.L.A. were - ----------- ~. -
exactly the same as those applying to Union African~. The former, 
however, had to contract for an initial period of twelve months with an 
option of renewing their contract for a further six months. There was also 
provision for compulsory deferred pay (
4
) and compulsory repatriation. As - -----" ,--- - - -- ~ ~ - -
it was to the advantage of the mines to maintain the system whereby the 
labourer could theoretically obtain a subsidiary means of subsistence and 
prevent him from becoming a permanent resident upon the Witwatersrand, 
the contract between the W. N. L.A. and recruits from Nyasaland, Northern 
and Southern Rhodesia, and Portuguese East Africa, provided that certain 
specified amounts could be deducted from the worker's pay to provide for 
the cost of his return fare to his home at the conclusion of his service. 
Thus all the men recruited by the W.N.L.A. paid the cost of their return 
t~ansport fro~ .the mines. (5) -. Free transport to Johannes_b_urg _wO:~PTO~ded 
for~~r:_opicals" from Northern Bechuanaland, Northern Rhodesia and Nyasaland, 
(1) Report on Nyasaland Natives in the Union of South Africa and in 
Southern Rhodesia by J.C. Abraham, Esq., 1937, Para. 14. 
(2) N.E.C., (1930), p.175, Para, 17, 
(3) There may have been many Africans employed in commerce and industry 
who had voluntarily gone to the Witwatersrand and who were not in 
possession of a valid passport. In addition, the W. N. L.A. was pro-
hibited at this time from recruiting "tropicals", only 72 being listed 
as possessing passports and working on the mines while 333 were 
otherwise employed. 
(4) In the case of the Portuguese African it was equal to one-half of 
his earnings after. his first nine months at work. 
(5) Except those who were found medically fit on arrival at labour centres 
or who had met with an accident, repatriation was then at the expense 
of the employers. 
... 
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Apart from the outward boat and railway fares in Mozambique itself, the 
cost of transport to the mines was deducted from the pay of the East Coast 
- --- ---- __ ____..~- - - - -~ 
l~er .. _In addition to this burden the PortugueJ>e miner paid a fee of 
.~ . ( 1) • 
lQs_._per annum to the Mozambique Go:re.rnment. In other tropical areas, 
- -- . - - -·--- - ( ) 
the African paid his own travelling expenses. 
2 
The biggest disadvantage suffered by the W. N. L.A. recruit was 
-~-
that, according to the terms of his contract, he could be sent to any -- - --·- --- -· -- ~ - - -
of th~_mines-affi1iated-to.the Chamber-and had -to-acceptany work allocated 
to him. (
3
) In this respect the recruits of the Native Recruiting Corporation. . - - ---- ...... -
_.had_a_considerable advantage.. Under the.Assisted Voluntary System (AVS) 
which had been introduced in 1928, the worker obtained from a depot of 
the Corporation an advance to meet the cost of his rail fare and his food, (4) 
which he had to refund from his first earnings. This scheme saved the 
African interest upon the railway fare or the advance. Formerly the 
African who wished to to the mines without being recruited had, if he 
could not pay his own fare, to obtain an advance against his wages for his 
fare from the local trader, who usually charged usurious rates of interesL 
In practice, however, the AVS miner was in turn refunded the advance if 
he worked 270 shifts underground on any one mine. The AVS worker 
had to register for service with one or other of the Chambers' companies 
within 30 days of the agreement. He was, however, free to choose his 
own mine and to select his period of employment, subject to the mine 
agreeing to accept his services and the conditions on the contract. The 
(1) A fee of £1. 14s. 6d. per African per annum was paid by the mines to 
the Mozambique Government. 
(2) See Reply by Minister of Mines to a question in the House of Assembly 
on 19. 2. 1943. 
(3) Thirtytwo and a half per cent were permitted, in terms of the W. N. L.A. 
statutes, to choose their mine, although, in terms of the contract, 
they had to accept any work given them. See W.N.W.C. (1943), 
Para. 4 7. 
(4) The usual amount, according to the Native Economic Commission of 
193 2, was £2 in addition to the railway fare. It may be assumed that 
as the maximum advance to recruited workers was £3 in 1943, the 
A. V. S. worker could receive a similar sum. The amount was subject 
to amendments under the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911. 
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minimum duration of contract varied, according to the mine, from a month 
to not less than a three months 1 , four months 1 or six months 1 period. (l) 
Personal freedom of movement and choice of employer were combined in 
the contract of the non-recruited worker. In this respect the contract 
was healthy and desirable. (2) 
Union and High Commission Territory Africans (3) couil.d also be 
recruited under the contrac..!._ ~13te1112ir~cruitment~ Under this system 
the potential miners presented themselves to the nearest representative 
of the NRG (a trader(
4
) in many cases) or at the NRG recruiting office. 
If found medically fit and in agreement with the terms of the contract, 
they were taken to the office of the magistrate or other attesting officer 
for attestation of their contracts in terms of section 12 of the Native 
(1) N.E.C. (1930), Para. 802. Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), 
p.12, Para .. 3(b). 
(2) The scheme was well-known and popular especially amongst the 
workers of the Transkeian Territories and the Ciskei, whereas 32 
per cent of the total arrivals in Johannesburg from these areas in 
1931 were A. V.S. recruits, the percentage in 1942 was 49. 2 
W.N.W.C., Para.46. See N.E.C. (1930), Annexure 21, for 
the initial effect of the introduction of the A. V. S. 
(3) Within the restrictions of the Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 o 
and its regulations, recruiting for other industries than gold-mining 
could, and, in fact, did take place in these areas. 
(4) The trader-recruiter received a capitation fee of 24s. for each accepted 
contract labourer he sent to the industry, and, in addition, he could 
advance up to £3 to each African miner, the amount being. recovered from 
deductions from his pay. This system of advances may have encouraged 
some Africans to resort to the contract system rather than to the A.V.S. 
as it allowed them to get into debt. As the number of trader-recruiters 
had diminished from 602 in 1912 to 373 in 1942, the frequency of this 
abuse occurring must similarly have diminished. The increasing 
popularity of the A. V. System must have had a similar effect. 
In addition, the N. R. C. encouraged the use of this method of recruiting 
as it avoided the payment of capitation fees. 
W.N.W.C. (1943), Paras. 44,56. 
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Labour Regulation Act, No. 15 of 1911, and the regulations thereunder. 
The essential difference between this system and the A. V. S. was that 
~---- -- - ~ --- --~ 
the_AfrJcan labourer was assigned by the recruiting authority to a 
-;:fil.ti.cuJ<:u-m.in_eJ-his own ~c~~ng __ ~r-anted. only_ "where posstble". (l) -- - -- --- - -·--
As in the case of the AVS recruit, the contract worker's transport 
expenses to Johannesburg were charged to the industry provided the 
contract was for more than 270 shifts. (
2
) If the contract was for less, 
the amount was recovered from the labourer. 
The NRC recruit was repatriated at his own expense, both under 
-- - -- . -- --(3) --- - - - - -
!he_A~sisted Voluntary System or the Contract System. Travelling 
_ __._....,__.-...- - - -- - ; 
expenses differed at different places - the average in respect of the 
Transkei or its neighbourhood was £2. 10s. Od.·(
4
) 
Apart from the two systems already discussed, viz. the Assisted 
Voluntary System and the Contract System, African miners from the Union 
and High Commission Territories were employed by the "local engagement" 
method. When an African had completed his initial contract on one mine 
and wished to transfer to another it constituted a "local engagement". (_S) 
During 1942 such contracts numbered 38,351, 19 per cent of the total 
Union and High Commission Territory Africans employed. Of this total, 
contracted miners employed for the same year were 81, 808 (40 per cent) 
and A.V.S. workers' numbered 79,212 (38 per cent). In addition 6,267 
(3 per cent of the total) made their way unassisted to the mines during 1942 
to do mainly surface work. (6) 
(1) W. N. W. C. (1943), Para. 50. This usually applied to "specials" 
i.e. men who had worked on a mine and asked to go back there. 
Those who could not be "accommodated" in this way were sent to 
mines which, through bad conditions, had been unable to attract 
their own labour. 
(2) Equivalent to 1 ot months. 
(3) Again with the exception of the medically unfit and victims of accidents. 
(4) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.49. 
(5) A contract was again entered into between the mine and the African miner. 
(6) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943)., p.12, Para.3. 
J 
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Africans employed by the gold mining industry, whether from the Union 
and High Commission Territories or "foreign" labourers, were bound by a 
contract of service which had certain common features. 
They were required to work on every working da)1) and could also 
---(-2)------ - . - -------... 
be call_eq_upon_to_do_Sunday: work._.. The African could not exercise 
a choice between day or night work, piece-work or day's pay:, but had 
to accept any work given him and accept the wage paid by that mine for 
that class of work. Previous experience was thus not necessarily taken 
into account. 
As the preceeding discussion on recruiting indicates, arrangements 
for paying the costs of the African miners' journey to the mines varied --- - ...: - - - . ~ -~ . -
between automatic payment for certain "foreign" labourers to payment 
on completion of a specified minimum number of shifts. Similarly, 
advances were only made available to certain recruits under the 
conditions mentioned above. Where applicable therefore, travelling 
costs and advances were automatically deducted from the worker's wage. 
All the African labourers, except High Commission Territory workers, 
:ggid for their own re2atrJaJion-.- They were assisted in paying their return 
fares by the employers who deducted the cost of the fare in instalments 
from their wages and bought the ticket. The only exceptions were those 
found medically unfit on arrival at the labour centre or who had met with 
an accident and were not in a fit condition to resume work. In such 
circumstances, and at the recommendation of the Mine Medical Officer, 
they were repatriated at the expense of the mine. The men from the High 
Commission Territories formed a category of _their own and made thei~_ o_:ivn 
arrangements for their return journey. 
(1) Only Christmas Day and Good Friday were paid holidays. 
W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.372. 
(2) Only work permitted under Section 6 of the Mines and Works Act 
of 1911 (as amended) could be performed on the mines on Sundays. 
J 
- 134 -
Representations urging the Government to ratify the Convention on C.~ r 
the Regulation of Contracts for Emplo:r:ment of Indigenous Workers , 19 3 9 ,? \
were frequently made in evidence before the Lansdown Commission. ' , 
_ =~::l::::n:h:yct::v:::~:Y::i:~~:::d h::: ::r~~;:t b::::h:e:a::!: :l;ce J ( 
at the latter's expense on the termination of the contract by the expiry • 
of the period of service, by reason of either the employer or employee 
(sickness or accident) being unable to fulfil the contract, by agreement 
between the parties or by "the application of either of the parties, unless 
the competent authority otherwise decides. " The competent authority 
(Union Government) could, in terms of Article 14, exempt the employer 
from liability for repatriation expenses in certain defined circumstances. 
If the contract had been terminated for any other reason than sickness 
or because of an accident which prevented the worker from resuming 
work after treatment, the employer could be exempted if the rates of 
wages made allowance for the payment of repatriation expenses by the 
worker and the worker possessed the necessary funds through a system 
( 1) 
of deferred pay. 
The Chamber of Mines was stronglY.. opposed_ to the Union's ratification ,...,--------- ·-, - .. - .. ~:, - . -
of the Convention as it was doubtful whether they could have claimed .--
exemption from its terms under Article 14. Indeed, the Native Economic 
Commission of 1930 estimated that the travelling expenses for the two 
journeys of labourers from the Transkei in 1931 represented as much as 
15 to 20 per cent of their total cash earnings. (
2
) 
\[_nder the contract-the~Africans-were-requirnd~to.livce_i-n-the-2!.quarters" 
provided for them by the mines. In the great majority of cases, they were 
~- -·:_ 
bachelor quarters known as compounds and akin to army barracks. 
(1) Copy of the Convention. 
(2) N.E.C. (1930), Para.830. 
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The contract was for a minimum period of engagement measured in 
shifts. The "shift" for the-day's pay men meant "work for an unbroken 
period of time according to the full working hours ,of (the) Mine, as 
authorised by law, for the work on which the Native is employed". 
When used with respect to piece work, a 11 shift 11 meant: 
~-----
"the minimum work as fixed by (the) Mine or by (the) Agreement 
for the class of work on which the Native is employed. No 
Native employed on piece work other than hand drilling will be 
entitled to cease work before the expiration of the working hours 
of (the) Mine ....•. No Native employed on hand drilling shall 
be entitled to cease work before the expiration of the working 
hours of (the) Mine unless he shall have performed the shovelling 
work called for in (the) Contract, and in addition have completed 
42 inches of drilling as directed .•.......•......••...•.•.•... 
. . . . . . . . . . . . Any shift during which a Native employed on hand 
drilling fails to do sufficient shovelling (not exceeding two hours) 
to clear the face after the preceding blast, and in addition to drill 
24 inches, shall be deemed to be an incompleted shift, and shall 
not count towards the period of contract. " (1) 
For the daily Raid workers, payment for any work was conditional on .............--- -..- --- ----- . 
what, according to the accepted standard of the mine at which they were 
employed, was regarded as a full day's work. Less time spent underground 
meant that the worker received neither wage nor recognition of a shift 
towards the fulfillment of his contract. The piece-worker had to have 
completed a certain minimum amount of work in order to be paid and have 
the shift counted against his period of service. According to the general 
regulations of th~ N.R.C. contract, (2) the minimum requirements for the 
African employed on hand drilling, for example 0 were the clearing of 
the stope face after the preceding blast (this shovelling not to exceed 
two hours) and the drilling of 24 inches. 
(1) Contract form of the Native Recruiting Corporation, Limited. 
(2) This applied to all the Companies represented by the NRC except 
the Van Ryn Gold Mines Estate, Ltd. whose minimum for hand 
drillers was 3 0 inches. Presumably no shovelling was required 
from hand drillers on this mine. 
j 
- 136 -
In terms of his contract, ~he African had to work for the requisite 
number of hc:mrs laid down by law irrespective of whether he was on day's 
-~--- ·- - - - -- ----· 
. I?ay ~9LJ?iece_ work. Shifts began at various times in the early morning 
and ended at corre~ponding times in the afternoon. The maximum number 
of work-hours permitted was 48 hours per week, excluding the time occupied 
in going to and from the place of work. (1) 
Several African miners (2) complained that they wasted time both 
waiting at the shaftheads to be taken down the mine to their work and 
then underground for the European miners to arrive. (
3
) They also complained 
of considerable delays in the afternoons in being taken to the surface. (4) 
In addition, it was suggested that the time spent walking from the compound 
should also be considered as part of the working day. 
'J'.he Afrtcan miner undou-btedly s_pent more than 8 hours in carrying 
. out his specific ta!3k· Estimates varied greatly. For example the African 
----=-·=-----=---=----- -__:_ ~ ~:___- -
Mine Wqrkers Union calculated that the miner on the Robinson Deep spent 
approximately 9t hours from the time he left_ the- shafthead until he returned 
again to the surface. "Altogether the miner probably (spent) 12 to 13 hours 
on some mines 11, if th;tim~~alkin;-to-a~d f;~~ the ~haft~ead wa; included. (S) 
(1) The hours of work underground are governed by Section (9), sub-section 2, 
of the Mines and Works Act, 1911. 
(2) This affected day's pay men and piece-workers especially because the 
piece-worker (except those employed as hand-drillers who had shovelled 
for 2 hours and drilled 4 2 11 ) had to remain underground until the end of . 
the "working day" even though he might have completed his work. 
l'vfore than 7 S per cent of the total African labour force was employed 
underground. Surface workers followed the same shifts as the 
-Europeans they assisted, which were 11 as a general rule not more than 
48 hours per week 11 • 
(3) In terms of the Mining Regulations, work could not be commenced until 
the stope face had been examined by a European miner. 
(4) This has been dealt with more fully on pp. 25, 26. 
(S) Evidence of the African Mine Workers Union to W. N. W. C. (1943), p. 34. 
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Similar complaints about time-wasting had been made to the Native 
Grievances Inquiry of 1913/14. Mr. H.O. Buckle, the sole Commissioner, 
suggested improvements that could avoid the long hours and waiting around 
( 1) 
underground. 6~parently little had been done in this respect, for even 
as the Lansdown Commission was in session, workers-resorted to "arastic 
action" (2) and exposed them-selves to p~os·e~ution to hi~hlight the length-, 
.....-----------~ ~...- ....... _- -· . 
of their working day. 
On the Rand Leases Mine at Roodepoort, 350 African miners who 
finished their shifts at 1 p. m. had to wait underground for the cages until 
4. 30 p. m. (
3
) They then refused, and at 5. 30 p. m. again refused, to 
enter the cages because of the delay which had taken place in providing 
this transport, notwithstanding the fact that blasting operations had begun 
about 4 p. m. They claimed that the delay had occurred on many occasions 
in the past. The workers only came to the surface after the compound 
manager had agreed to meet them there. Police arrested 339 when they were 
brought up, twenty-two of them later being charged and sentenced for breaches 
of the Mining Regulations. (
4
) 
Lansdown and his fellow Commissioners thought the delays inevitable, 
"having regard to the work which must be done at the shafts and the limited 
capacity of the cages" ~ 5 ) This was contrary both to the spirit of the Mining 
Regulations and what, presumably, the African labourer understood on being 
recruited. Although they recognised that the delays were thus a real 
grievance, the Commissioners only recommended that "all reasonable efforts 
should be made for the curtailment of these delays. "(
5
) 
(1) N.G.I. (1913), Para.53-64. 
(2) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.374. 
(3) The winding gear to lift the cages was "otherwise employed". 
W. N. W.C. (1943), Para. 374. 
(4) Inkululeko, 18. 9.-43. 
21 were fined £10 or 2 months, suspended for 12 months. Remaining 
miner was fined £2 or 21 days, two-thirds suspended for 3 months. 
(5) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.374. 
(6) ibid, Para. 375. 
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The recruit was presented with a set form of contract which he could 
refuse or accept but riot amend in any way. Once signed he could not 
cancel the contract nor amend it and was liable to prosecution for a 
criminal offence if he left the mine before completing his period of 
service. However, when the mine was unable to provide (1) the African 
work because of causes "beyond the control of the employer", the African 
miner had to be content, in terms of the contract, to receive a wage which 
was only guaranteed to be not less than half that which he formerly received(Z) 
and to do "any class of work underground or surface irrespective of the class 
of work he was engaged for." If the "cause" persisted for 30 days,either 
the miner or the employer could cancel the contract. (
3
) Causes beyond 
the control of the employer were widely interpreted to include an "act of God, 
vis. major, flooding, fire, strike of workmen, accidents to mine or to plant". (
4
) 
This clause discriminated in favour of the employers as the mine owners were 
able to substitute new terms of employment on very subjective grounds. 
(1) The term used was "prevented from furnishing work". 
(2) To be "calculated on the average pay earned during the preceding 
three months or during such shorter period as the Natives may have 
worked priot to the cessation of work". Each day, however, was 
to be calculated as a completed shift. 
(3) This cancellation provision was not included in the W.N.L.A. 
contract. 
(4) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p.13. 
The writer, too, finds the phraseology puzzling. 
., 
AFRICAN LABOUR CONDITIONS: CASH 
WAGES. AND WAGES IN KIND" THE 




The contractual obligations of the African miners to the mining 
company which employed them were many and varied. On pain of 
.. 
committing a criminal offence if he broke the contract, the labourer 
contracted to accept work of varying remuneration, living accommodation 
and hours all within the discretion of the mine management. Although 
the African was faced with a charge brought by the State if he failed to 
, comply with any management decisions or orders made in terms of his 
contract, the European who contracted to work on the mines entered 
~-- --~------ -
into_ a. private _-agreement with the mine which, when broken by either. 
side, became a matter for the civil courts. ( l) -- - - --- -------------------
The representative of the recruiting organisation who signed the 
contract, in turn, involved the mining company which employed the 
labourer in certain obligations. The company undertook to pay the 
rates of wages set out in the contract and to provide free of charge, 
the prescribed rations, quarters and medical and hospital attention 
for the duration of the contracto We shall deal with each of these 
in turn. 
(1) The rationale for this was as follows: 
"It would be impossible to control native labourers in 
the employ of European masters, or to rely on them for 
satisfactory fulfilment of labour contracts, but for the 
deterrent provisions included in the various laws with 
special application to natives. The average native 
labourer would be totally unaffected by civil process, 
as judgement against him could nqt be enforced. He 
has no property to attach, and his circumstances would 
defeat any attempt to mulct him in damages. On the 
other hand, while the native is unconscious of the stigma 
which is the main deterrent in the conviction and imprison-
ment of Europeans, the forced labour, the discipline, and 
the loss of wages serve to convince him of wrongdoing and 
-to demonstrate the unprofitableness of any failure, without 
lawful clause, to observe the terms of his labour agreement. 
The differentiation between white and black in the prescribed 
procedure in cases of breach of contract is essential; ,for 
the law, to be effective, must provide such deterrents as 
the native mind is able to appreciate. " 
Evidence of the Gold Producers' Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of 
Mines to the Economic and Wage Commission, (1925), Statement No. 3, 
pp. 1 and 2. 
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Rates of pay of African miners varied according to the work allocated 
to themo The worker who was paid by the day received a minimum rate per 
shift, while the piece worker who failed to complete the required work 
received no pay for that shift at alL The average earnings of all African 
miners, moreover, were controlled by the Native Recruiting Corporation 
through the mechanism of the "Maximum Average Clause". 
The N. R. C. was empowered in terms of its Articles of Association 
to "fix the wages to be paid by members for each class of work to be 
done by native labourers in their employ and from time to time revise 
and alter the wages so fixed" o (1) This was necessary in view of the 
Corporation's function of controlling the distribution of all labour 
employed by itself and the W. N. L.A. To achieve an equitable 
distribution the Corporation considered it necessary to maintain equal 
opportunity of earnings on all mines, for the mines which offered the 
greater earning facilities would tend to draw to them more than their 
share of recruited labouro -.) 
l 
In pursuance of this aim the N.R.C. introduced the maximum average 
clause into its wage scheduleso· We have already discussed this provision 
in some detail(Z) and will confine ourselves now to the situation in 1943 . 
.. -~· 
By this year(3) the provision controlled the average earnings of all 
African labour and was no longer confined to the specific control of piece 
work. The maximum average for underground workers was not to exceed '-· --=----
2s. 3d. per shift, while the average rate of pay o~_ur,fac_~ourers could 
be increased to 2s o per shift, (
4
) In addition to the above, each Mine 
Manager had a fixed sum at his disposal to enable him to grant bonuses 
to individuals or gangs of workers as a reward for efficiencyo Each mine 
(1) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943L Po 113. 
(2) See PPo 74-800 
(3) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), Po 115. 
(4) First Aid Bonuses, wages of unscheduled classes of labour and Shaft 




calculated this sum every month~ 
"by taking five per cenL of its total native labour complement 
and translating the resulting figure into pounds sterling; e.g. 
a mine having an underground complement of 4, 000 natives and 
a surface complement of 1, 000 natives would have £250 per 
month at the disposal of the Manager for distribution in bonuses 
~o his efficient natives, both underground and surface". (1) 
In effect ,_what this all amounted to was that the maximum average 
- (2) ____ - -- -- . 
for all workers was 2s,3.3/4do per shift in 1943. The effectiveness 
of the control is measured by the fact that the N. R. C. was able to report 
in 1943 that it had never been necessary to penalise a mine for paying 
an average rate which exceeded the given limit. (
3
) 
A minimum rate of pay of lso 8d. per shift for "adult" African under-
ground day's pay workers was laid down for the first time in June, 19260 
Before that date no definite minimum rate was officially in force, although 
the minimum in practice was ls, 6d. The minimum of ls. 8do per shift 
continued until January, 19280 when a minimum shift pay of ls. lOdo on 
the completion of 90 shifts underground was laid downo In 193 6 the 
number of completed shifts necessary to make the miner eligible for the 
minimum of ls. lOd. was decreased to 60 shifts. (
4
) In addition, day's 
(1) Evidence of the G.P.Co to W.N.W.C. (1943L Poll5. 
(2) Mro Wo Gemmill in evidence to the Commissiono 
W.N.W.C. (1943L Para.80o 
(3) "Thus control provided that a mine should become liable to a penalty 
if the average rate of earnings of its native labourers on piece-work 
exceeded a given limit, but at the same time it was provided that if a 
mine became liable to a penalty, it could submit to the Corporation 
details of the price or prices which were paid and particulars regarding 
the results which had been accomplished on piece-work and on day's 
pay on that mine for consideration by an Advisory Committee who would 
recommend to the Board of the Corporation the action that should be 
taken"o 
Evidence of the G.P.C. toW.N.W.C. (1943), Poll4. 
(4) Trammers who had completed 60 shifts underground were paid 2s. 
per shifL 
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pay labourers who had completed 120 shifts underground were paid a 
minimum of 2so per shift. (1) In January,_1943-,.-the"'rrtinimum-rate-of. ,.-- - - '.. ~ 
payment for_surfaceJabour was fixed at ls. 9d. per shift, and the minimum 
---- - -~--- ' - (2) . 
rate for underground labour at 2s. per shift. 
- -- --- ---.,..._ .. ___ -----... - - -
As it turned out, these minimum rates were applicable to a considerable 
number of workers. Of 227 ,000 men employed underground on 17th February, 
1943, 108, 000 (48 per cent) were listed as receiving the minimum of 2s. 
per shift. Despite the smaller numbers employed on the surface on that 
day, the proportion earning the minimum (or below) was less than that of 
the underground workers. Only 3 7 per cent (27, 063) of 73, 265 surface 
workers earned ls. 9d. or less. Nearly 5 o 000 (16 per cent) were listed 
as receiving less than lso 9do per shift. (
3
) This may be accounted for 
by the provision in the W. N. L.Ao contract whereby every African engaged 
under the agreement had to work on the surface during his first twenty-six 
days of employment at mine surface rates of pay with a minimum of lso 
per dayo (4) If found medically fit on the completion of this acclimatization · 
period, the W.N.L-.A. recruit would then be used for underground work 
at the 2s. minimum. 
(1) They had to have actually worked underground at any time for 120 
shifts o 
(2) There was provision in the NRG contract for a probation period of 
14 shifts at a mini.mum of ls o 8d. per shift for those men engaged 
on hammer work for the first time during their contracts. This 
provision appears to have been of little importance because of the 
107 "hammer boys" employed on 17th February, 1943, none earned 
less than 2s. while only five earned the minimum underground wage 
of 2s o per shift. 
Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943L Annexure "C" to 
Statement No. 1. 
(3) Derived from the Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), 
Annexure "C" to Statement No. L 
(4) W. N. L.A. contract formo 
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The African miner was not always rewarded for long service and 
efficiency. (l) Every case was considered on its own merits. This 
had not always been so. A system of bonuses for long service had 
been introduced towards the end of 1919 but was apparently discontinued 
(2) 
around 1936. According to the Lansdown Commission, many deserving 
cases were overlooked "through the inadvertence or indifference of a 
ganger and the reticence of the labourer" (3) as it was the duty of the 
European ganger, either of his own accord or at the prompting of the 
black miner, to recommend an increment. Re-employment provisions 
were more equitable in that length of service and efficiency were taken 
into account. If the African was being paid at a rate above the minimum 
on the completion of his contract, he would be re-employed at the same 
rate if he returned to his old mine, within twelve months in the case of 
"tropicals", eight months in the case of Portuguese miners and six months 
. 11 h (4) m a ot er cases. 
The changes in the minimum rate of pay which had taken place over 
the years and the introduction and subsequent abolition of bonuses for 
long service had no significant effect on the average cash wage of the 
- - - - ·---....:....---- ----...:--·· - - ~ - ---~- -- ~ r- "' 





There was an indirect inducement to the AVS worker to prolong his 
stay on the mines. If he worked underground for a continuous 
period of 270 shifts he was refunded his inward rail fare. 
When the scheme was first introduced in December, 1919, a bonus 
of Ss. per month was paid to each African who continued to work 
after having completed 180 shifts. The bonus was continued if 
he returned to work after an absence of up to 4 months; 
By 1930 the bonus was· only paid to the miner who had continuously 
completed 270 shifts. The East Coast labourer had to return within 
6 months, the "British South African" within 4 months, to be paid 
the additional 2d. per shift (Ss. per month) when he resumed work if 
he had been getting it before he left. 
N.E.C. (1930)·, Para. 817. 
W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.269. 




o~orm or anoth~_i_._e._fr.om_l9.19_to_l93 6, av~rage ca_sh ~ages decreased 
(1) (2) . -- --- --- --
~m 2so 2o 5d. to 2s. L 5d. Also during this period the minimum rate 
-·-&---- ----
for underground work increased by 22 per cent (for the miner who completed 
60 shifts, from lso 6do to lso lOd.) up to 33. 1/3 per cent (on completion 
of 120 shifts, (
3
) from ls. 6do to 2sa )o It was only by January, 1943, 
however, when the minimum rate for underground labour was increased 
to 2so per shift, irrespective of the number of shifts already completed, 
that the average cash earnings for all African miners (4) surpassed the 
levels of 1920 and 192S0(
5
) when the minimum rate had been 25 per cent 
lower. (5) 
The increases in the African miner's minimum rates of pay were 
.Qffs_et by regulating the _:~lative proportion receiving higher rates. 
~ -- - . - - - -~ - ~--- - - -
The.Chamber's explanation for the static condition of average black 
-· ~·- - ----------- -
e~_rnings wa-s that ·the African.miner h~? not shown an increase iri-proat.ictivity - -
over the years" . ----~ ........ A Chamber spokesman 0 in fact, went so far as to assert 
that "the native labourer underground as an individual was no more 
efficient than he was 30 years ago"" (
7
) As can be seen from the chart 
(1) G.M.E. (1921), p.29o 
(2) Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), Annexure "B" to Statement 
No. L 
(3) The number who qualified for the bonus must have been large as the 
average length of service of the African miner in 1931 was alr~ady 
more than 280 shiftso 
N.E.C. (1930), Para.815. 
(4) The average figure for 1942 had been 2so 2a 5d. and that for January, 
1943, 2s.3d. 
Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), Annexure "B" to 
Statement No. L 
(5) For 1930 I 2sa 2o 5do and for 1925, 2s. 2a 8do 
Figure for 1925 from Economic and Wage Commission (1-925), op cito 
Para" 351, p.183. 
(6) From 2s. in 1943 to lsa 6d. up to 19260 
(7) Mr. G.H. Beattie (President in 1936 and 1939, Vice President in 
19 3 4, 3 5 , 3 8, 41 , 4 2 and 44) in evidence before the Lans down 
Commission. 
Star, 2 6. 8. 19 43 o 
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below, the African and Coloured labour force had "apparently" become 
more productive. The Chamber, however, attributed-{his "apparent 
improvement" to the "introduction and greatly extended use of 
~echanisatio.n.!!-. (ll The extent of mechanisation is weH illustrated 
by the fact that the quantity of electrical energy used by the gold mines 
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Employees at work per 1000 tons hoisted per day, Large Producing, Gold 
Mines, 1910-1944. 
Source: 
Social and Economic Planning Council, Report No. 11, p. 3 O. 
(1) Evidence of the G.P.C. toW.N.W.C. (1943), p.29. 
(2) Dr. Bernard Price to a special Meeting of the Chamber, 25. 10. 1946. 
Rand Daily Mail, 26. 10. 1946. 
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Thus despite the difficulties of overcoming "the. continuously increasing 
depth of mining, higher rock temperatures, necessity for greatly increased 
support of working, decrease in stoping width and increased distances 
over which ore is transported", (l) which all worked against an increase 
in the tonnage produced, the African had become more productive, which, 
according to the Chamber, was entirely due to advances in methods of 
mining. (
2
) It is extremely difficult to verify the Chamber's contentions 
about the efficiency of the individual African miner as the apparent 
increase in productivity of just less than 40 per cent between 1920 and 
1945 may have been due solely to the increased use of capital equipment 
or partly to the above and partly to the increasing proficiency of the J 
African minero ~ 
During the early years of gold mining most of the African labourers 
had not been to the Witwatersrand before and had only stayed there for 
comparatively short periods. This position gradually changed._ By 
1943 the m3jority of Af!ic?ans had been there previously, (
3
) while;~­
average length of stay at any one time of the majority of the Union men, 
------ - -(4)~- - . . . 
for example, was .now.~ne.arly- 14 months. Increasing familiarity with 
._.-... .... -- -~-- -- ... .....,. 
=~pdustria1-procB"S-s-us-ua-l-l.:y-leads_to_greater efficiency-2-~As we shall 
see from our subsequent discussion of migrant labour, there is a strong 
presumption that this was so on the gold mines. 
Since Buckle's Report in 1914, the question of piece work payment 
had always been a contentious issue amongst African mineworkers. 
Despite the agitation for greater reliance on payment by results, the 
average number of black workers_e_mp.1.Qyed on piece work declined from 
-------~ -------
(1) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943),. p •. 28. 
(2) Machine drills replaced hand drillers, development of jack-
hammers and mechanical scrapers. 
(3) During the period 1930 to 1942 only 10. 84% of African miners 
engaged from the Cape Province were "new boys". 
Evidence of G. P. C. to W. N. W. C. (1943), Annexure to Statement 
No. 4. 
(4) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), Annexure to Statement 
No. 4. 
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~3. 7 per cent in 1913 (1) toj.~2_pex.._9_e_nt_ JI! 1943. ~2 ) _ 
~verage earnings of pieceworkers in 1943, as in 1913/14, were 
significantly higher than those of day's pay labourers. A good test --- --~-·- - ~ 
was to compare the men engaged on shovelling and tramming. Whereas 
the day's pay men engaged on this work earned 2s. 2d. per shift, the 
pieceworkers employed on shovelling and tramming averaged 2s. 4. 7d. (3) 
r The Chamber's explanation for limiting the opportunity of the African 
. 
miner to_be-paid-according _to_his. "productivity", was that the nature of 
--~-
1 the work carried .out by the individual African labourer made it "impracticable" 
I 
lJ_~_almosJ .all_o_cpup_at!on~ to _pay by _resulto European underground workers engaged in supervising the work of these miners were, however, encouraged 
"to make the best use of the equipment and native labour placed in their 
charge" by the offer of "a reward, the amount of which (was) dependent 
on the results achieved" o (
4
) In view of this it is not clear why a similar 
system could not have been adopted for the African miner, who must surely 
have been as responsive to pecuniary incentives as his European counterparto 
_ The black workers on piecework in 1943 were mainly machine drillers (5) 
and a small proportion of_the men eng.9.,ged on shovelling and tr~mi~~: 
This latter group had declined markedly over the years from 190 42 per cent 
in 1931, to 13. 95 per cent in 1935 0 and to 9o 52 per cent in 19430 (
5
) Again 
the Chamber's rationale was not entirely convincingo Conditions in certain 
sections of a mine might favour piecework for shovelling and tramming, 
while in other sections it was "impossible" to apply the same system. 
The other factors which allegedly inhibited the further adoption of the 
piecework system for shovelling and tramming, vizo , the difficulty of 
(1) N.G.I. (1913), Annexure 15, p, 116. 
(2) Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), Po 280 
(3) ibid 
(4) ibid, p. 24. 
(5) Approximately 80 per cent of a total of more than 41, OOOo 
(6) Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p. 27. 
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assessing a fair price and the possibility of pieceworkers both 
concentrating on easily handled rock and underfilling trucks 0 (1) would 
appear to have been as applicable to the men engaged on piecework as to 
those working on the basis of a day's payo 
The Chamber frequently, and very proudly, referred to the expensive 
research undertaken to facilitate the economic use of its African labour· 
forceo To this end competitions for improving the design of the rock-
drill were organised, as well as investigations into the size and shape 
of the shoveL However, in spite of all its expertise, the Chamber could 
not (or, possibly, would not) devise a method of paying the African 
labourers in terms of results" Or perhaps the individual mines and 
groups which constituted the Chamber, by accepting the principle of 
non-competitiveness, as embodied in the maximum average provision, 
tacitly accepted that the number of highly paid workers should be 
strictly limited" 
In the Report of the Native Economic Commission of 1930, the 
· cost of providing each black miner with free food, quarters and hospital 
treatment was calculated for a number of mines, but not for the industry 
as a whole. The feeding and hospital costs were equivalent to 3. 85d. 
and L 04do respectively for each African per shift workedo All other 
costs to the mines of employing an African labourer, with the exception 
of the capital cost of compound and hospital buildings, were included 
under "other costs". These amounted to So42do per employee, the total 
being 10, 3ld. per shift worked by each African. (
2
) 
Comparable figures for 1942 for all the gold mines of the Witwatersrand, 
members of the Transvaal Chamber of Mines, were So 28do 0 L lSd. and 
60 97d. for food, hospital treatment and "other costs" respectively. 
(1) Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p. 27. 
(2) N.E.C. (1930), Parao 820" 
---- J 
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The total thus amounted 13. 4d. As in 1930, the capital cost of compound 
and hospital buildings was excluded from the above. This was estimated 
in 194 2 to be . 94d. per shift per man. ( l) 
Both in 1930 and 1942 the category "other costs" accounted for more 
·than 50 per cent of the cost of "wages in kind" incurred by each mine 
. (2) 
in employing an African miner. The breakdown below of the 1942 
estimate shows that an exceedingly wide range of expenses was included 




Salaries and wages of compound staff ••..••.•....••• 
Preparation of foodstuffs (including wages) 
Fees to N.R.C. and W.N.L.A. (1939 figure plus 
present rail fare allowance) .••...••.•.•...•.•.•••.• 
(d) Sundry costs - irrecoverable rail fares and advances, 
1. 06d. 
0 0 31 d. 
repatriation fees, etc .•.•.........••... ·.••••..•.•. 0. 08d. 
(e) Passport and registration fees to Union and Portuguese 
Governments and the various Governments of the · 
Tropical Areas "o o ~ o o"' o o fl o fl o of) o o o o o 0 (Io. o f:I e e o ... e e e o 1 o 26do 
(f) W. N. L.A. Hospital - Lazaretto and other charges . • • . 0. 03d. 
(g) Maintenance of compound and hospital buildings . . • . • 0. 47d. 
(h) Fees to local authorities for sanitation, assessment 




Entertainment, education and religion 
Miners' Phthisis Compensation and Accident Premiums 
Clothing and boots 
(1) Fuel, water and light 
(m) Fire insurance 
(n) Other expenditure 000®0000080fJOflGOOOOOaeoe>OE>l!l0'90 
0 0 2 6d. 
o. 04d. 
0.45d. 
o. 3 6d. 
0 0 5 3d. 
O. Old. 
o. 06d. 
Several items do not appear to merit inclusion. The fees to the re-
cruiting agencies (c), and the passport and repatriation fees (e), for example, 
were clearly recruiting costs and not expenditure which benefited the African 
miner. The Chamber included them on the grounds that "a portion of these 
(1) Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), unpublished document. 
(2) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.91. 
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charges are fairly to be 10oked at as an advantage to the Native because 
, , ..... , , .. , his facilities and experience for obtaining employment 
independently of a reputable recruiting organisation are limited". (l) 
However, the Chamber's Statistician did, in fact, concede when 
questioned before the Lansdown Commission, (
2
) that some of the 
items were not chargeable as benefits to the black miners, 
Part of the mines 1 remuneration for labour consisted of free quarters, 
which, for the overwhelming majority of the men, were in "compounds". 
The essential feature of the compound system .was that it involved 
separation of the inmates from their families for the period of their 
contract, With the exception of less than l per cent of the total 
. black labour force employed on the gold mines during 1943, the men 
were not encouraged to bring their wives with them, even though 
55 per cent of them were married, 
The compound system of housing the African worker originated on the 
diamond mines of Kimberley, in order to prevent diamond smuggling by 
confining the labourer to the compound for the total length of his service. 
The gold mining industry subsequently took over the system although this 
rationale for its use was never applicable, In fact, on the Witwatersrand 
gold mines, the African worker was allowed to leave the compound from 
time to time, as on an occasional week-end, 
The Chamber defended its use of migratory labour and compounds 
on both financial and moral grounds. The usual "prohibitive cost" 
argument was that the capital and additional running costs of stabilising, 
say, only 23 per cent of the African labour force - the proportion of 
married Union men employed - would have severely limited the scope of 
operation of the industry, Mines would have had to close down and the 
result would have been unemployment amongst many black workers. 
The moral justification for separating a m~rried man from his family was 
(1) N.E.C. (1930), Para, 820, 
As these items were included in 1942, the rationale_ given in 1930 
was presumably still applicable. 
(2) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.9L 
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that the compounds protected the African against an over-:hasty uprooting 
from his own background and from being precipitated into the strange and 
foreign standards and conventions of a cultural system of which he had 
little understanding o " "The advantage of the compound system", according 
to an official of the Chamber, "is that it gradually accustoms the primitive 
tribal native to the European way of life, while allowing him to retain the 
best in his own cultureo "(1) It was presumably a coincidence that this 
' 
preservation of the African's "own culture" about which the Chamber 
expressed such concern also meant the continued existence of the Reserves., 
which provided the industry with a pretext for continuing to pay low wages 
on the grounds that the Afri.can could always return to the land. 
As in the case of feeding and health requirements, the housing 
conditions of Africans on the mines were governed by the provisions of 
the Native Labour Regulation Act, 1911, and were controlled by the 
Director of Native Labour for the Uniono 
Housing conditions varied with the age of the individual compound, 
the newer compounds being superior primarily with respect to the number 
of men allocated to each roomo -we have little information here except 
what was given in the "additional" evi.dence by the Chamber ( 
2
) on 
conditions on the Simmer and Jack Mi.nes o Rooms to accommodate 80 
(1) Star, 27. 6.1947. 
(2) After the African Mine Workers' Union had given evidence to the 
Lansdown Commission, the Chamber attempted to rebutt some of 
the more specific allegations made in the workers' memorandum. 
The reason for doing so was to dispel the impression left by the 
document, which, "if taken at its face value, might lead to the 
conclusion that all was not right with the Gold Mining Industry 
of the Witwatersrand in regard to the control and handling of 
its Native labour force" o This was indeed a subject on which 
the Chamber seemed hypersensitive. 
.. 
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(1) . 
workers measured 40 feet by 32 feet, up to 40 men were housed in a room 
25 feet square, while the rooms housing 20 men measured 17. 3/4 feet by 
21. 3/4 feeL (
2
) These room size/number of men ratios were probably above 
averageo There was usually a stove with a pipe going up to the roof in 
the centre of the roomo Coal provided by the authorities gave both warmth 
and cooking facilities, while a shelf for the miners 1 possessions ran around 
round the room above the sleeping bunkso However, no lockers or cupboards 
of any sort were providedo There were washing and toilet facilities 0 but 
they were usually some distance from these large concrete rooms. ·Three 
to seven thousand Africans were usually housed. in each compoundo (3) 
(4). 
The bunks or sleeping places were constructed of concrete and the 
sleeper was completely separated from his neighbour either by lying parallel 
to the wall on two tier bunks or by concrete partitions" Concrete was used 
instead of wood because of its superiority from a sanitary and health point 
of view" (5) Vermin were kept down as the bunks were easily hosed and 
the incidence of pneumonia was found to be less in compounds where the 
men slept on partitioned-off concrete bunks" 
(1) As far as possible men of different tribes did not share a room ostensibly 
because inter-tribal warfare was to be preventedo This may have been 
trueo However, there was also the possibility that this was part of a 
policy of "divide and rule" which perpetuated tribal differences and 
was inimical to united action by African miners o 
Buckle implicitly recognised this when he listed as one of three 
safeguards against disturbances emanating from the mine compounds 
the inter-tribal jealousies "which have always rendered it possible, 
in the last resort, to protect Europeans by utilising one tribe against 
anothero " 
N.G.I., (1913), Parao476o 
(2) Evidence of the G,P.C. to W.N,W.Co (1943) o Po 127. 
(3) Orensteiil. 0 Dro A.J. "Diet of Natives on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines," 
Race Relations, First Quarter 19390 Po 160 
(4) First installed on the Rand Mines Group Circa 1914/1915. 
(5) Evidence of the Transvaal Mine Medical Officers' Association, printed 
togetherwith the Evidence of the G.P.C. toW.N.W.C. (1943), PPol20,121. 
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Nevertheless, despite its advantages, concrete is hard 0 uncomfortable 
and cold. A "chill-proof" layer to improve these conditions had formerly 
been provided, but had been dispensed with in 1935 by permission of the 
Director of Native Labour. Thus by 1943 the African miner slept in 
crowded quarters on what he constantly referred to (in evidence to the 
Lansdown Commission) as "sleeping coffins". Blankets and mattresses 
had to be provided by the miners themselves. 
Of all the forms of wages in kind, the provision of adequate free 
food for the African miners most clearly benefited both the industry and \ 
I 
\ 
the Africans themselves. Working on the mines was exhausting and 
energy-consuming - to complete his work, mostly manual and unskilled, 
the African miner had to be fed scientifically to achieve maximum nutritional j 
energy and vitamin value at a low costo A properly balanced diet improved 
his health and raised his productivity. 
Prior to going on shift, each black worker was issued with his daily 
bread rations (5oz.), unsweetened porridge and coffee with sugar. No food 
was provided underground during the course of the day o as no "practicable 
scheme" could be devised. The principal meal of the day was taken during 
the early afternoon when the men returned from their shifts. rt usually 
consisted of "hot 0 hard (Leo non-liquid) mealie meal porridge, beans or 
. (1) 
mealies, and a meat and vegetable stew." Fish was provided in the 
stew for those who preferred it to meat. Three pounds of raw meat per 
man was usually issued weekly, in addition to the meat stew. This meat 
was cooked by the men themselves on the fires in their rooms. During 1943, 
however, as a result of war scarcities, the Government gave instructions 
for the mealie meal and meat rations to be reduced. (
2
) A non-alcoholic 
beverage "Marewu" (fermentedu thin maize meal porridge) was issued twice 
daily and "Kaffir Beer" (made of millet) 0 with an alcoholic content of less 
than 4 per cent 0 twice weekly, (
3
) 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Parao380, 
(2) Rand Daily Mailo 7. 7. 1943. 
(3) Orenstein, op cit, PPol6, 17. 
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The Chamber argued that the "excellent feeding" was "one of the most 
important factors in the popularity of mine work 11 • (1) This may well have 
been true as there do not seem to have been many other reasons why the 
mines should have been "popular" amongst the Africans. 
It was frequently suggested(2) that the fact that the vast majority 
of Africans gained weight whilst employed on the mines, as was. shown 
by the records of their weights, which were taken on arrival, departure and 
at approximately five-weekly intervals during their employment, indicated 
that the rations provided were ample. 
It is indeed true that in spite of the strenuous nature of their work, 
the black miner's physical conditions improved as the result of his mine 
diet. However, this is perhaps not so much a recommendation of the food 
provided on the mines 0 but a reflection on the poor quality and meagre quantity 
of the food supplies of the Reserves. 
Strict precautions were taken to employ only men who were physically 
fit for the strain of mine labour, In pursuance of this aim, the recruit 
was examined in his home area before leaving for the Witwatersrand, on 
his arrival at the W, N. LA. compound in Johannesburg 0 and again when he 
first arrived at a mine by the mi.ne 0s own medical officer, 
The African accepted for employment was well looked after. Every 
man was examined as he returned from his shift and, if necessary, treated 
at the dressing stations. If the injury needed more than first aid treatment 
or if he became ill, the African miner was sent to one of the 43 mine 
hospitals, (3) These hospitals provided beds for just over 2 per cent of the 
total African labour force, which allowed a constant reserve as the number 
in hospital had never been higher than L 5 per cent. In hospital the 
(1) Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C, (1943), p. 13, Para, 6. 
(2) For example,see the Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), 
p. 13, Para. 6 and the Star of 25. 5. 1943. 
(3) There were nearly 8, 000 beds on the mine hospitals in 1943 as 
compared to a total of approximately 18, 000 throughout the Union 
for non-Europeans in 1940. 
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African was cared for by a medical officer of the mine medical service. 
There were more than 60 such medical officers, which meant a ratio of 
one doctor to approximately 6,000 men, or a doctor for every 90 patients. 
The European nursing staff ratio was one for every 30 beds, while there 
was, on average, an African nurse for every 17 or 18 beds. (l) 
Each day spent by a patient in the hospital was taken as a shift 
worked towards the completion of his contract. He received no pay, 
however, unless he did light work and then only at the convalescent 
rate of lso 6do per day, 
Considerable importance was attached to preventing accidents. 
Propaganda and "safety first" measures, as well as the training of 
10 to 15 per cent of the African labour complenient on each mine in First 
Aid, reduced the death rate per 1, 000 per annum from 2. 60 in 1930 to 2. 20 
in 1935 o and L 74 in 1940 to 1. 48 in '1943. (2) 
< 
Although feeding and health conditions were closely related and it 
was in the interests of the mines to maintain high standards in this 
respect, certain diseases had by 1946 become more prevalent because 
of cost-reducing changes made in the dieL 
Reviewing the incidence of disease among its African labour force 
over a number of years 0 the Department of Health of the Central Mining -
Rand Mines Group(
3
) found that although the number of shifts lost owing 
to accidents had been steadily declining, since 1942 (
4
) there had been 
(1) Star, 24.801943. 
Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. o (1943L PPo 14, 150 
Memorandum of the Transvaal Mi!)e Medical Officer's Association 
rebutting certain allegations contai.ned in the Statement submitted 
by the African Mine Workers 1 Union printed in Evidence of the G. P. C. 
to W.N.W.C. (1943), PPo 130-1370 
(2) T.C.M. (1943}u Po 1250 
(3) This group employed nearly a third of the total black labour 
force of the industry. 
(4) The disease death rate per thousand men had decreased from 5. 02 
in 1938, to 3. 03 in 1939 and 2. 94 in 1942. 
Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C, (1943), p. 16, Para. 9. 
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a slight but progressive increase in the shifts lost through disease. (l) 
The Report stated: 
" 'The rise in the disease rates, in particular those of 
respiratory di.seases 0 and the increase in shifts lost 
can reasonably be related to the food shortages. In 
fact, it is difficult to escape the conclusion that they 
are so related. This conclusion (was) supported by 
comparative tables which (showed) a steady rise in the 
cost of food per Native from 1936 to 1939 and a steep rise 
from 1940 to 1945 .•••.• Overall feeding costs for the 
group rose from £767, 680 in 1939 to £1, 140, 148 in 1945 
over which period the average number of natives employed 
fell from 103, 226 to 94, 878. . In regard to these figures 
the Report added~ It should be noted that the increased 
costs were not due to increases in foodstuffs consumed. 
On the contrary, owing to the shortages of certain food-
stuffs the issues, particularly of meat, had to be curtailed.' 
The result was that the African workers received insufficient first 
class protein and animal fat to do hard manual work, as the increases 
in the issues of second-class protein and vegetable fat (in the form 
of beans and peanuts) did not compensate for the curtailment of part 
of the meat ration. "(2) · . 
In addition to providing the food, quarters and medical attention 
already discussed, the industry assisted the African miner in several 
other respects as welL 
The deferred .pay system was an attempt by the industry partly to 
encourage its workers to share their earnings with their dependants and 
partly to ensure that a proportion of the mineworker's cash earnings was 
spent in the area from which he was recruited. For the "tropicals" and 
other "foreign" mine labourers there existed a system of compulsory 
deferment of pa; whereby the African miner received a fixed proportion (3) 
of his cash earnings only on his return home. The black workers of the 
(1) There is a strong presumption that this was the situation throughout 
the ind us try. 
(2) Umteteli Wa Bantu, 27. 8. 1946. 
"Poverty Hunger and Disease" by Margaret Ballinger 0 M. P. 
(3) The minimum percentage was laid down in the Agreement which 
permitted recruiting. 
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Union and High Commission Territories were not compelled to forego 
the collection of any portion of their cash wages until the completion 
of their contracts, but couldu however, take advantage of a deferred 
payment system which was entirely voluntary. The miner indicated 
the amount he wished to draw each pay day (on completion of 30 shifts), 
while the remaining amount was put aside and 8 with any other sums 
saved and deposited' with the compound manager, was returned to him 
upon returning home after completion of his contract. 
A certain amount of the deferred pay was retained by the Native 
Recruiting Corporation to meet i.mmediate demands. The balance.was 
paid over to a Government-appointed body, the Deferred Pay Interest· 
Board of Control, (l)which invested it in Government Securities at 
L 3/4 per cent and distributed the interest to undertakings and institutions 
directly associated with the welfare of Africans. From the establishment 
of the Voluntary Deferred Pay System i.n 1918,the total distributed in this 
way had, by 1943,amounted to approximately £148, 000. (2) In that year 
the interest on the fund 0s deposits amounted to £9 0 800, the services of 
the board being utilised by over 49 per cent of South African and Protectorate 
mineworkers. (
3
) The scheme had certainly grown in importance; whereas 
. the amount of deferred wages paid out for the five years 192 6 to 193 0 was 
(1) The Board consisted of three Government nominees and three represen-
tatives of the N. R. C., with the Di.rector of Native Labour as Chairman. 
(2) W.N.W.C. (1943), Appendix M. 
(3) Evidence of Mr. J. H. Tandy, Acting Director of Native Labour and ex 
officio chairman of the Deferred Pay Interest Fund and Mr. P. J. Bennett, 
secretary of the Fund to the W. N. W. C. 
Star 29. 5. 1943. 
The system had enjoyed immediate popularity among the recruited 
African miners from the Union and Protectorates and 28 per cent by 
1920, 33 per cent by 1925 and 52 per cent by 1930 had elected to come 
under the sys tern. 
N. E. C. Para. 9 2 7. 
The figure for 1943 included all workers 0 whether contracted or 
A.V.S. 
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£775, 000, (1) the annual figure paid to. the workers at their homes by the 
1940 1s was about £750,000. (2) 
The interest from deposits for safekeeping or remittance and of sums 
retained under the deferred pay system amounted in the aggregate to a 
considerable amount, but the individual sums were so small as to make 
it impracticable to distribute the interest among the black miners. If the 
African miner had been given the interest which accrued from his money, 
each man would have received on the average about 2s. per annum. 
However, this would have involved the N. R. C. in tremendous additional 
expenses - the administrative costs in 1943 already amounting to 
£3 0 000 per annum (
3
) - which would hardly have been justified. In 
allocating grants the Board aimed at directing the money where it would 
best benefit the mine labourer and his family. Most of the beneficiaries 
were religious missions and churches a hospitals 0 welfare and sports 
organisations. No money was voted for the education of the Africana 
this bei.ng a "matter for the Government". (
4
) 
Certain articles of protective clothing were provided free, while 
others were sold below cost to the black miner. Each underground worker 
received a free issue of a protective jacket as protection against the cold, (5) 
and, wh~n considered "desirable", a free set of shin and leg guards. 
The boots which were issued to the underground workers, and to those 
surface workers who were required to wear boots for protection while at 
work, cost 16s. 6d. per pair, but were supplied to the African miner at 14s. 6d, 
(1) N.E.C. (1930), Para, 928. 
(2) Star, 29. 5, 1943. 
The discrepancy in the totals for 1930 and 1940 was in part due 
to differences in the numbers employed and in part to the increased 
use of the remittance scheme, 
(3) W.N.W.G. (1943), Para.419, 
(4) Star, 29.5.1943. 
(5) At an annual cost of £ 120, 000, 
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Evidence on the life of a pair of such mine boots varied. Mr. F. C. 
Geary, boot inspector of the N. R. C., claimed that a pair which had been 
properly cared for lasted for from 90 to 270 shifts for underground workers, 
( 1) 
and from 12 to 24 months for surface workers" African miners questioned 
at random by the Lansdown Commission had unanimously stated that their 
(2) 
boots lasted only two or three months. The "life expectancy" of a 
pair of boots included one series of repairs which cost the labourer 
7s. 6d. (3) 
Contrary to the generally recognised principle of providing employees 
with such protective wear as is demanded by the nature of the work 
performed, the black underground labourer had to incur a heavy expense 
in providing his own boots, If we accept the estimates of the Chamber(
4
) 
this amounted to £2. Ss. lOd. per annum (for 2 pairs of boots (
5
) and 2. 1/4 
sets of repairs) 0 (
6) while 0 according to the labourers themselves the 
expenditure each year for an underground worker on boots and repairs 
was £4. 8s, Od. (four pairs and four sets of repairs), In either case the 
burden on the mineworker in 1942 who earned an average cash wage of 
£2. 17s. 5d. per month (of 26 shifts) was enormous. 
(1) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p, 118. 
(2) Star~ 18. 8. 1943. 
(3) The Crown Mines were an exception in that they provided free repairs 
of a 11 boots. 
W. N . W. C . ( 19 4 3), Para, 2 9 5 , 
(4) The Lansdown Commission concluded that "in some cases the lifetime 
of the article (was) shorter" than the Chamber estimate, 
W.N.W.C. (1943), Para, 292. 
(5) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p~36. 





The black labour force of the Witwatersrand Gold Mines consisted 
almost entirely of men from the reserves and neighbouring territories 
who had left their families behind. There was, however, a small 
group of workers, distinct from the mine labourers, who were permanent 
employees of the mines and lived on the Witwatersrand with their families. 
They were, for the most part, the clerks and "indunas" who numbered 
approximately 1900. (l) 
This had always been so. The Native Economic Commission of 
1932 (2) stated that of an African labour force of approximately 198, 000 (3) 
employed on the gold mines, only lo 518 men were housed with their families. 
By 1943 the position was not much improved and only • 84 per cent (
4
) of the 
African labour force, about 2, 455 men, lived permanently on the Witwatersrand 
during January of that year. (
5
) 
The recommended scale of wages and other conditions of employment 
of these workers were contained in "Standing Instructions" issued by the ' . 
Gold Producers' Committee in 1939. (
5
) As we shall see these recommended 
conditions differed significantly from those of the migrant labourer. 
All married clerks (usually termed "mabalans ") were to be provided 
I 
w,ith rent-free living accommodation for their families on the mines. 
(1) According to the Lansdown Commission, the number of clerks was 1, 935. 
(W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.96). 
In the breakdown on the classification of surface work given by the 
Chamber of Mines, "indunas" and clerks numbered 1, 87 L 
(Evidence of the G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), Annexure "C" 
to Statement No. 1). 
(2) N.E.C. (1930), Para. 833. 
(3) The Commission used the term "at present" but did not state in which 
year or month. By definition the actual number of permanent workers 
was unlikely to alter although the total number varied greatly. We 
have used the total for 19th May, 1931, given in Annexure 21 - IV, p. 300. 
(4) Evidence ofG.P.C. toW.N.W.C. (1943), p.30. 
(5) The 193 2 figure was • 77 per cent. 
(6) W.N.W.C. (1943), p.52. 
l 
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Because of lack of suitable accommodation on the mines, a few clerks 
lived outside the mining properties with their families. Some of them 
received an allowance of 3 Os. per month in lieu of this accommodation, 
while others did not receive the benefit of this allowance. Unmarried 
clerks lived in the compounds in accommodation separated from the 
latter but received the same cooked rations as mine labourerso The 
married men who lived with their families were supplied with free fuel, 
light and uncooked rations for themselves as well as for their families. 
The 1939 Instructions recommended the classification of the clerks 
into three grades for which the respective minimum rates were £4, £6 and 
£7. 10s. for each 30 shifts worked, a scale of £7. 10s. to £10. per 30_ 
shifts for "indunas" 0 and a minimum of £3 for each 30 shifts worked by 
probationers. However, these recommended wage rates had little 
resemblance to those actually operative in 1943. The Chamber's 
classification of surface workers listed only "indunas" and first and 
second grade clerks. Moreover, approximately forty-five per cent of the 
"indunas" received less than £7. 10s. per 30 shiftso (l) 
Leave arrangements for clerks varied from mine to mine.. Unpaid 
leave was generally granted through a discharge which was cancelled if 
the clerk returned before the expiry of the period arranged between 
himself and the Mine Manager. (
2
) In the same way promotions and 
increases in wages were the ad hoc decisions of the mine management; 
furthermore, there was no scheme for promotion within the grades. 
A "sympathetic attitude" was recommended in the matter of allowing 
meetings of the clerks' "trade union" in the compounds. (
3
) In addition, 
by 1943 the Chamber recognised the association even though it was not a 
(1) Derived from the Evidence of the G. P. C. to W. N. W. C. (1943), 
Annexure "C" to Statement No. 1. 
(2) Evidence of the Witwatersrand Gold Mines Native Clerks' Association 
toW.N.W.C. (1943), Para.5. 
(3) W.N.W.C. (1943), p.$2 
"Standing Instructions" issued in 1939. 
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registered trade union, (l) It appears that it was mainly due to this that 
many clerks suspected the association of being under the influence of 
the Chamber, with the result that the membership was small relative to 
(2) 
the total number of clerks, Nevertheless, in spite of these suspicions, 
the Lansdown Commission suggested that "recognition of the association 
(had) led to improvement in the status of clerks" 0 (3) 
(1) The Association claimed to have existed as early as 1920 as the 
"African Mine Clerks 0 Association" and.have changed its name to 
the "Witwatersrand Gold Mines Native Clerks' Association" on 
re-organisation in 19360 
Evidence of the Witwatersrand Gold Mines Clerks' Association 
to W.N.W.C. (1943)0 
A.W.G. Champion, in his capacity as Chairman, gave evidence 
to the Mining Regulations Commission (1925) on behalf of the 
"Transvaal Mine Clerks' Association". 
(2) Variously given by the Association as 54 7 in its Memorandum and 
later as 400 in evidenceo 
Star, L 60 19430 
(3) W.N.W.C. (1943), Parao96o 
APPENDIX 8, 
Percenti.le histograms of rates per shift 
for all African employees of th~ 
Witwatersrand gold mines" 1931 and 1943, 
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ASSUMPTIONS FOR DIAGRAM: 
For the purposes of the diagrammatic representation, the following 
assumptions have been made regarding shift wages as recorded in the 
sources from which the diagram was derived: 
For 1931, rates "less than ls" 8d. " were taken as 19d. 
For 1943, rates "less than ls. 9do" were taken as 20d. 
rates "over 9so" and "over lls." were taken as not 
exceeding 11 s" 6d" 
The percentages at shift rates from 6ld. to 138d. are represented in the 
diagram by the small rectangles detached from the base line. 
EXAMINATION OF THE DIAGRAM SHOWS THE FOLLOWIN.G: 
Both in 1931 and in 1943, shift rates were centred around 25d. , the 
modal class being in each case 23d. to 25d. Only a small percentage of 
employees were at rates above 3 6do (So 5 per cent in 1931 and 1943, to one 
decimal place). 
Ignoring any minor alteration in the percentages at rates above 
3 6d. , one may say that from 1931 to 1943 the total percentage in the 
classes II 19do II and II 20d. to 22do II oecreased by 15. 2 per cent I from 
26. 4 per cent to 11. 2 per cent; and the percentage in higher shift rate 
classes increased correspondingly" The increase was mainly in the 
next higher classes, i.e. in the class "23d. to 25d. ", an increase of 
6. 2 per cent, from 39. 8 per cent to 46 per cent, and in the class 
"26do to 28d. ", an increase of 5. 1 per cent, from 18. 9 per cent to 
24. 0 per cent. 

APPENDIX C, 
Average cash wages per shift of A.frican 
labour on, ~he Witwatersrand gold minesu 
1930 _, 1942, 
Jan. 
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AVERAGE CASH EARNINGS OF ALL AFRICANS ON THE 
WITWATERSRAND PRODUCING GOLD MINES, 1933 - January, 1943. 
Per Month 
Year Per Shift of 26 Shifts 
1933 2s. 1. 2d. 54s. 7d. 
1934 2s. 1. 2d. 54s. 7d. 
1935 2s. 1. 2d. 54s. 7d. 
1936 2s. 1. 5d. 55s. 3d. 
1937 2s. 1. 6d. 55s. 6d. 
1938 2s. 1 .. 9d. 56s. ld. 
1939 2s. 2. 2d. 56s. 9d. 
1940 2s. 2. 3d. 56s. lld. 
1941 2s. 2.4d. 5 7s. 2d. 
1942 2s. 2.5d. 5 7s. 5d. 
1943 2s. 3. Od. 58s. 6d. 
SOURCE: 
Evidence of the Gold Producers 1 Committee of the Transvaal Chamber 
of Mines to the Witwatersrand Mine Native Wages Commission, 
Statement No. 1 : Annexure "B". 
'I, 
AFRICAN LABOUR -CONDITIONS : .THE 
MIGRANT; HIS INCOME A.ND EXPENDI~ 
TUR-E" 
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One of the characteristics of African economic development has 
been the migration of large numbers of Africans from their homes to 
towns, mines, and plantations, to supplement their claims on the 
subsistence economy with a money income. During the early stages 
of contact with the money economy, "the peasants produced a cash 
crop on a spare-time basis while continuing to produce their subsistence 
requirements. The migrant labour system is a counterpart of that, 
representing a partial entry into the wage economy. Under this 
system, those who came to work in the mines and plantations still 
retained a foothold in the subsistence economy". (1) Initially 
migration occurred because of the difference between the economic 
opportunities in different regions. However, when the voluntary 
supply of migrant labour became inadequate, direct and, more often, 
indirect pressure, in the form of poll, or hut taxes, (
2
) was applied. 
New wants and luxuries gradually became semi-necessities and 
contributed to the flow of labour. This, indeed, was the pattern of 
development in South Africa, where the discovery of diamo!).dS and gold 
gave rise to a nearly unsatiable demand for migrant labour. Over the 
years the gold mining industry became the epicentre or vortex of the 
system, drawing workers from far afield. The extent of this has been 
picturesquely described by the Chamber of Mines itself: 
"They come on foot, on horseback, on bicycles, by dug-out 
canoe, by lake and river streamers, in lorries, by train and 
some even by air. They come from as far afield as 2, 000 
miles. They come from all points of the compass - from the 
peaceful hills of the Transkei, from the lion country of the 
Bechuanaland bush, down the broad reaches of the Zambes i, 
from the tropical shores of Lake Nyasa and the mountain 
fastnesses of Basutoland. They come, too, in their 
thousands from the hills and vallt~ys of Portuguese East 
Africa, from the rocky uplands of Sekukuniland, the 
tangled swamp country of the Okavango delta and the 
(1) Myint, H. The Economics of the Developing Countries, 
Hutchinson, 1964, p. 58. 
(2) The poll tax was levied on every African over a certain age while 
the hut tax depended on the ownership of huts. 
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green fields of Swazilando From these far corners 
of Southern Africa men from more than 100 different 
tribes are.attracted every year to the Witwatersrand 
by the magnet of the mining industry". (1) 
The vital importance of the gold mining industry to the development 
of South Africa. has already been discussed. (
2
) The industry was, in tum, 
dependent on migrant labour which was "a fundamental factor" (3) in its 
profitability. The migrant's "income" from the Reserves was taken into 
account when his requirements were assessed, as he earned this income 
"largely as a result of, the fact that he (was) granted ..•.•••. o land to 
cultivate, and pasturage, with practically free occupation of both" by the 
Government. This 'substantial subsidy' enabled him to work ~'in the 
intermittent fashion which suits him and accords with his historic 
background and tribal circumstances ... (
4
) The industry was based on the 
labour of the landed African 0 who accepted work on the mines at the then 
existing rates of payo 
The Chamber contended that the remedy for the comparatively less 
fortunate landless class of African miner was the provision of more lando 
If the employment of these men required higher wages, then, .like the 
urbanised African 0 they would become "unsuitable" for work on the gold 
mines. Furthermore, it was suggested that the economic position of the 
"average,; employee should be considered when assessing the requirements 
of the black miner, as the landless African constituted an insignificant 
proportion of the total employedo (5) 
The Chamber's efforts to perpetuate the migrant labour system are 
understandable. The switch-over to a stabilized labour force would 
(1) Mining Survey, June 1951 0 T. C. M. o quoted by Hobart Houghton, D 0 
"Men of Two Worlds: Some Aspects of Migratory Labour", S.A.J.E., 
1960' pp. 181, 1820 
(2) See p. 119. 
(3) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p.160. 




have involved raising wages and the heavy expenses of converting a 
casual labour force into a permanent oneo However, the Chamber did 
not stop at this but went on to justify the system on moral groundso 
The word "monstrous 11 was used to describe the process of the "detribalizing 
and converting" of the African "into a discontented black proletariat 
in the towns."( 1) 
It is difficult to believe that the Chamber was, in fact, entirely 
serious when it asked the rhetorical question: "Is there any other body 
of workers in the world so fortunately situated?" (
2
) Apparently it was, 
for in evidence to the Native Laws Commission of 1947, the Chamber 
asserted that the migratory system gave the African labourers 'a freedom 
no other worker in the world enjoys, enabling them to retain their valuable 
heritage and yet be free to choose the occupation they wish, when they 
wish, and for as long as they wisho 11( 3) This statement goes far beyond 
mere special pleading in its idealisation of a far from ideal situationo 
In evidence before the Commission, the reference to the "miserable 
and depressed conditions in the Reserves 11 was denounced by the Chamber 
as a "parrot cry sedulously echoed by agitators and Parliamentarians" o (
4
) 
The average black miner had, on the basis of the Chamber's estimates, 
"a considerable surplus of earnings over his economic requirements", 
which "he could easily augmento •• o. o o o. o by increasing to some extent 
his period of work on the mines without detriment to his tribal and family 
life". (5) As we shall see, this standard rationalisation was largely 
devoid of substanceo 
There had been a gradual tendency, with the passage of time, for 
the black miners from what was for many years classified as British 
(1) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p.150. 
(2) ibid 
(3) Evidence of G.P.C. to Native Laws Commission of Enquiry (1947), p.39. 
(4) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N. W.C. (1943), Po 156. 
(5) ibid, p.174. 
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South Africa (1) to become "more regular workers". At the tum of the century 
. (2) 
they spent an estimated 3 to 6 months away from home, by 1924 the 
Chamber insisted on nine months 1 contracts, and by 1931 the average 
length of service was lOo 88 months, (3) By 1942 the average period of 
service was 352 shifts 0 which was equal to 13. 6 calendar months; the 
total period of absence from home for each visit to the mines averaged 
about 14 months. (
4
) Together with this increase in the length of service 
between 1931 and 1942, there had 0 in addition, been a decrease in the 
time spent by each man at home between periods of work, The average 




the comparable figure for 1943 was 7. 6 months. Over 20 per cent of the 
British South African labour force which had previously been employed on 
the mines (
7
) in 1943, had returned "after what may be regarded as no 
more than a holiday visit to the Reserves". {
3
) The breakdown of the 
time spent in the Reserves by these men is given below: (
9
) 
(1) Africans from the Union and the Protectorates, 
(2) South African Native Affairs Commission (1903-05) 0 Para. 365. 
(3) N.E.C. (1930),Para,815. 
(4) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p.35. 
The balance was the time spent travelling to and from the Reserves 
and other inevitable absences from home. 
(5) N.E.C. (1930), Para. 816. 
(6) W. N. W. C. (1943) 0 Para. 202. 
(7) More than 80 per cent. 
( 8) W. N • W. C . ( 19 4 3) 0 Para, 2 0 9 , 
(9) ibid, Appendix "I", p. 55. 
------------------------------------------• 
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Duration of time spent in Reserves between periods of work by 
British South Africans previously employed on the mines, (Novo 1943) 
Months . Percentage 
1 7o96 










12 and over 36.26 
These percentages are significant as they show that many African miners 
worked on the mines almost continuously a The Lansdown Commission 
considered the 1943 average length of service (13 o 6 months) and stay at 
( 1) 
home (7 0 6 months) to be a "wholesome standard". By implication the 
Commissioners therefore acknowledged that there was "undue interference" 
in the family lives of 45 per cent of the meno For many of them the 
Reserve income was only a mytho It was the poorer classes who would 
have desired to augment their earnings, yet, contrary to the over-simplified 
' . 
suggestion by the Chamber that they could choose mine work when they 
wished and for as long as they wished, the expedient of working for longer 
periods was not open to themo 
In the course of outlining the "social structure" of the African people 
in its evidence before the Native Laws Commission of 1947 u the Chamber 
stated that the change from a migratory to a permanent labour force would 
be so great that "those opposed to the present system (Leo migratory) 
should produce the most convincing reasons before any deliberate attempt 
to make even a partial change is contemplatedo o ••. o . o the ultimate results 
of any ill-considered action might prove disastrous to the people of South 
Africa as a whole". (2) In the next breath, however, the Chamber gave the 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Parao243. 
(2) Evidence of G.P.C. to N.L.C. (1947), p. 37, Para. I. 
- 171 -
very reason why the migratory system should not have been retained. 
It said: "In the tribal system of the native people of South Africa there 
is a clearly defined structure of which the family unit is the root". (1) 
By striking at the family 0 the migratory labour system threatened the 
whole social structure of the African, without replacing it with anything 
elseo The Inter-Departmental Committee on Urban Natives (the Smit 
Committee) of 1942 referred to the "maladjustment arising from broken 
family ties" in respect of Africans in compoundso It was common to all 
societies that the "family (was) the fundamental unit upon which the 
community is built. A system which runs contrary to the maintenance 
of this unit of social life is in essence unsoundo •• o •••••• the Committee 
(had) received extensive evidence of the detrimental results of broken 
family life". (2) 
The social evils resulting from the migrant labour system was not 
confined to its disastrous effects on African family lifeo It was suggested 
by many witnesses that the system of African contract labour, which meant 
long separations between husband and wife and distorted the sex ratios 
in the country and the towns 0 was largely responsible for the increasing 
prevalence of adultery, prostitution 0 venereal disease 8 juvenile delinquency 
etc. 0 among the African peopleo The evidence of the South African Institute 
of Race Relations was typical of these views: · 
·"The long separations of husbands and wives cause unfaithfulness 
on both sides, and undermine the discipline of the home in relation 
to childreno African homes are in effect "broken homes" for a 
large part of their existence, and social workers know that the 
"broken home" is at the heart of a great many grave social 
problems, such as adultery 0 desertion, prostitution, juvenile 
delinquency, and adult crime" o (3) 
(1) Evidence of G.P.C. to N.L.C. (1947), p. 37, Parao 2o 
(2) Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health 
and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives of the Department of 
Native Affairs 0 (1942), Para. 47. 
(3) Evidence of South African Institute of Race Relations to W. N. W. C. 
(1943), p. 7. , Para. 3 6. 
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The Chamber's contrary view was summed up in this unconvincing 
argument: 
"It has been said that the compound system leads to immorality. 
This is the result of regarding the problem through European eyes. 
The fact is that, fundamentally o the sex life of a tribal native 
is covered by a very strict codeo As an example of this, it 
should be recognised that irt a number of native tribes from the 
time it is established that a woman is pregnant until her baby 
is weaned, sex relationship between man and wife cease. 
All credit is due to the native male for the traditional manner 
in which he accustoms himself to practise continence during 
such periods, which are not infrequently spent at work on the 
gold mines. It is, perhaps, unfortunate in this respect that 
the high moral standard of the vast majority should fail to 
receive public recognition through the failure of the comparatively 
few to live up to the standards laid down by· tribal law and custom. 
Moral standards are generally lower in detribalised urban communities 
than in the native territories. Antagonists of the compound system 
refer vaguely to the growth of ill-health 0 illicit liquor sellers, 
prostitution, venereal disease and all those consequences of 
vicious living as though they can be directly traced to this 
system. In point of fact 0 the reverse is the case. Tribal 
ethics tend to lessen excessive impulses among natives from 
the Rese;rves ". (1) 
This statement tells us a great deal about the Chamber's attitudeo It 
shut its eyes to the problems, and did not face them. 
In the words of Professor D. Hobart Houghton, migratory labour is 
"an evil canker at the heart of our whole society o wasteful of labour, 
destructive of ambition, a wrecker of homes and a symptom of our 
fundamental failure to create a coherent and progressive economic societyo .. (2) 
The trend, which has been discussed above 0 for Africans to work on the 
gold mines for longer and longer periods and spend less time in the 
reserves exacerbated an already serious problemo 
(1) Evidence ofG.P.C. to N.L.Co (1947) 0 p.3lo Parao9. 
(2) Hobart 0 Houghton, Do 0 "Men of Two Worlds: Some Aspects of 
Migratory Labour/' S.A.JoE. 0 1960, Po 189. 
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The Commission admitted that the mining industry was under no 
further obligation as regards wages than to make up the difference between 
the African's Reserve income and the amount required to keep his family 
and him.self. Because of the "community of benefit and obligation which 
(existed) between the Government and the gold mining industry", it was 
considered "unnecessary" and "unprofitable" to examine the argument 
that the income from the Reserves should be regarded in the same light 
as the private income of a European employee. (l) The Smit Committee of 
1942 had earlier investigated the problem and found that such an argument 
for low wages was only acceptable "if it (was) considered equitable that 
industry should accept what would amount to a subsidy from the employee 
fortunate enough to possess private resources, a frankly untenable 
position". (2) It was 8 in fact, argued by witnesses (
3
) before the Lansdown 
Commission that it was actually the Reserves which subsidised the gold 
mining industry, for cheap migrant labour made otherwise "non-payable" mines 
profitable to shareholders. In addition, the subsidised gold mines, through 
-taxation, assisted nearly every region and sector, except the Reserves. 
The serious and progressive deterioration of the Reserves referred to by, 
inter alia, the Native Affairs Commission in its Report for the years 
1937-38 - "it is notorious that the existing native locations and 
reserves are congested, denuded, over-stocked, eroded and for the 
most part in deplorable condition" (
4
) - is hard to reconcile with the picture 
of the migratory labour system depi.cted by the Chamber of Mines. It has, 
on the contrary, been used to add weight to the argument that the reserves 
were bled in the interests of the mines and other sectors. 
Conditions in the reserves were i.nvestigated at some length by the 
Lansdown Commissi.on which visited some of the areas in the Cape, Natal 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.224. 
(2) Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health 
. and Economic Conditions of Urban Natives of the Department of 
Native Affairs, (1942}, Para. 47. 
(3) See I for example I Evidence of Dt. G. w. Gale to the w. N. w. c. 
(1943). 
(4) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para,122. 
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and the Transvaal 8 and also sent out questionnaires to ascertain 
relevant information. With few exceptions it was found that the 
Reserves had become overpopulated and overstocked, causing a decline 
in the productivity of the land. The economic condition of the inhabitantE? 
,, ( 1) 
had consequently been "detrimentally affected" o 
Although the Chamber had contended that the Transkei: was 
"practically self-supporting from the food point of view 8 the import 
of grain being very small" 0 (
2
) it was found that there had been a serious 
decline of grain production in that area and a steady increase in the 
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The accepted requirements per unit of population were 2o 7 5 bags of grain 
per annum; the average available for consumption$ taking account of the 
maize consumed while green and the maize imported both by rail and road, 
was estimated to be only L 6 bags per head per annum (
4
) over the period 
1939-420 
In the Ciskei, too, grain production fell far below the needs of the 
inhabitants, The yield in 1943 was approximately 8, 1 bags per family 
per annum as against the accepted requirements of l3o 75 bags. (
5
) 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Parao 12L 
(2) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943L Po lOL 
(3) W,NoW.C. (1943), Paraol38, 
(4) ibi.d8 Para, 140, 
(5) ibid 8 Para. 149, 
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The South African Institute of Race Relations Memorandum to the 
Lansdown Commission quoted the following description of the Glen Grey 
district in the Ciskei which appeared in the South African Medical 
Journal of 1943: 
"It is erroneous to regard a Native Reserve as an agricultural 
area. It. would be more accurate to speak of it as a well-
spread residential area, where the average family unit makes 
no more out of his land than the average city dweller pottering 
around in his backyard gardeno .••••• o •••• As an agricultural 
venture, this Native Reserve must be regarded as a total 
failure, Not only are its production figures negligible, but 
the methods employed by the residents in their efforts to squeeze 
a livelihood off the land are destructive. Overstocking has 
denuded the veld and started soil erosion on a large scale". (1) 
The same Memorandum quoted the Third Interim Report of the Industrial 
and Agricultural Requirements Commission: 
"There is every likelihood that production will decline 
(in the Reserves) as the cumulative effect of soil depletion 
and erosion gathers momentumo If unchecked, a continuation 
of the situation now prevailing in the Reserves must undermine 
a large part of the Union's land resources"o (2) 
Not all soil exhaustion and erosion can be attributed to the system of 
migrant labour; there are several other contributory causes, such as the 
system of land tenure. An important factor must also have been the 
absence of the younger men, Leo of the more vigorous elements of the 
population, for increasingly long periods which must have adversely 
affected efficient farming techniques and animal husbandryo 
With regard to the reserves in the Cape Province, the Commission 
concluded, therefore, that insufficient crops were reaped and insufficient 
stock owned to feed the resident population. Numerically u the Cape was 
of considerable importance to the mi.nes, as 30 per cent of the total 
(1) Evidence of South African Institute of Race Relations to W. N. W. C. 
(1943) 0 Po 4o 8 Para. 220 
(2) ibid, Po So, Para. 23, 
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employed and 50 per cent of the British South Africans employed on the 
gold mines during 1946 came from the Cape Provinceo (l) 
Conditions in the reserves of the Transvaal 0 Natal and Zululand, 
and Swazilandu were considered to be satisfactory; in the rest of British 
South Africa (Orange Free State o Basutoland and Bechuanaland) they were 
similar to those which prevailed in the Cape Province. The number employed 
from the former areas in 1946 was approximately 13 per cent of the total, 
and from the latter 17 per cent, The "foreign" blacks on the gold mines 
of the Witwatersrand during 1946 numbered approximately 40 per cent of the 
. (2) 
total employed, The Governments of Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland 
and Portuguese East Africa refused to give evidence to the Lansdown 
Commission, so that the investigation of conditions in these areas were 
severely hampered, Nevertheless, on the information available, it was 
felt that the "foreign" miners were a "good deal better" off than the Union 
and High Commission Territory men, (
3
) 
The uneven distribution of wealth was a feature repeatedly referred 
to by the Lansdown Commission, While some families owned no stock 
and had no arable land to cultivate, a small wealthy minority, on the other 
hand, not only had the use of many acres of land but also owned many 
cattle and sheep. The range of wealth 0 especially in the Union reserves 0 
was very great, In the Transkei 0 for example 0 officials estimated that 
approximately 20, 000 married men (out of a population of approximately 
260, 000 families) were without allotments in 1943, (
4
) A typical survey 
of the Territory showed that 44 per cent of the families had no cattle 0. 
20 per cent owned from l to 5 head, and the remaining 36 per cent more 
than 5 head, (S) The extent of the mal-distribution was extremely large -
( 1) Evidence of G. P. C. to NoL.C. (1947), p.17, 
(2) ibid 
(3) W.N.W.C. (1943) B Para, 183. 
(4) ibid, Para, 125, 
(5) ibid' Para.129. 
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nearly a half of the population of the Union reserves owned no cattle 
whatever(!) - and further complicated the measurement of the economic 
requirements of the migrant workers o 
In the light of the Commission's findings about the general 
insufficiency of food in the reserves, its conclusions on the health 
·conditions in the Union reserves is not surprising: 
"The Commission is satisfied that the allegation as to 
the unsatisfactory state of health of the rural natives and 
the existence of malnutrition in the reserves generally is no 
'parrot cry', but,. on the contrary, that the conditions give 
cause for grave concern 0 II (2) 
In arriving at this conclusion the Commission quoted a number of authorities, 
Dr. Peter Allan, the Secretary for Public Health, had tested 6, 508 Africans 
in the Ciskei and Transkei with tuberculin between 1924-26 66 per cent 
reacted positively. (
3
) The Chief Magistrate for the Transkeian Territories 
reported' in 1936: "In all districts tuberculosis continues to take a heavy 
tolL •. , ••.•• , The menace of the disease looms very large and the general 
physique of the native is steadily deteriorating". (
4
) Dr, F. W. Fox of 
the South African Institute of Medical Research said that malnutrition and 
disease in the Transkei and Ciskei were widespread and referred to the African's 
deteriorating standard of physique, (
5
) Dr, Mary McGregor of the Umtata 
Health Unit reported: "Nearly 50 per cent of the babies born in the Umtata 
district .died before reaching the age of two years", and "Medical work in 
the Transkei becomes increasingly disheartening as it becomes increasingly 
obvious that the biggest enemy is malnutrition; and the greatest lack is 
fresh milk. The health problem rapidly becomes one beyond the scope of 
. (6) h d d the medical man". The Commission ear evi ence from Dr. Ryno Smit, 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para. 190. 
(2) ibid, Para. 200. 
(3) ibid, Para. 187. 
(4) ibid, Para. 188, 
(5) ibid, Para.192. 
( 6) ibid, Para. 194. 
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Medical Inspector for the Native Areas, and Dro G. W, Gale, Assistant 
Health Officer in the Department of Public Health, both of wh9m supported 
the views quoted above about malnutrition and poverty in the reserves. { l) 
The view that the health of the Reserve African had deteriorated; 
due mainly to overstocking, soil erosion, insufficiency of land, unequal 
distribution of stock and consequent lack of essential foods, inefficient 
methods of agriculture 0 and poverty 0 was corroborated by many other 
experts, According to Dro E. H. Cluver 0 Director of the South African 
Institute of Medical Research 0 the term healthy when used with reference 
to the African was a "misnomer". As a labourer the black man was unfit 
and did "not live to be an old man in South Africa", and moreover, as 
many as SO per cent of African babies died before they were 12 months 
old, (2) Dro J.M. Latsky 0 Nutrition Officer of the Union Health Department, 
reported widespread malnutrition in the Ciskei during 194S, (
3
) In the same 
year Dro H. M. Bennett 0 Director of the Mount Coke Hospitalo near King-
williamstown, voiced the opinion that the children in the Ciskei were then 
more undernourished than at any time during the previous 12 years. (
4
) 
And finally one might mention the indictment of a former Secretary for 
Native Affairs 0 Mro J. F. Herbst 0 who was reported in 1944 as saying: 
"The deterioration in the health of the Transkeian community is now most 
evident. The well-developedo well-nourished muscular figures of, say 
SO years ago have been replaced by weedy under-sized deficient manhood". (S) 
If these were the results of the "balanced South African native policy" 
to which the Chamber referred in basing its African employment policy, (
5
) 
it seems quite clear that the "policy" 0 to say the least, was in urgent need 
of overhauL The perpetual migration of the African males had a harmful 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para, 197, 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 30,S,44, 
(3) ibid, 28, So 4So 
(4) ibid, 14, 9, 4S. 
(S) ibid, 24, 4, 44, 
(6) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para, 101, see pp.12S and 126. 
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effect upon their productivity both in subsistence agriculture and in wage 
employment, as well as on the soil of the reserves and the physique of 
their inhabitants. 
The Lansdown Commission's primary function had been to make 
recommendations on wages and the conditions of employment of the black 
labour force on the Witwatersrand gold mines, with particular reference 
to the economic requirements of the migrant workers. In order to do so 
the Commission calculated the income and expenditure of the migrant and 
his family over a period of two years, thus making allowance for the 
continuous exodus of temporary migrants followed by a stay in the reserves. 
The figures arrived at, although, admittedly an improvement on those 
outlined by the Chamber, left much to be desired. The Lansdown criteria 
for the diet scale of an African family in the reserves was based on "the 
I 
minimum that a man's income should enable him to supply to his family 
in the way of food if they are to be maintained at a reasonable standard of 
health". (l) This was to be distinguished from the Chamber's estimates, 
which were rejected on the grounds that they were based on the standard 
the African was compelled to adopt because of his limited means, and not 
that required to preserve his health. (
2
) Nevertheless, the scale adopted, 
as well as certain other features of the Commission's estimates, - the 
Chamber's claims as to the black worker's boot requirements had previously 
been questionedP) but in its calculations the Commission gave the Chamber 
the benefit of the doubt - were such that Professor Edward Batson's comments 
on the "conventional standard datum line" appear to be applicable to the 
Commission's standard as well: 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.231. 
(2) ibid, Para. 228. 
(3) See Po 159. 
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"Such a standard is perhaps more remarkable for what it omits 
than for what it includes. It does not allow a penny for 
amusements, for sport, for medicine, for education, for saving, 
for hire purchase, for holidays, for odd - bus rides, for news-
papers, stationery, tobacco, sweets, hobbies, gifts, pocket 
money, or comforts or luxuries of any kind. It does not allow 
a penny for replacements of blankets, furniture, or crockery. 
It is not a 'human' standard of living. It thus admirably fulfils 
its purpose of stating the barest minimum upon which subsisten_ce 
and health can theoretically be achieved under Western conditions. 
It does not in any sense describe even a minimum ideal". (1) 
Calculations were made in respect of three labourers, who, over a 
period of two years, remained at work on the mines for 14 months, 16 months 
and 18 months respectively, and spent the remaining time, 10 months, 
8 months, and 6 months respectively, at their homes in the reserves. 
Assuming that these labourers and their families lived according to the 
standard set by the Lansdown Commission, the final results, both for 
1939 and 1942,. in all cases would have been a considerable shortfail: (
2
) 
Shortfall of income over 
expenditure for labourer 









athomeforlOmonths ••• £27. 4s.ld •. £25. Ss.Od. £45. ls.2d. £43.18s. 6d. 
Shortfall of income over 
expenditure for labourer 
at work for 16 months and 
at home for 8 months 
Shortfall of income over 
expenditure for labourer 
at work for 18 months and 
at home for 6 months 
£2Ll8s.Od. £19.13s.4d. £39.lls.2d. £38. Ss. 2d. 
£16. 12s. Od. £14. ls. 9d. £34. ls. 2d. £32. lls. lld. 
The black miner's budget for working for 14 months and spending 10 months 
in the reserves was of special significance, since these constituted both 
the average length of service stay at home periods in 1943 and those approved 
(1) Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and 
Economic Conditions of Urban Natives of the Department of Native Affairs 
(1942), Para. 23. 
( 2) W. N . W. C . (19 4 3) , Para. 2 4 2 . 
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of by the Commissionerso It was felt that an increase in the amount of 
time spent on the mines at the expense of that passed at home would have 
diminished the income of the reserve and unduly interfered with family 
life. A breakdown of this budget is given below: 
1943 Budget of. Labourer at work at mines for fourteen months (35 7 shifts) 
and living in the reserve for ten months 
Surface Underground 
Worker Worker 
Wages £31. 4s. 9d. £35.14s. Od. 
Cash income from the reserve £8.lOs. Od. £8. 10s. Od. 
Value of own produce consumed 
by family £27. Os. 4d. £27. Os. 4d. 
Income £660 15s. ld. £71. 4s. 4d. 
Food and clothing for wife and 
children (3), kraal expenditureu 
taxes, etc. , for two years £87.lOs. Od. £87. 10s. Od. 
Man's ordinary clothing for two 
years £7.18s. Odo £7.18s. Od. 
Man's additional requirements at 
mines for twelve months '£7. ls. Od. £9. l 8s. Od. 
Man's additional expenses at mines 
for period worked in excess of 
twelve months, excluding non-
recurring items 13s. lldo £1. 3So 5d. 
Man's food for period of stay in 
reserve £8. 13s o 4do £80 13So 4d. 
Expenditure £111. l 6s. 3do £115. 2s. 9d. 
Income £66.15So ld. £71. 4s. 4d. 
Shortfall £45. ls. 2do £43. l 8s. 5d. 
. Source: W.N.W.C. (1943), Para. 242. 
To bring about an improvement in the economic position of the mine 
labourer, the Lansdown Commission made recommendations, ( l) which, if 
adopted, would have resulted in an increase in the annual earnings (Le. 
for 306 shifts) of the lowest paid labourers on the surface and underground 
by £10. 4s. Od. and £1L 14s. 7d. respectively. For fourteen months (Le. 
35 7 shifts), the earnings of surface and underground workers were to have 
(1) See p. 204 for breakdown of recommendations and cost to the industry. 
- 182 -
increased by £1 L 17s. 7d. and £13. 13s. 7d. respectively. The "average 11 
worker - the man who worked for 13. 6 months and stayed at home for 7. 6 
months - would still, however, have been faced with considerable hardship. 
Surface Under9:round 
Worker Worker 
Initial shortfall £45. ls. 2d. £43. 18s. 5d. 
Increase per recommendations £1L17s. 7d. £13. 13s. 7d. 
Final shortfall £33. 3s. 7d. £30. 4s.10d. 
Further relief measures were not considered because of their possible 
"disastrous economic consequences" on the gold mining industry. The 
shortfall would have had to be made up by improvements in reserve 
conditions. (l) However, no real progress towards the rehabilitation of 
the reserves was possible as long as the system of migrant labour continued 
and the able-bodied adult male African spent "the greater part of his working 
life circulating between wage earning occupations in the urban centres and 
subsistence farming in the reserves". (
2
) 
The Economic and Wage Commission of 1925 held that the possibility 
of producing at least a part of his family's subsistence by farming in t)1e 
reserves strengthened the migrant worker's bargaining power in the labour 
market and "(enabled) him to resist an unjust contract and to exact something 
like the full economic value of his services" (
3
) It did not appear, however, 
that the average migrant had a very strong bargaining position in so far as 
he accepted employment on the mines, and so had to be satisfied with a 
standard of living regarded as unsatisfactory by any rational criteria. 
The stabilisation of the Afri.can migrant worker, accotding to the 
Chamber, "would have a catastrophic economic effect upon the native 
themselves. The system provides a bridge between the old tribal pastoral 
existence, which is now impossible in its entirety, and the complete 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.323. 
(2) Hobart Houghton, D,, "Land Reforms in the Bantu Areas and its Effect 
upon Urban Labour," S.A.J.E., 1961, p.166. 
(3) Economic and Wage Commission, U.G.14 of 1926, Para. 28L 
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industrialised condition which is ul\desirable· in the national fnterest and 
in any event impracticable, at least for some generations to ·come". (l) 
The Fagan Commission aptly commented on this simile of a bridge -
"a bridge is intended to be crossed, not to serve as a permanent abode". (2) 
Already by the 1940's the crossing was long overdue. The ill effects 
on the reserves and on the African's productivity, both as a farmer and as 
an industrial worker, were becoming increasingly apparent. 
(1) Evidence ofG.P.C. to N.L.C. (1947), p.36, Para.5. 
(2) Report of the Native Laws Commission, U. G. 28 of 1948, p. 43, quoted 
.. by Hobart Houghton, D. , "Men of Two Worlds : Some Aspects of 
Migratory Labour," S.A.J.E., 1960, p.186. 
10, 
AFRICAN LABOUR CONDITIONS: TRADE 
UNIONS AND THE RIGHT TO STRIKE, 
- 184 '." 
Trade unions have never been illegal in South Africa yet their 
fight for recognition has been both bitter and bloody. There was 
little significant organisation in the mining areas until after the Boer 
War, and, th~n only amongst the Europeans, whose main goal was to 
protect white labour against the increasing use of Africans in jobs 
involving some industrial skillso These early European trade unionists 
had to wait until 1915(1), however, before the Chamber of Mine~ 
recognised them. Recognition was only granted, moreover, after a 
strike on the gold mines in 1913 over the question of their status, 
and a general strike during 1914, (
2
) and, finally, af~er the intervention 
of General Smuts. 
With the exception of the Mine Clerks' Association, (3) the 
Chamber has never recognised the existence of a trade union among 
the African miners. Although African trade unions both in mining and 
other sectors of the economy have not been officially recognised or 
encouraged, there has been no legislation to prevent their formation 
and they are not illegaL However, legal obstacles as well as more .... 
drastic measures, such as the banning of leaders, have been used 
to prevent African trade union organisation and strikes. 
(1) Until 1915 the only trade unions recognised by the gold mining 
industry were the trade unions representing the winding engine 
drivers. From 19 15 onwards, the policy of recognising trade 
unions was adopted by the industry o The mechanics' union, 
constituting about 15 per cent of the European employees on 
the mines, had not been recognised by 1924 as they had not 
accepted the conditions stipulated for recognitiono 
Evidence of the Gold Producers' Committee to the Economic and 
. Wage Commission (1925) 0 Statement No. 2, p. L 
(2) A strike which originated on the Natal coal mines, spread to the 
railways and gold mines and consequently developed into a 
general strikeo 
(3) See pp. 161 and 162. 
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Legislation to recognise, protect and contain trade unions, as well 
as to establish statutory machinery for collective bargaining was first 
introduced early in 19230 (1) The Industrial Conciliation Act, ·passed 
in the final session of the Smuts Government in 1924, (
2
) rhade it com-
pulsory for trade unions to apply to the Industrial Registrar for registration, 
though if refused they could still continue to exist. "Trade union" was. 
defined as "any number of persons associated together. o .• o" .• o o o for the 
purpose of regulating relations between themselves and their employers 
or for protecting or furthering the interests of employees •• o o . o o • o •• in 
relation to their employers"o The vast majority of Africans were, however, 
excluded from the operation of the Industrial Conciliation Act by the 
definition of "employee" which read "any person engaged by an employer 
... o .... " , but shall not include a person whose contract of service or 
labour is regulated by any Native Pass Laws and Regulations, or by Act 
No. 15 of 1911. .. " "" •• , or by Law No. 25 of 1891 of Natal." .... o o or 
by Act Noo 40 of 1894 of Natal . o o" .. ". 11 o (
3
) Unions of Africans whose 
contracts of service were regulated by any pass law and Africans recruited 
by labour agents or holders of employers' recruiting licences were not 
unions in terms of the Act and thus could not apply for registration. 
Although many African men in the Cape and Orange Free State, 
where there were no pass laws and where many employers of Africans 
were not required to have recruiting licenses, as well as .African women 
workers in factories fell within the definition of an "employee" and could 
(1) The Smuts Government introduced the bill on the lines of the· recom-
mendations of the Industrial Board that had investigated the Witwaters-
rand disturbances in 1922. House of Assembly Debates, VoL 1 (1924) 
p. 16, quoted by Ellison Kahn, 11 The Right to Strike in South Africa -
"An Historical Analysis" S.A.J.E., 1943 0 p. 34" 
(2) Routh, C.G.C., "State Intervention in the Regulation of Wages 
and Working Conditions in Great Britain and South Africa", 
S.A.J.E., 1949, p.295. 
(3) Industrial Conciliation Act, No. 11 (1924), parao 24. 
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thus legally join registered unions, (l) all African mine workers were -
1 
excluded from participation in the operation of the Act as they were 
covered by the Native Labour Regulation Act (No. 15 of 1911). The _.., 
essence of the Industrial Conciliati.on Act was that it established 
machinery for the regulation of conditions of work and the setting of 
wage-rates by industrial councils comprising representatives of 
I 
employers and registered unions sitting togethero By an amendment 
in 1930, agreements of the councils cc;mld,un~er most circumstances, 
be made binding not only on the parties themselves but on a whole 
industryo (
2
) Thus the African mine worker, prevented from forming 
registered trade unions,was also largely precluded from taking part , 
.,J 
in collective bargainingo (3) 
In addition, from the time Africans first began working on the 
mines in considerable numbers, "it has been well-nigh impossible 
(4) (5) • 
for them to stage a legal strike" o As early as 1841 and until 
1904,(
6
) various Masters and Servants Acts were passed in the four 
territories which later became the Union of South Africa. The early 
Cape, the first Natal and the Transvaal Acts, with which we are 
(1) Horrell, Muriel., South African Trade Unionism, S.A.I.R.R., 
1961, p.6L 
Amendments to the Industrial Conciliation Act in 1930 0 1937 
and 1959 revised the definition of an 'employee' in order to 
place further obstacles in the way of African trade unionismo 
(2) Doxey, Po 137. 
(3) He could still take part in collective bargaining - but the 
effectiveness of this was limited (1) by not being able to 
extend an agreement reached with employers to other employers 
and (2) because an agreement reached by others, in which he 
had no part 0 might determine his own conditions of employment. 
(4) Horrell, op cit, p, 60. 
(5) Doxey, Po 1280 
(6) Kahn, op cit, p. 26, 
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particularly concerned, were "ostensibly colour-blind", (l) yet the Courts 
held that they applied only to unskilled work o which, by and large, did 
not include Europeans. The Acts imposed criminal sanctions for breach 
of a contract by a servant. Thus, as long as the contract between master 
and servant was in existence, a servant could not leave his master's 
employment. (Z) Although there was little consideration of the possibility 
of strikes when the Acts were passed, the laws "were wonderfully 
adaptable 11 ( 3) and were used extensively on the gold mines. 
With the passing of the. Native Labour Regulation Act of 1911 penal 
sanctions were applied to contractual obligations of the black miner for 
a wide range of offences. (
4
) Conviction of an offence in terms of this 
Act rendered the miner liable to a fine of up to £10 or imprisonment not 
exceeding two months. The African labourer was guilty of an offence 
if he: 
"(a) without lawful cause deserts or absents himself 
from his place of employment or fails to enter upon 
or carry out the terms of his contract of employment; 
or 
(b) wilfully and unlawfully does or omits to do anything 
which causes or is likely to cause injury to persons 
or property; or 
(b) (bis) neglects to perform any work which it is his duty 
to perform or unfits himself for the proper performance 
of his work through the use of dagga or other habit-
forming drugs or by having become or being intoxicated 
during working hours; or 
(b) (ter) refuses to obey any lawful command of his employer 
or any person ·lawfully placed in authority over him 
or uses insulting or abusive language to those in 
authority; or 
(1) Kahn, op cit, p. 26. 
(2) The Act also protected the servant against wrongful acts by the 
master. 
(3) Kahn, op cit, p. 27. 
( 4) See next page. 
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(c) after entering into an oral or written agreement 
of service with a labour agent or authorised 
recruiting officer and accepting an advance in 
respect thereof, accepts another advance from 
another labour agent or recruiting officer in 
consideration of entering upon another contract 
of service before he has completed his term of 
service under the first-mentioned agreement.,; (1) 
These limitations on the black miner severely inhibited normal trade 
union activity and, in the words of the 1951 Industrial Legislation 
Commission, left "no scope for collective action for the improvement of 
conditions of employment", (2) nor did it contain any provi~ion for 
negotiation or for the fixing of minimum wages. _J 
Strikes are inextricably bound up with the right of free speech and 
assembly, and by curtailing there rights, a legislative body indirectly 
restricts the use of the strike as a weapono General provisions in regard 
to the prohibition of public assembly are contained in the Riotous Assemblies 
and Criminal Law Amendment Act of 1914, (
3
) This measure gave the 
Minister of Justice authority to prohibit public gatherings and the "dissemination 
of documentary information." whenever, in his opinion, "there is reason to 
apprehend that feelings of hostility would be engendered between the European 
inhabitants of the Union on the one hand and any other section of the 
inhabitants of the Union on the other hand". (4) In addition, the Act 
could be used to control the actions ancillary to striking itself, such as 
picketing and intimidationo The Act came as an aftermath' of the defeat 
of the white miners in 1914 and was designed to cope with the possibilities 
of a recurrence of the industrial upheavals of 1913/14, as the existing 
legislation was apparently ineffectiveo Although precipitated by the 
Footnote (4) fr~m previous page~ The Chamber regarded this as "a funda-
mental principle of the law of South Africa" and "absolutely essential 
in the present economic condition of the native". 
Evidence of the G.P.C. to the Economic and Wage Commission (1925), 
Statement No. 3, Po L 
(1) Section 14 (1) of the Act, summarised by Doxey, p. 1290 
(2) U.G. 62 of 195l, p. 194, Parao 1445 quoted by Doxey, Po 130. 
(3) Act Noa 27 of 1914, as amended by Act Noo 19 of 1930. 
(4) Kahn, op cit, Po 280 
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excesses of a white strike, the Act, as amended in 193 0, was to be used 
to great effect by the Government to undermine the African Mine Workers' 
Union during the 1940's. Invoked both to prevent Europeans from instigating 
or assisting African strikes and to suppress the activities of "agitators", the 
Act resulted in the arrest of the leaders, both miner and non-miner, of the 
1946 strike. It was thus a major cause of the collapse of the strike. 
Wide as it was, the Riotous Assemblies Act was further reinforced 
under the War Government of Smuts. Although the Act inhibited trade 
union organisation, War Measure 1425 was introduced in 1944. (l) This 
proclamation totally prohibited meetings of more than 20 persons on mine 
property, and, in so far as it was only the African Mine Workers' Union 
which held meetings on gold-proclaimed land, the measure was nothing 
more than a crude, but highly effective, method of preventing the A. M. W. U. 
from establishing communication with prospective members. Before the end 
of that same year the measure was to be invoked against the leadership of 
the Union. In effect, the organisation was immobilised. 
African trade unions came to rely on a measure supplementary to the 
Industrial Conciliation Act, the Wage Act, (
2
) for giving legal expression 
-to their aspirations. This Act created machinery for fixing wage-rates and 
regulating conditions of work in industries where the employers and employees 
were not organised. Domestic servants 0 government employees, farm 
workers and others were excluded from its operation - as mine workers were 
not included in this list, the Act could be applied to the Mining Industry, 
,__; 
hut actually never was. 
(1) During the Second World War the Government was anxious to prevent 
stoppages of work in essential i.ndustries. War Measure No. 9' of 
January,1942,and War Measure No. 145 of December,1942,gave the 
Minister of Labour power to intervene in industrial disputes that 
were likely to affect the war effort by appointing arbitrators. The 
penalties for striking illegally were greatly increased, yet there was 
compensation in the further avenues that were opened whereby the 
Africans' grievances could be redressed. Although these measures 
were apparently applicable to the African miner, they were never 
invoked. 
(2) Act No. 27 of 1925, as amended by Act No. 44 of 1937. 
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Despite the restrictions on public gatherings and the prohibition 
on strikes, a committee to organise African mine workers was formed 
at a conference of a large number of organisations convened by the 
Transvaal African Congress during August, 1941. (l) Nearly two years 
later this committee, calling itself the "African Mine Workers' Union", 
was only able to claim a membership of 1, 827(
2
) out of approximately 
300, 000 black minerso By October, 1945, the Union claimed a card 
membership of 20, 000 of whom only 2 0 000 had paid subscriptions. (
3) 
The A.MoW. U. was not representative of African labourers on the 
mines as its paid-up membership accounted for less than one per cent 
. . (4) 
of the total African labour forceo This, however, can be partly 
accounted for by the legal obstacles discussed above and partly by 
the attitude of the Chamber of Mineso The Chamber opposed the 
formation of a trade union amongst its African labourers as they were 
"insufficiently advanced to understand the principles of Trade Union 
organisations" o (
5
) The Chamber was "strongly averse to any steps 
that would stimulate or encourage the growth of the trade union movement 
amongst Native mine workers" o (
5
) Its method of opposition was the 
subject of a court case when Colonel A. E. Trigger, manager of the 
Mines Police Department of the New Consolidated Goldfields, claimed 
(1) Evidence ofA.M.W.Uo to the W.N.W.C. (1943), Annexure "B;,o 
A body calling itself the Coloured Mine Workers' Union apparently 
applied to be registered in September 1928, but was refused after 
the South African Mine Workers had lodged an objection. "Coloured" 
may have meant all non-Europeans as there were only a few Coloured 
as opposed to black mineworkerso 
Osborn, V. H., A Critical Survey of Trade Unionism in South Africa, 
unpublished ·M.A. thesis, University of the Witwatersrand, 1931, 
PPo 78, 790 . 
The following very unsatisfactory reference is given: 
"Reported in "Star" dated ? o 90 280 
(2) Evidence of A.M.W. U. to W,,N.W.C. (1943), Po L 
(3) Evidence of H.J. Simons to Sedition Trial 194 7 o 
Cape Argus, 13 o 2 o 4 7 o 
(4) This is on tpe assumption that the figures given by the Union itself 
were correct and not exaggeratedo 
(5) Evidence ofG.P.C.to W.N.W.C. (1943), Po90. 
(6) ibid, p. 92. 
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£1, 000 for alleged defamation contained in Senator Basner's statements 
to the Lansdown Commissiono In giving judgement against Basner, Mr. 
Justice Murray of the Supreme Court said: 
"I feel constrained .•.... to express my disapproval of Colonel 
Trigger's conduct. I do not questi.on the bona fides of his 
objection, both personally and from the point of view of his 
employers, to the existence of the African Mine Workers 1 
Union, as Communist or Communistically inclined. There 
is also much to be said for the belief that Communistic theory 
is too heady a wine for consumpti.on with safety by the mass 
of the members of the Native Mine Workers' Uniono 
"Even so, Communism in theory is entirely legal and permissible, 
and the Native Mine Workers' Union, on the evidence, is a 
perfectly legitimate association - even if, which has not been 
proved, its leaders are Communists or inclined to Communism. 
"The method adopted by Colonel Trigger to safeguard the 
interests of the mining industry was to insinuate a spy into 
the councils of the native union and to cause that spy to 
practice deceit. It is not a method which commends itself 
to me - I refrain from using the descriptive adjectives appearing 
in the innuendo, but it leaves behind an unpleasant tas.te. 
The end has not justified the means. 11 (1) ~ 
Perhaps the end did justify the means. It certainly must have seemed 
so to the Chamber - for the A. M, W, U. apparently never got off the ground. 
Although unrepresentative of the African miner, the Union nevertheless 
acted as a pressure group. An exam-ination of the Union's evidence to the 
Mine Native Wages Commission reveals a striking contrast - the letters 
to the Prime Minister of 12th September, 1941,and the Minister of Labour 
of 9th January, 1943, in the Appendix are well-reasoned and informed, 
the evidence itself is unsubstantiated, illogical and poorly presented. 
Senator Basner refused to accept res pons ibili.ty for all the statements 
in the Memorandum while Justice Lansdown himself harshly (and perhaps 
fairly) criticised the exaggeration of the document when he said~ 
(1) Rand Daily Mail, 3. L 450 A member of the Mine Police had 
joined the Ao M. W, U. to obtain information about the organisation. 
Judgement was given against Basner, whilst Trigger was awarded 
damages of £5 O. Basner, however, won on appeal. 
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"When one reads the memorandum one wonders why half the 
labourers are not dead, why the death rate has decreased to 
2. 94 per thousand. There is nothing you touch here which 
you do not condemn. I am only saying this because I should 
regret it if it were found that there was any over-statement 
or exaggeration in these communications that you have made 
here, because exaggeration very often defeats its own case". (1) 
It is difficult to avoid the general impression gained from newspaper 
reports and the available evidence, that sections of the memorandum 
actually were so far-fetched and irresponsible that they in fact harmed 
the case of the African Trade Union. The widespread fear of victimisation · 
may have contributed to the total lack of supporting affidavits but is not an 
acceptable excuse for the document's failings. The Union squandered the 
opportunity of airing its grievances and thus, in the final analysis, failed 
when it was most needed. 
The question whether African mineworkers should be unionised was 
considered by the Lansdown Commission, which rejected the idea as the 
black miners had "not yet reached the stage of development which would 
enable them safely and usefully to employ trade unionism as a means of 
promoting their advancement". (2) The Commission recognised that the 
African miners needed protection - "the excellence of the recruiting 
organisation and the eQonomic necessities of the natives in their 
reserves .••...•• exercise a measure of compulsion which pro tanto 
may be said to clog the exercise of free will" (
3
) - and so recommended 
~ that the Government "maintain its surveillance". (4) The system whereby 
the individual miner brought his complaints and grievances to the notice 
of the responsible authority was, however, inadequate in passing on 
"information of mass grievances", and, for this purpose, it was suggested 
that welfare officers, men with a "sound knowledge of the native mentality", 
( 1) Star, 8. 7 . 19 4 3 • 
(2) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.467. 
See the Appendix to this Chapter. 
(3) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.468. 
(4) ibid, Para. 469. 
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be appointed. (l) Although the Commission reported in 1944, the first 
group of "Native Liaison Officers" were only appointed during May, 1947. (2) 
After the strike of African mineworkers in August, 1946, renewed 
demands were made by various organisations for the recognition of the 
A. M. W. U. Typical of these protests was the resolution passed by the 
Anglican Synod of Johannesburg which urged the Government to recognise 
the African Mine Workers' Union and other African trade unions, and 
proposed "that negotiations between the Chamber of Mines and native 
!/'~" 
mineworkers should be opened without delay so that future unnecessary 
conflict and bloodshed may be avoided". (
3
) 
The mounting pressure for a review of policy towards black trade 
unions finally extracted a comprehensive response from the Chamber of 
Mines. During November, 1946, the Chamber issued a lengthy statemenr-
defending its position and claiming that "trade unionism (was) against the 
best interests of tribal natives employed on the mines". (4) 
The Chamber based its case on the general assumption that the African 
labourers on the mines were not sufficiently advanced to control and 
manage a trade union without outside aid, and, as such assistance might 
be from communists, trade unions should not be recognised. Other 
reasons were advanced. The'nature of service on the mines was one 
of these, for mine labourers were held to differ from other urban African 
workers as they did not live in the towns at all, but returned to their 
tribes when their period of service was over. This was supposedly 
strengthened by the contention that the African had no trade union 
tradition, and no experience or appreciation of the responsibilities arising 
from collective representation. Further,, the promotion of a trade union 
would ostensibly disrupt tribal life as there would be a conflict of loyalties 
between the labour organisation and the tribal system. 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.473. 
(2) Star, 17. 5.1947. 
(3) Rand Daily Mail, 8. 10. 1946. 
(4) Rand Daily Mail, 16. lL 1946. 
Full statement included as Appendix. 
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All this, it seems, would have violated the spirit of that national 
policy of trusteeship which claimed to preserve all that was best in 
African tribal life. 
It is possible to sympathise with the Chamber's fear of unrest 
on the mines. It is not so easy, however o to sympathise with their 
reason for rejecting African trade unionism. There is an unavoidable 
impression that they were looking for arguments to justify a preconceived 
attitude largely based on political and economic fearso The available 
evidence indicates, on the contrary, that there is no inherent connection 
between. industrial unrest and trade unionism. In short, the Chamber's 
attitude was based on specious arguments. 
APPENDIX 
Tribal Natives and Trade Unionism" 
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THE POLICY OF THE RAND GOLD MINING INDUSTRY 
Recent happenings have focussed attention on the subject of trade 
unionism among Native mine labourers. In view of the public interest 
that has been aroused, and the many misconceptions of this aspect of 
the Gold Mining Industry's Native policy, the following official statement 
is issued by the Gold Producers' Committee of the Transvaal Chamber of 
Mines:-
It is the opinion of the Gold Mining Industry that trade unionism is 
against the best interests of tribal Natives employed on the mines. They 
are not yet sufficiently .advanced for trade unionism, nor do they themselves 
want it. 
Of approximately 300, 000 Native mine labourers, over 290, 000 are 
untutored tribal peasants who, between the ages of 18 and 45 years, come 
voluntarily to the mines seven or eight times on short terms of employment 
averaging between 12 arid 13 months. At the end of each period of work, -
they return to their families- and their pastoral and agricultural pursuits in 
the Native territories. The extent of this migration is reflected by the fact 
that each year there is a turnover of Native mine workers of almost 100 per 
cent. 
These migratory labourers, whose periodic contracts are made with 
the approval of their tribal chiefs, come to the Witwatersrand from a 
number of territories and are members of a large variety of African tribes 
speaking different languages. About 140, 000 come from the Native 
Reserves in the Union; about 50, 000 from the High Commission Territories 
of Bechuanaland, Basutoland and Swaziland; about 75, 000 from Portuguese 
East Africa, south of latitude 22 degrees south; and the remainder - about 
3 5, 000 - from the so-called tropical areas. Each year some 40, 000 leave 
their kraals for the first time, and their short s.tay on the Witwatersrand 
is their first direct contact with European civilisation. 
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The culture of all these Natives is tribal and rural. Their contact 
with industrialism and industrial conditions is only recent, and they have 
little knowledge or understanding of the organisation of industry. They 
are bound by the strongest ties to the traditions, customs and the authority 
of their respective tribes. 
NATIONAL POLICY 
The basis of the attitude of the Gold Mining Industry to its Native 
labour force is the principle of European trusteeship.- the declared basis of 
South African national policy as embodied in the Native Trust Acts. In 
accord with this principle, the industry, in. the administration and organisation 
of its huge Native labour force, seeks to preserve all that is best in Native 
tribal life. 
In the employment, the housing, the feeding, the entertainment and 
recreation of these hundreds of thousands of Natives, tribal tradition and 
connection are fostered and respectedo The organisation of the compounds 
in which the Natives live, has as its basis the pattern of tribal organisation 
and discipline to which. the Natives are accustomed and from which they 
show little inclination to deviate. 
The Gold Mining Industry considers that trade unionism, as practised 
by Europeans, is still beyond the understanding of the tribal Native; nor 
can he know how to employ it as a means of promoting his advancement. 
He has no tradition in that respect q.nd has no experience or appreciation 
of the responsibilities arising from collective representation. No proper 
conduct of a trade union is possible unless the workers have that tradition 
and such a sense of responsibility. 
Were the tribal Native precipitated into a form of organisation of which 
he has no real experience and for which he is not sufficiently advanced, he 
would fall an easy prey to control by alien interests - often acting from 
political motives - which would undermine his own tribal customs and 
allegiances, and his own conception of values. Conflict between the 
allegiance demanded by a trade union and those owed to the tribe, would 
tend to disrupt tribal life; a result diametrically opposed to a basic 
principle of national policy. 
J 
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ABUSES AND IRRESPONSIBILITY 
The full recognition of, and the cordial relations with, European 
trade unions show that the Gold Mining Industry is not hostile to trade 
unionism as such. ,The tribal Native who works intermittently on the 
mines for approximately eight years between the ages of 18 and 45 is 
obviously in a different .position from the European or urban Native who 
has to work throughout his lifetime. The Industry considers that the 
introduction of trade unionism among tribal Natives at their present 
stage of development would lead to abuses and irresponsible action. 
The demand for a basic wage of 10s. a day by the African Mine 
Workers' Union, which led to the recent strike of Native mine labourers, 
exemplifies this serious element of irresponsibility. Had the demand 
succeeded, 35 of the present total of 45 producing gold mines would have 
been forced to close and, among all its other consequences 240, 000 
Natives would have been thrown out of work. 
For the detribalised Natives on the mines, comprising some 
3 per cent of the labour force and consisting mainly of Natives employed 
on clerical work, there is already in existence the Witwatersrand Gold 
Mines Native Clerks' Association which is recognised by the Industry. 
GOVERNMENT COMMISSIONS 
The Gold Mining Industry's view that the tribal Native is not 
sufficiently advanced to assimilate trade unionism is supported by the 
findings of a number. of Government Commissions. In 1940 a Commission 
appointed to inquire into the disturbances in the Copperbelt of Northern 
Rhodesia, considered the position of the tribal Native in relation to trade 
unionism. In paragraph 175 of its report, the Commission stated:-
"For trades unionism, as trades unionism is generally 
understood by the British worker, the African worker in 
Northern Rhodesia is clearly not ready. The reason for 
this unreadine~:;s is not far to seek. In no case has his 
education gone very far; in most instances it has not 
even begun. Further, his introduction to industrialism 
and industrial conditions is of a very recent date, too 
recent to admit of his intelligent participation in the more 
elaborate trades-union system existing in Great Britain. " 
J 
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The same arguments may be applied to tribal Natives working on 
the Rand. 
In 1942 the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Social, Health and 
Economic Conditions of Urban Natives, under the chairmanship of Mr. D. L. 
Smit, Secretary for Native Affairs, in suggesting that 11 ••• Native trade 
unions should be registered and afforded administrative recognition ... 11 
specifically excluded the mining industry from this recommendation. 
The Smit Committee stressed that the Natives for the gold mines were 
recruited almost exclusively from reserves and tribal areas, and that 
there was a considerable percentage of foreign Natives from tropical 
Africa and Mozambique. They were, however, untutored; and a danger 
in their organisation foreseen by the Committee, was a cleavage on 
colour lines, a result obviously more repugnant than past cleavages 
along lines of class or supposed conflicts of interest. 
The introduction of trade unionism for Native mine labourers was 
again considered, in 1943, by the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' Wages 
Commission which heard evidence by the Gold Mining Industry, by 
various societies and individuals, by labour organisations and also by 
the African Mine Workers' Union and by the African National Congress. 
This was a judicial Commission headed by Mr. Justice C.W.H. 
Lansdown, Judge-President of the Eastern Districts Division of the 
Supreme Court; and included Mr. H.P. Smit, Controller and Auditor-
General of the Union; Mr. H.S.H. Donald, Government Mining Engineer; 
Mr. A.A. Moore, President of the S.A. Trades and Labour Council; 
and Mr. H.G. Scott, Acting President of the Native Appeal Court for the 
Cape Province and the Oran~e Free State. 
In paragraph 466 of its report, the Commission agreed that the 
more educated and socially advanced classes of Natives recognised the 




"The position of the vast body of Native labourers on the gold mines 
of the Witwatersrand is, however, different. As a result of meetings 
with many of them and several Native associations purporting to make 
representations on their behalf, the conclusion has very definitely 
been forced upon the Commission that they have not yet reached the 
stage of development which would enable them safely and usefully 
_to employ trade unionism as a means of promoting their advancement. " 
The Commission found further that the tribal Natives' periods of 
service were comparatively short and non-continuous, and a considerable 
proportion of them were domiciled in foreign territory o These facts in 
themselves, the Commission concluded, made it difficult for any trade 
union to operate successfully among tribal Natives: moreover, it wbuld 
be impossible to find among their numbers persons who could administer 
and maintain the organisation of a trade union. 
CONTROL OF UNIONS 
In any reasoned discussion of the matter it has always been accepted 
that the control of Native trade unions, if recognised, should be placed 
in the hands of persons either actively engaged in or directly connected 
with the industries concernedo It has similarly been accepted that no 
Native organisation should be permitted which is used for political ends 
or which does not have as its principal object the representation of its 
members' interests on matters connected with their employment in industry. 
Because tribal Natives on the gold mines are insufficiently advanced 
to manage their own trade unions, it follows that the control of such 
unions would fall, inevitably, to persons not connected with the Industry. 
As far as is known, the self-styled African Mine Workers' Union 
is directed by persons who are not employed on the gold mines and the 
union is not representative of the vast body of tribal Natives in the 
Industry. 
In the recent strike it was immediately apparent that this was no 
sporadic movement, but was the beginning of a general strike organised 
and directed from outside the Industry by the African Mine Workers' Union 
- which claimed to represent the strikers - and that union's supporters. 
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It is clear that the union is connected with and has the support of 
communistic influences. Members of the Communist Party, by whom 
the union was actively assisted in the recent strike, took part in the 
distribution in mine compounds of provocative pamphlets and other 
li tera tu re. 
The question of permitting outside bodies to participate in the 
management of Native trade unions was dealt with by the Lansdown 
Commission, which in paragraph-467 of its report stated that:-
"The Commission which has met representatives of those 
bodies which would es say the task of constituting, main-
. taining and controlling trade unionism amongst the mine 
Natives, is of opinion that the public interests would 
definitely negative the delegation of such powers to any 
of those bodies. When the time comes that the mine 
labourers of the Witwatersrand are capable of benefiting 
by any trade union organisation 0 the movement musto in 
the general public interests, be constituted and managed 
by those labourers themselves and under the guidance, 
instruction and influence of the Departments of Labour 
and Native Affairs, " 
The Lansdown Commission stated, in paragraph 458 of its report, that 
. no movement for a trade union had come from the mine Native labourers 
themselves, the vast bulk of whom knew nothing about trade unions and 
were not concerned to become members of any society. 
This statement is equally true today. There is still no general 
movement among tribal Natives for a trade union. During the recent 
strike, a majority of Natives on man}" of the mines affected were unconcerned 
with the activities of the African Mine Workers' Union and were forcibly 
prevented, by others, from proceeding to work which they were otherwise 
prepared to do. 
FIFTY YEARS I EXPERIENCE 
If trade unionism is an unsuitable medium for the representation of 
the interests of the tribal Native on the gold mines, what is the alternative? 
J 
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Avenues already exist, and have existed for many years, through 
which Native employees of the Gold Mining Industry can present their 
views to the managements. The procedure has been developed, in 
accord with the principle of European trusteeship, by officials with 
. . ; 
special knowledge of Native customs and language and mining 
conditions. The Industry has, from its inception, promoted the 
welfare of these workers and, apart from the initial period when conditions 
were inevitably primitive, can point to over half-a-century of progressive 
success in this field. 
All matters affecting Native employees as mine residents are, 
under the administration of the compound manager on each mine. 
The compounds were described by the Witwatersrand Mine Natives' 
Wages Commission of 1943 as "efficiently managed by men of experience 
and with sympathetic consideration for the welfare and comfort of the 
inhabitants. " 
Every Native employee may go direct to the compound manager, 
who is always ready to listen to grievances without their pas sing 
through formal channels. 
The organisation of the compound is based on the tribal organisation 
~ . 
to which the Native is accustomed. The tribal pattern is the Chief, 
the Induna, the headman and the kraal head. In the mine compound 
the pattern is the compound manager, the Induna, the tribal representative 
- called the Isibonda - and the room headboy, who takes the position of 
the kraal head. 
It is a general custom in the mine compounds for the occupants 
of each room to elect one of their number as their spokesman and 
intermediary with the Isibonda. He is elected to represent a number 
of members of any particular tribe; varying from 80 to 300. On occasion 
the Isibonda is appointed by the compound manager. 
The highest Native authority in the compound is the chief Induna, 
who is directly responsible to the compound manager and is required 
J 
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to ensure that all matters concerning the welfare of the Natives receive 
due attention. In large compounds assistant Indunas, generally repre-
sentatives of the tribes from which the greatest number of Native labourers 
is derived, are also appointed. 
INTERESTS SAFEGUARDED 
It is essential that the Natives employed in the Gold Mining 
Industry have some organised body to supervise their general welfare, 
to see that the terms and conditions of employment are faithfully 
carried out, and through whom contact with their tribes and homes may 
be maintained. These duties are carried out by the organisations 
responsible for their recruitment - the Witwatersrand Native Labour 
Association, Limited, and the Native Recruiting Corporation, Limited, 
A special department was created at the inception of the Native 
Recruiting Corporation, Limited, in 1912, and has always been controlled 
by men who, because of their intimate association with Native peoples 
and their knowledge of Native languages and customs, are specially 
fitted for the work, 
Inspectors of this department regularly visit mine compounds and, 
in collaboration with compound managers, investigate complaints and 
satisfy them.selves that every attention is given to the material comfort 
and well-being of the Native workers. 
The Industry does not suggest that the existing arrangements for 
safeguarding the interests of Native mine workers are final, or incapable 
of improvement. Changes in detail are made in the light of experience, 
as they have always been in the past, and there is every reason to 
suppose that they will similarly be made in the future. 
NATIVE AFFAIRS DEPARTMENT 
The Industry emphasises that it is the special function of the 
Native Affairs Department to care for Native interests and to represent 
Native views to others. Ever since the passing of the Native Labour 
Regulation Act in 1911, the Governor-General has appointed inspectors 
J 
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whose duty it is to enquire into, redress, or otherwise report to the 
Director of Native Labour any grievance complained of by Native workers. 
These inspectors pay weekly visits to all mine compounds. 
It was suggested by the Lansdown Commission (paragraph 473) 
that: -
11 a scheme better designed to meet the present conditions 
of the Native workers on the Witwatersrand mines would be to 
appoint as welfare officers working under and subject to the 
control of the Department of Native Affairs in consultation with 
the Department of Labour a number of men of sound knowledge 
of the Native mentality, speaking one or more of the Native 
languages and preferably with experience of underground 
conditions, whose duty it would be to move about regularly 
amongst the mine workers; to hold at convenient times 
meetings with them or their chosen representatives at which 
the collective voice of the whole body of the Native workers 
of the mine might find expression; and to present to the 
Department of Native Affairs and to the mine managements 
any matters of interest or importance which might be 
agitating the minds of the meno II 
The Gold Mining Industry considers that this recommendation should 
be implemented. 
Natives are traditionally conservative, and it is the considered view 
of the Gold Mining Industry that step-by-step progress on the lines under-
stood by the Natives is a practical method of advancing their relationship 
with their employers, whether that development takes place under the 
authority of the employer or of the Government. A trade union organisation 
would be outside the comprehension of all but a few of the educated Natives 
of the urban type: it would be not only useless, but detrimental, to the 
ordinary mine Native in his present stage of development. 
11, 
NINETEEN HUNDRED AND FORTY SIX, 
-J 
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The Report of the Mine Native Wages Commission was finally tabled 
in Parliament on the 24th April, 1944. (l) The Commission recommended(Z) 
an increase of 5d, per shift in the minimum wage of all African miners 
(from ls. 9d. to 2s. 2d, per shift for surface workers and from 2s. to 2s. 5d. 
per shift for underground workers), (
3
) payment of a cost of living allowance 
of 3d. per shift, (
4
) provision of a boot allowance of 3s. for 30 shifts to 
all workers required to wear boots, (
5
) and the extens iQn to the black 
miners of time-and-a-half rates for overtime ~nd Sunday work. (6) 
The aggregate cost of adopting these proposals, assuming a black labour 
force of 300, 000, was estimated at £2, 642, 000 per annum. (
7
) 
The implementation of these recommendations would, according to 
the calculations of the Commission, have reduced the annual ·deficit for 
the surface worker (for the year during which he was at work on the mines) 
to 4d. and converted an annual deficit for the underground labourer (again 
only for the year at work) of over £9 to an excess of income over expenditure 
of £2, 9s. 9d. (8) These calculations were on the basis of a "budget" based 
on the "minimum requirements to keep a native family at a reasonable standard. "(
9
) 
(1) Cape Times, 25.3.44. 
(2) Separate recommendations were made for the "permanent" workers -
cost of living allowance of 5d, per shift, improved wage scales, grant 
of leave on full pay for two weeks per annum after 2 years' service. 
Although the Government did not comment on these recommendations, 
the industry nevertheless adopted them in full. 
W.N.W.C. ,(1943), Paras. 312, 314 and 317. 
Rand Daily Mail, 3. L 47. 
(3) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para.302. 
(4) ibid, Para. 287. 
(5) ibid, Para. 293. 
(6) ibid, Para.306. 
(7) ibid, Para.325, 
This figure included the proposed benefits to the "permanent" workers, 
The cost of living allowance accounted for £1, 168, 000, the boot allowance 
for £317, 000 and the wage increase for £1, 15 7, 000. 
(8) W.N.W.C. (1943), Para,32L 
(9) ibid, Para. 230. 
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Their adoption would not have radically improved the position of the 
migrant labourer. Both immediately before the war and in 1943, the migrant 
labourer had "to be satisfied with a scale of living .•• o .•••. regarded as 
unsatisfactory, bein~ below the line of ordinary reasonable requirement". (l) 
The Lansdown recommendations fell short of providing the migrant with an 
income which equalled expenditure for the labourer and his family not 
only for the period during which he was at work, but also for that period 
combined with another, Leo "reasonable" 0 stay in the reserve. Such an 
"ideal" was "under present conditions, unattainable". (
2
) For its achievement 
it was necessary to improve conditions in the reserves, so that the income 
of the Africans there could be raisedo 
In a superficial examination of the effects on the gold mining industry 
of the suggested additional allowances to the black miners, the Commission 
came to the very tentative conclusion that the expected increased costs 
"would hasten (the) end" of four mines o (
3
) No detailed analysis was made 
of whether these allowances would necessarily have resulted in a change 
in the pay limit; (
4
) nor were possible methods investigated for the industry 
to further subsidise the marginal mineso An example of the preferential 
treatment accorded low grade mines was the practice of allocating a larger 
proportionate share of the available African labour to the poorer mines, 
so that some· mines with high grade ore had no more than 70 per cent of 
their full complement of black labour while some of the poorer mines were 
allotted 90 per cent of their complementso (5) It was, however, suggested 
that revenue derived from indirect taxation (
5
) (imposed upon product only 
and not upon profit), should be the source of Government assistance if the 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943), Parao245o 
(2) ibid, Para. 322. 
(3) ibid,. Para. 330. 
This is out of a total of approximately 60 mines. 
(4) The "pay limit" means the minimum amount of gold contained in a 
ton of ore which can be mined without monetary loss. 
(5) W.N.W.C. (1943), ParaoSSo 
(6) Customs dues, high railway rates, claim licences and gold 
realization charges o 
W.N.W.C. (1943), Parao337o 
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industry was unable to economise and therefore to continue producing ore 
of the same volume and same grade. The Commission pointed out that an 
industry which paid £17, 000, 000 per year in profits should be able to pay 
an additional £2,600,000 in wages to its lowest paid workers. (l) 
The insistence of the Lansdown Commission that "no less (than the 
adoption of their recommendations) can be done for the workers" (2) 
apparently went unheeded. Although the total effect would have been 
/ 
that the labourer's income still fell short of expenditure for the combined 
period of work at the mines and residence in the reserve, Prime Minister 
Smuts, in consultation with the Chamber of Mines~ initiated improvements 
which involved an annual additional expenditure of approximately £1, 850, 000, 
30 per cent less than the total recommended improvements (£2, 642,000). 
As proposed by the Commission, African workers were to receive pay at 
time-arid-a-half rates for overtime or Sunday work. In lieu of all the 
other find in gs of the Comm is s ion, however, the wage of surface workers 
was to be increased by 4d. per shift and that of underground workers by 
5d. per shift. (3) The cost of these increases was to be met by remission 
of taxation in the form of the gold realisation charges (
4
) which amounted to 
approximately £2 million for the financial year 1944-45. (5) 
(1) W.N.W.C. (1943L Para.33L 
(2) ibid, Para. 323. 
(3) These improvements were to take effect from 1st April, 1944. 
Cape Times, 25.3.44. 
(4) The depreciation of the dollar-sterling rate just before the outbreak of 
war gave the gold mines a large unexpected rise in the price of their 
product. The mines received this increased price, minus the realization 
charges which were borne by the Reserve Bank acting as agent for the 
Treasury. By 1940, however, most of these charges fell away by 
mutual agreement between the Union and United Kingdom Governments, 
with only a small amount still being collected for the loan account in the 
Consolidated Revenue Fund. The gold realization charge of 3s. 6d. per 
fine ounce of gold was levied from 1940 to 1945. In effect it meant that 
the mines received l 64s. 6d. per ounce instead of the l 68s. which was 
then the price of gold. 
Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943)a p. 47. 
Report of the Committee on Gold Mining Taxation, U.G.16 of 1946, Paras. 
140 and 141. 
(5) T.C.M.(1945), p.122. 
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The relative effects of the changes in wage rates suggested by the 
Lansdown Commission and those decided upon by the Government are 
summarised in the following table: 
SURFACE EMPLOYEES 
Previous VVa~e Rate Number Commission's Actual 
2er Shift (1943) Employed Recommendation New Rate 
1943o(a) 12er Shift. (b) 12er Shift 
Under ls. 9d. 4,658 Zs. 5d. Zs. ld. 
1 s . 9 d. to 1 s . 11 d. 30,360 Zs. 5d. Zs. ld. to Zs. 
Zs. 17,488 Zs. 5d. Zs. 4d. 
Zs. ld. to Zs. 3d. 7,993 Zs. 5d. to Zs. 6d. Zs. 5d. to Zs. 
3d. 
7d. 
Zs. 4d. toZs.6d. 5,74Z Zs. 7d. to Zs.9d. Zs. 8d. to Zs. lOd, 
Zs. 7d. to 6s. 
Over 6s. 
TOTAL 
Previous VVage Rate 
2er Shift (1943) 
Under ls. 9d. 
ls. 9d. to ls. lld. 
Zs. 
6,889 Zs. lOd. to 6s. 3d. Zs.lld. to6s. 










per Shift. (b) 
Zs. 9d. 





6d. to Zs. 
4d. 
8d. Zs_. ld. to Zs. 3d. 
Zs. 4d. to Zs. 6d. 
Zs. 7d. to 6s. 
Over 6s. 
Z6,4Z7 Zso 9do to Zs. lld. Zso 9do to Zso lldo 
Z9,566 Zso lldo to 6So 4d. 3s. Od, to 6s. 
1,181 over 6s. 4do over 6s. 5d. 
TOTAL ZZ6,51Z 
(a) Source: U .G. Zl - 1944, para. 78. 
(b) Including cost of living allowance and (for underground workers) 
boot allowance. 
SOURCE: Social and Economic Planning Council, Report No. 11, "Economic 
Aspects of the Gold Mining Industry", Pretoria,- 1947, p. Z9, 
As can be seen, the scales introduced by the Government meant that the 
majority of employees received less than the Commission had recommended, 
but the minority of higher paid black miners received a penny more per shift 




The result of these increased scales on the average wage of the African 
mineworker are shown below: 
Average cash earnings of all Coloured workers on the 
Gold Mines Witwatersrand and Extensions 
1942 2So 3. l 2d. 
1943 2So 3 o 84do 
1944 2So 7 o 92do 
1945 · 2s o 9 0 3 6d. 
1946 2So 9 o 60do 
Sources: Derived from T.C.Mo (1942-46) 
G. M. E. ( 19 41- 4 6) 
. ("' 
The new scales were only in force for three-quarters of 1944 with the result 
that the average wage for the year was a 4do improvement on 1943. However, 
both for 1945 and 1946, average cash earnings increased by 5~do over the 
1943 level, an improvement which exceeded the changes initiated by the 
Government and Chambero A possible explanation for this apparent disparity 
may be that the distribution of workers within the wage grades had changed 
in favour of the higher grades after 1943. 
The costs of the improvements in the conditions of employment, however, 
were approximately those which had been envisagedo Over the three year 
period, 1944-46, the recommended increases (5do for underground workers 
and 4d. for surface workers) were on average those which were actually paido 
"Expected increase of total coloured wage(!) for 1944, 1945 and 
1946(2) (assuming 75 per cent underground workers at 5d. per shift 
and 25 per cent surface workers at 4d. per shift) - £5, 943, 4890 
(1) "Coloured" referred to non-whiteso Nearly all the "coloured" miners 
were black. 
(2) For 2.3/4 years, from 1st April, 1944, to 31st December, 19460 
The average number of coloured men in service for 1944 was 297, 511, 
for 1945 3 07, 140, and for 1946 the number was 304, 857 (total of 
909, 508 for the 3 years). 
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Actual increase of total coloured wage for 1944, 1945 and 1946 
(over 1943 figure)(!) - £5,940,712. 
Source: Derived from T.C.M. (1943-46) 
G. M. E. ( 19 41- 4 6) 
Smuts' statement on the relief which was to be given to the industry 
was, however, ambiguous. On the one hand he said that the gold realisati.on 
charges which had been collected since 1940 would, be made available "to 
meet this situation", while on the other he referred only to the gold realisation 
charges collected "in respect of the financial year 1944-45" (
2
) According 
to the first statement approximately £11 million was to be placed at the 
disposal of the mines; the second statement implied that only £2 million 
could have been used by the industry to meet the cost of increasing the 
wages of its black labour force. (
3
) In either event, the amount was 
apparently sufficient to meet the industry's requirements in full. 
The gold realisation charges levied for. the first six months of the 
financial year 1945-46 were not returned to the industry. As the price of 
gold had increased from 168s. a fine ounce to 172s.3d. as from 1st January, 
1945, the Government consequently advised the Chamber that in view of this 
higher price it was not considered "necessary to extend (the) arrangement". (
4
) 
The increase in the gold price of 4s. 6d. a fine ounce more than compensated 
for the gold realisation charges of 3s. 6d. a fine ounce. Moreover, from 
1st October, 1945, this levy itself was abolished, (
5
) which made both- the 
charges and the increased price available for the purpose of financing the 
improvements in African wages. Thus the return of the gold realisation 
charges for 1944-45 of approximately £2 million, (
5
) together with the benefits 
of a rise in the gold price from January u 1945, and the discontinuation of the 
(1) However, the number in service during 1943 was 3, 019 greater than the 
average of the number in service for the years 1944-46. 
(2) HouseofAssembly, 24.3.44, Hansard, 3817, 3818. 
(3) T.C.M. (1940-46). 
(4) Rand Daily Mail, 12. 6. 45. 
(5) Report of the Committee on Gold Mining Taxation, op cit, Para. 141. 
(6) Gold realisation charges during the year ended 31st March, 1945 were 
£1,971,071. 
T.C.M. (1945), p.122. 
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gold realisation levy from October 0 1945, meant that the industry was able 
to meet the expense of improving African labour conditions without incurring 
any additional expenditure. 
Press comments on the Government's response to the Lansdown Commission 
were varied. The Cape Times referred to it as a "compromise" which was 
"unsatisfactory in meeting the just demands .of the native worker and it is 
unsatisfactory in its potential effect on the already high cost-structure of 
South African economy". (l) The "solution", according to The Cape Argus, 
was an "equitable and practical method of alleviating what would otherwise 
have become a situation of extreme gravity" 0 although it was recognised 
that it did not "go to the root of the matter". (2) The Rand Daily Mail, 
however, expressed surprise that an inquiry was called "into the wages 
paid by one of the best employing bodies in South Africa to its native workers. " 
The suggested reason for this was that South Africans found "it difficult to 
stomach •..•••.••• the sight of a well-run self-supporting industry". It 
made reference to the "milking" of the mines at the expense of other sectors of 
the economy - "agriculture has probably got most of the profits of the mines; 
if the miners are to have more, agriculture must have. less". (3) The Star, 
apparently the more liberal of the Johannesburg papers, referred to the 
Cabinet's decision as "sensible" and "courageous". Criticism of Smuts' 
failure to apply the total increases recommended could "easily be met by 
reference to the economic situation. The mine natives, who work on the 
'all found' basis, are by no means so hard hit by the rise in living and 
general costs as workers in other employment". (
4
) The Guardian,. published 
by the Communist Part of South Africa, alone attacked the Government's 
decision, noting that Smuts had by implication "condemned the Commission 
for being too generous". (S) 
(1) Cape Times, 25. 3. 44. 
(2) Cape Argus, 24. 3. 44. 
(3) Rand Daily Mail 0 27. 3. 44. 
(4) Star·, 25. 3. 44. 
(5) Guardian, 30. 3. 44. 
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The appointment of the Native Mine Wages Commission had naturally 
raised the expectations of the African mine labourerso Its recommendations, 
however, were regarded as "miserable and grudging", while Smuts' decision 
to cut these "to the bone" was scornfully condemnedo (1) Protest meetings 
of mine employees were organised by the African Mine Workers' Uniono 
The .Government used its emergency war powers to introduce War 
Measure No. 1425 which prohibited meetings of more than 20 persons 
on gold-proclaimed land (mine property} without a special permit. Permits 
~ IV) 'vV \.A 
were rarely granted and never at all to the African Mine Workers 1 Union, a 
non-recognised trade uniono This was an exceptionally serious blow to 
the Union which relied mainly on mass meetings of the workers to conduct 
its activities. The measure was used to harry officials of the Union and 
retard effective trade union organisation. J.B. Marks, President of the 
A. M. W. U. , and four other officials were arrested during December 0 1944 0 
for contravening the Proclamationo All were subsequently found not guilty 
h . l' (2) on a tee mca ity. 
Subsequently, in May, 1945, a large meeting of black miners (3) 
requested the Government to meet a deputation from the A. M. W. U. , which 
had a mandate to ask for: 
"(1) The implementation of all the recommendations of the Native 
Mine Wages Commission for improved wages and conditions o 
The improvement to be retrospective as from 1st April, 19440 
(2) The removal of the Emergency Regulation banning meetings of 
more than 20 persons on Gold proclaimed lando 
(3) A general increase of wages 0 "(
4
) 
These requests were not, on the face of it, unreasonable, yet the miners were 
not even granted an audience by the Acting Prime Minister, J.H. Hofmeyro 
(1) Inkululeko, 15th April, 19440 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 16. L 450 
Inkululeko, 9th December, 1944; 19th December, 1944; 29th January, 19450 
(3) It was alleged that 2, 000 men (representing all the African mineworkers) 
attended the meeting in the Trades Hall on 6th May. 
(4) Inkululeko, 9th June, 1945. 
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The impatience of the African miner with his conditions of employment 
was reflected in the growing number of strikes on the Rand, These conditions 
had deteriorated since the Commission reported - the rising cost of living 
had further aggravated the position of the migrant worker and, because of a 
drought and poor crops, there had been a reduction, with Government . 
sanction, of his beer and porridge rations. (1) Typical of the unrest was a 
hunger strike of about 3, 500 men on a compound of the Crown Mines. (2) 
"Riots" of black mineworkers occurred regularly during the early 
months of 1946, The distinguishing feature of these "disturbances" 'was 
that they were all concerned with non-provision of certain rations. Police 
were used to devastating effect - on the Modder East Mine, for example, 
a police baton charge resulted in the death of two and hospitalisation of 
over 100 African miners. (3) 
(4) 
More than 2, 000 delegates attended the annual conference of 
the African Mine Workers' Union on Sunday, 14th April, 1946. It was 
unanimously resolved that the Chamber of Mines and the Government should 
take "immediate steps to provide adequate and suitable food for the workers, "(
5
) 
and that, "in accordance with the new world principles for an improved 
standard of living subscribed to by our Government at U. N. 0. !' the minimum 
wage of all African miners should be raised to 10s. per day. The text of 
these re~olutions was sent to the Chamber and a reply in the form of a printed 
b-, 
post-card dated 6th May, 1946, was received from the A. M. W. U. The reply 
simply noted that the matter was "receiving attention". This was both the 
first and the last Chamber communication received by the A. M. W. U. (5) 
(1) See p. 15 6. 
(2) RandDailyMail, 2L7.45. 
Inkululeko, 28th July, 1945, 
This paper claimed that 5 0 000 workers had gone on strike. 
(3) Rand Daily Mail, 8. 3. 46. 
(4) Figure given by Rand Daily Mail, 14. 4. 46, in a report which occupied 
a full 3 column inches, 
(5) Rand Daily Mail, 15. 4. 46. 
(6) The Impending Strike of African Miners, A Statement by the African 
Mineworkers' Union, 7. 8. 46,.. p, 3. 
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Roux suggests that it "was apparently sent in error by a subordinate 
1 k 
II ( 1) 
c er " 
This April conference was followed by strikes of African miners on a 
number of mines. In each case the miners demanded lOso per day and 
better food, but returned to work after the police had taken "action" and 
arrested the ringleaders. (
2
) The Rand Daily Mailu in reporting on the 
strikes at the Luipaardsvlei and Randfontein Estate Mines, observed 
"there have been similar strikes on other mines along the Reef in recent 
weeks, and the similarity of the demands made on each occasion indicates 
that a central organisation is behind the apparent spontaneous strikes 
on various prope~ties". (3) The A. M. W. U. did not claim any credit, 
however, and further stated that the,strikers were "not acting on the 
advice of the leadership of the Union" 0 (
4
) 
Again in late May, the Union convened.a mass meeting of mineworkers. 
If the earlier demands were not met, it was unanimously agreed that there 
s.hould be "preparation for a strike of all native mineworkers on the Rand". (S) 
The meeting was open and was attended by the Police, the Director of Native 
Labour, and representatives of the Chamber of Mines. (
6
) The Chamber and 
Government were thus given timely notice of the black miners' intention to 
( 1) Roux, p. 3 3 7. 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 4o So 460 , 60 So 46. 1 7 o S. 46. , 29. So 46. 
Justice was not very expeditious. Fifty-nine men from the Randfontein 
Estates Mine had to wait over 10 weeks in order to be found not guilty of 
contravening the Riotous Assemblies AcL 
Rand Daily Mail, 20. 7. 460 
(3) Rand Daily Mail, 4o S. 46. 
(4) The Impending Strike of African Miners, op cit, pp. 3 and 4o 
(S) Rand Daily Mail, 20. S. 46. 
Meeting held on Sunday, 19, S. 46. 
(6) Evidence of Det. Sgt. H.G. Boy at preparatory examination on an 
allegation of sedition of eight members of the Communist Party. 
Cape Argus, 22. 1. 47. 
( 
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strike. (l) Mr. G.H. Beatty, addressing a Shareholders' meeting, suggested 
that the agitation was by communists and that it was hoped "to get over it 
without much trouble". (Z) 
The next two months were uneventful. At a conference of the African 
Mine Workers' Union(~) held on the Newton Square, Johannesburg, on Sunday, 
4th August, 1946, the gathering reached agreement both on the strike and 
the date on which it was to begin. It was unanimously resolved: 
"Because of the intransigent attitude of the Transvaal Chamber 
of Mines towards the legitimate demands of the workers for a 
minimum wage of ten shillings per day and better conditions of 
work, this meeting of African miners resolves to embark upon a 
General Strike of all Africans employed on the Gold Mines, as 
from the 12th August, 1946. 11 (4) 
The decision to strike on a certain day was proposed by an unidentified 
African and agreed to by the meeting. Neither the proposal to strike nor 
the decision to do so on a certain day came from J.B. Marks, President of 
the A. M. W. U. , or any of the other speakers. Marks , how ever, did 
specifically warn against the use of violence and cautioned the men not 
to break up kitchens and the offices of the compound managers. A policeman 
present at the meeting alleged that the unknown miner who. demanded the 
(1) The authors of a recent book have also drawn attention to this point: 
"The proceedings (of the meeting) were widely publicised 1 
but mine owners and Government refused to credit Africans 
with the capacity to organise concerted action on a large 
scale in defiance of the elaborate system of surveillance, 
intimidation and espionage that operated in the compounds". 
Simons, H.J. and R. E., Class and Colour in South Africa, 1850-1950, 
Penguin African Library, 19 69, p. 5 73 o 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 23. 5. 460 
(3) The A. M. W. U. claimed an attendance of "over one thousand delegates" 
while a police witness to the "Sedition" trial of 1947 estimated that 
only 300 to 400 African mi.ners attendedo 
(4) The Impending Strike of African Miners, op cit, Po 1. 
Rand Daily Mail, 12. 8. 46. 
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strike said, "It is better to die here than to go home empty handed". (l) 
The strike thus decided upon began on 12th Augusto Mary Benson 
portrayed the scene very vividly even though she was not there: 
"At 3 a.m. onMonday 9 12th August, it was a cold clear night 
on the highveld. All along the Reef from hundreds of shaft-
heads African miners surfaced at the end of their shift and 
walked out in the wintry night, back to the compound. Some, 
as they tramped wearily along, passed others, awaitinc;:J to go 
underground. But on seven mines they passed no one. The 
cages went down empty. The huge fly-wheels stopped. The 
great mine strike had begun". (2) 
The African mine strike of 1946 lasted four days and, according to the 
Chief Native Commissioner for the Witwatersrand, involved 73, 557 workers. 
l, 248 of them were injured in the course of police action, nine were killed. (3) 
. The strike was quickly broken - as were a few heads. The black worker 
did not gain a single concession from the Chamber and, in fact, at no stage 
were negotiations even opened to discuss their "apparent" grievances. 
Such, in brief, was the course of the strikeo 
The strike had started quietly during the early hours of Monday morning, 
12th August, Initially it was successful for more than 48, 000 men(
4
)reacted 
to the call to stay away from work., Eleven properties were affected - a 
total stoppage at 6, but only a partial abstention from work on the remaining 
(1) Evidence of Det. Constable J. S. Viviers at preparatory examination on 
an allegation of sedi.tion of eight members of the Communist Party. 
Cape Argus, 22. L 47. 
Guardian, 23. 1. 4 7. 
(2) Benson, Maryo 0 The African Patriots, Faber and Faber, London, 1963, 
pp. 126 and 127. 
(3) Estimates of strike casualties given by Mr. J.M. Brink, Chief Native 
Commissioner for the Witwatersrand. 
Forum, 26. 10. 46. 
Johannesburg Joint Council of Europeans and Africans 
Annual Report, April, 1946 to March, 1947, p. 4. 
(4) The Chamber estimate of the number involved was 45, 000. After 




five. (l) A novel element was introduced at this early stage when workers 
on the City Deep mine, who had been driven from their compounds, went 
underground where they then held a "sit-down" strikeo 
As Government reaction to the demands of the African miners 1 had been 
tardy, so its reaction to the threat of a strike by the A. M. W. U. had likewise 
been tardy. Yet now the Government reacted (or perhaps over-reacted) 
and already by the first morning of the strike reinforcements were sent to 
Johannesburg. A baton. charge was made on black miners in Benoni who 
"contemplated an attack on the police station". (
2
) Apparently the police 
were acting on the principle that attack was the best form of defence. 
On all the mines involved in the strike, police arrested the ringleaders, 
constantly referred to in the daily press as "agitators 11 o 
The Tuesday (13th August) saw little change in conditions on the 
Witwatersrand gold mines o The police had surrounded each compound where 
the workers were on strike. Thirty-two of the Rand's 45 producing mines 
were reported not to be affected by the strike - the number of mines at 
which there was a total stoppage had increased to eight, a total of 13 mines 
being involved. (
3
) The African miners were being arrested in increasing 
numbers o At the Turf compound, 3 6, and at the Chris Compound, 24, were 
held when "strong detachments of police visited these compounds". (
4
) 
The Transvaal Council of Non-European Trade Unions convened a 
meeting to debate two resolutions - whether all the African Unions 
affiliated to the Council should go on strike immediately, or whether the 
Chamber of Mines should be given 4B hours to open negotiations with the 
African Mine Workers' Union before a general strike was called. While 
this debate was in progress, news was received that the offices of the 
Garment Workers' Union h<;1d been raided by the police, and all the printing 
( 1) Star, 12. Bo 460 
I 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 120 Bo 46. 
(3) Star, 130 B.46. 
(4) Rand Daily Mail, 140 B. 460 
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and duplicating machinery in them removed. Soon afterwards the police 
calmly requested J.B. Marks, President both of the A. M. W. U. and the 
Transvaal Council of Non-European Trade Unions, to come out of the 
building in which the meeting was being held and. thereupon arrested him. 
Marks appeared in Court the following day (14th August) but his bail 
application was refused. (l) The case was remanded until 22nd August. 
Thus only 24 hours after the strike commenced the Government detained 
the leader of the African miners. The meeting of Non-European Trade 
Unions, on hearing of Marks 1 arrest, immediately decided by an over-
whelming majority that a general strike of all African workers represented 
, by the Council of Non-European Trade Unions should be called within 
48 hours. This general strike did not, however, take place. 
Critical events were still to take place on the second day of the 
strike, Tuesday. After Marks and several other officials of the A.M.W.U. 
had been arrested, the police raided the Head Office of the A. M. W. U. and 
confiscated files, letters and other documents. As the strike had been 
organised by the Union, this move, in conjunction with the arrest of many 
of the Union's leaders, must have both seriously inhibited continued 
organisation and assisted the mine authorities in breaking the strike. 
It was on this day that African miners were for the first time fired upon 
by the police. The latter surrounded the strikers at the Sub-Nigel Mine 
and when stoned, "fired 12 rounds, selecting individual targets". (
2
) In the 
ensuing panic amongst the black miners four were trampled to death. The 
verdict of the subsequent inquest on these men was "death due to asphyxia 
occasioned though the four deceased being buried under other natives after 
having fallen at the entrance to a compound during a stamped_e after shots 
had been fired at or towards an unruly ·mob of compound natives by members 
of the police in an attempt to quell a riot". (
3
) Eight workers had sustained 
(1) Together with three others, he was charged under the Riotous Assemblies 
Act with inciting African mineworkers to cease work. 
Star, 14. 8. 46. 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 14. 8.46. 
(3) ibid, 24. 10. 46. 
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gunshot wounds - one later died of wo.unds in both thighs. Soon after 
this "incident" all the workers on strike at the Sub-Nigel Mine, irrespective 
of whether it was their shift or not, indicated that they "wished to go 
underground". The death' of some of their number had a significant effect 
on the strikers. In addition I the news of the deaths must have inhibited 
and deterred those contemplating strike action and weakened the resolve 
of those already involved. 
The strike developed into a "see-saw" affair on the Wednesday, 
(14th August). While some of the original strikers went back to work, 
others, for the first time u went on strike. On balance 0 however, by late 
afternoon the trend was "back to work 11 • 
The many Africans who had been arrested during the preceding two 
days were speedily brought to trial. Sixty-two were charged in the 
Johannesburg Magistrates Court with contravening Section 19 of the Native. 
Labour Regulation Act by refusing to commence work. The case was 
remanded until 28th August and each of the men was released on payment of 
£1 bail. The twenty men employed on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines did not 
fare so well. S'imilarly charged to the 62 above, these men had their 
contracts cancelled by a Germiston Magistrate. Similar sentences were 
meted out to 53 miners from the Simmer and Jack Mine~ (1) "Justice" was 
both swift and harsh, and was undoubtedly intended as a lesson to those 
miners who still refused to work. 
Smuts had appointed a Cabinet sub-committee of the Minister of 
Mines (S. F. Waterson), the Minister of Labour (Dr. Colin Steyn), the 
Minister of Justice (H.G. Lawrence), and the Minister of Native Affairs 
(Major Piet van der Byl) to "deal" with the strike. (
2
) On the Wednesday, 
however, Smuts told a regional committee of his party, in words which 
have a familiar ring, that he was "not unduly concerned over what was 
happening on the Witwatersrand mines ••••..... because the native strike 
was not caused by legitimate grievances but by agitators". (
3
) 
(1) Star, 14.8.46. 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 14. 8. 46. 
(3) Star, 14. 8. 46. 
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The black workers continued to stage "sit-down" strikes. Police 
were called to the Nigel Gold Mine and descended to investigate the 
position. It was reported that "they drove the natives up stope by stope, 
{l) 
level by level until they reached the surface" o This was later denied 
by the Management, who claimed that the men had "voluntarily" returned 
to the surface. 
By the Thursday (15th August), the strike had been all but broken -
only two mines still being affectedo. By the following evening. (16th August) 
all the mines had returned to normal. Seventeen mines had, in varying 
degrees, been involved. As many as a million man-hours were estimated 
to have been lost. (2) 
The attitude of the black striker had initially been peaceful. A newsman 
who toured the strike compounds found that the men treated the occasion as 
if it were a Sunday: 
"They sat or lay about in blanketed groups, sunning themselves 
behind compound walls out of the wind. Others strolled along 
veld paths smoking and talkingo •..••.•••• The only signs of 
abnormal conditions were the frequent lorry-loads of armed 
police arriving in the area" 0 (3) 
The ill-advised arrest of ringleaders, however o led to a wave of intense 
bitterness and ill-feeling which was reflected in a change in the black 
workers' attitude" Nevertheless, the clashes between the police arid 
miners occurred for the most part in the compounds themselves or in 
their immediate vicinity" The black workers apparently heeded Marks' advice 
not to break up the kitchens and compound managers' offices, which had 
been the practice of previous black strikers, but vented their resentment 
by hurling rocks at the police who encircled them" Few clashes took place 
outside the environment of the mine" Mass marches on Johannesburg, 
undertaken for no apparent reason 9 were turned back in spite of the fact that 
they were orderly. The march on the Nigel Police Station which resulted 
(1) Rand Daily Mail, 16. Bo 460 
Cape Times, 16. B. 46. "Police Drive Strikers to Surface" o 
(2) Star, 16. Bo 46. 
(3) Rand Daily Mail, 12. B. 46. 
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in five fatalities had, on the other hando been undertaken for the legitimate 
purpose of enquiring after some leaders who had been arrested. On these 
occasions, however, the police considered it necessary to resort to batons, 
bayonets and even the use of gunso 
It is futile to attempt to apportion responsibility for the fatalities 
and injurieso The police as well as the daily press claimed the Africans 
were armed with "sticks, stones, steel bars, knives, iron bars and other 
weapons". (l) Photographs of the "weapons" collected after the clash 
at the Nigel Police Station showed the vast majority to be sticks, an 
article usually associated with the "blanket African". Police action 
had apparently been directed, or so the Johannesburg newspapers suggested, 
towards safeguardi.ng the citizens of the Witwatersrand. The Cape Times, 
However, commenting on the third day of the strike, found much to be 
desired in the attitude of the Police: 
"It is deplorable, but it is one of the facts of South African 
life, that when there is native labour unrest there are clashes 
between natives and the Police, and that when there are clashes 
between natives and the Police the native casualties will be in 
the majorityo Those who organise native labour demonstrations 
or strikes, therefore, unless they do so on grounds that are both 
just and urgent, are deliberately baring not their own but their 
deluded followers e heads to the baton. Which increases the 
culpability of their irresponsibility. On the other hand there 
is abundant justification for the prevalent complaint among . 
both natives and Europeans who try to be objective that the 
force used by the Police in dispensing native demonstrators 
commonly errs on the side of ruthlessness. Although it is no 
use being half-hearted when order has to be maintained, it is 
not only inhumane but unwise to use force too violently". (2) 
Other newspapers did not describe the clashes in the· same terms. The 
Rand Daily Mail reflected general sentiment when it suggested that the 
police deserved "the gratitude of the public for their courageous and 
skilful behaviour". (3) 
(1) Rand Daily Mail, lSo 8. 460 
(2) CapeTimes, 1608046. 
(3) Rand Daily Mail, 14. 8. 460 
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The Mail was not alone in its praise of the police. The 1, 600 
policemen (1) who had been made available on the Rand to deal with the 
labour troubles were later complimented by the Minister of Justice and the 
Witwatersrand Deputy Commissioner of Police for their "restrained" behaviour -
each European being rewarded with a bottle of beer (2) and each non-European 
policeman, appropriately o with kaffir beer. (3) 
From the first day of the strike, "agitators" had been blamed for 
inciting the workers to refuse to work. Already by the third day Smuts 
had publicly agreed with this view, while the Rand Daily Mail (
4
) quite 
blandly identified the "forces behind the strike". "Prominent" among these 
forces was "the Communist Party", (
5
) The fact that the strike was organised 
from outside and that Marks was a communist was cited as proof that the 
strike was caused by "agitators". It could, however, hardly have been 
otherwise. Anyone trying to organise miners from the inside would soon 
have found himself outside in any event due to the hostility of the Management. 
A Compound Manager, in fact, said as much at the trial of the leadership of 
the Communist Party in early 1947: "If he found•organisers in the compounds 
who were trying to organise the workers into trade unions he would try to get 
rid of them". Further, he stated categorically that this policy was universally 
practised all along the Witwatersrand. (
6
) Numerous organisation, including 
the Communist Party and the Institute of Race Relations, condemned the use 
of police to break the strike. The police, by adopting physical force and 
(1) Star, 16.8.46. 
(2) Rand Daily Mail, 20. 8. 46. 
(3) ibid, 23. 8. 46. 
(4) The "Cape Times" used rather devious logic to support the stand of its 
sister paper (The Rand Daily Mail) and of the Prime Minister: "With 
no responsible European backing, the strike was doomed from the start. 
This is complete justification for General Smuts' statement •••••••••.• 
that the strike was the work of agitators". 
Cape Times, 16. 8. 46. · 
(5) • Rand Daily Mail, 14. 8. 46. 
(6) Mr. J.C. Brown, Compound Manager, New Kleinfontein Mine. 
Star, 22.1.47. 
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intimidatory tactics, (1) must have had a significant effect on the outcome of 
the strike. Yet the responsibility and blame for the strike was decisively 
shifted to the communists by the police raid on the Party offices during the 
stri~e. (2) In addition, 12 members of the Johannesburg District Committee 
of the Communist Party were included amongst the more than 50 men and 
women of all races charged wi.th conspiring to incite, and of inciting, the 
black mineworkers to strike. (
3
) The impression which the Government 
obviously wished to spread, vizo that the Communist Party was behind the 
strike, was further reinforced by the allegation of sedition brought against 
the Party's National Chairman and seven other prominent communists during 
(4) 
January, 194 7 o 
Perhaps the complicity of the "agitators" was put into true perspective 
by the Sunday Times which urged the Government to "analyse the basic 
causes of discontent among native workers and ascertain what makes them 
a fertile field for the agitator" o (
5
) What then were the African miners' 
"basic causes of discontent"? 
The origins of the strike are complex but not necessarily obscureo 
We shall list them below in an order which does not necessarily reflect 
their importance. 
First, the general state of unrest throughout the world. Industrial 
disturbances swept over the world after the waro For patriotic reasons .. 
trade unio~s restrained their members during the war years so that the end 
of the conflict saw renewed activity and militance by unionised workers. 
Second, the heightened race consciousness which was manifested at 
this time both in South Africa and other parts of the world, such as India, 
(1) Printing offices were raided, pamphlets confiscated, sweeping arrests 
of miners and non-miners made, "scabs" protected, and possession 
even taken of a loudspeaker vano 
(2) Cape Times, 16.8.46. 
(3) RandDailyMail, 3.9o46o 
(4) Cape Times, 220 L 47. 
They were committed for trial but the case was not proceeded with. 
(5) Sunday Times, 18. 8. 46. 
J 
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Indonesia, the Middle East and the African Colonies. The subject 
populations of Asia and Africa were asserting their claims to those 
freedoms the Allies had claimed to defend against Hitlero 
Third, the example set by the African mineworkers 1 European counter-
parts. The white miners had successfully 0 but illegally, struck during 
. March, 1946. The strike began as a protest against the dismissal of an 
employee in arrears with his subscriptions to the South Africa-n Mine 
Workers' Union· (closed shop agreement) _and developed into a demand 
for new elections of Union officials. (l) It lasted for nearly ten days 
and, although quite illegal 0 involved every mine on the Reef - no officials 
of the Protesting Committee were arrested and the men were not forced 
back to work. 
Fourth, the colour bar and the economic disabilities of the African 
miners. The appointment of the Lansdown Commission buoyed up the 
hopes of the black miners, but the Report and the Government's reaction 
to the Report must have persuaded the most reasonable among them that 
the only way to gain a living wage from the Chamber was to resort to 
strike action. The Government virtually ignored the estimates of the 
Commission and did not even contest them. The decision a therefore, 
to grant relief to the black miners which was insufficient to meet their 
minimum requirements, on the basis of the Lansdown Commission's 
calculations, was therefore regarded as purely expedient. The situation 
was further aggravated by the fact that African trade unions were not 
officially recognised and could not therefore participate in collective 
bargaining. 
Fifth, the shortage of food affected the rations of the miner and the 
cost to his family. Because of the scarcity of certain foodstuffs, the 
Government had permitted the Chamber to reduce mine rations. Furthermore, 
during 1945 there was a maize crop failure in the Transkei and other reserve 
(1) The Settlement included a new election of officials to the South 
African Mineworkers' Union and provision for the setting up of a 
Commission of Inquiry into the Uni.on. 
Rand Daily Mail, 23. 3. 46. 
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areas, with the position described as "desperate", as maize supplies 
from other areas were also being curtailed. A member of the Maize Board, 
speaking in his personal capacity u voiced the opinion that Africans faced 
"absolute starvation unless there are bountiful crops of maize in other 
countries of the world 11 • (1) However 0 the Minister of Native Affairs 
(Major Piet van der Byl) told Parliament~ "No natives are 'star:.vi'ng'o. 
The expression is one commonly used by natives to indicate that food 
supplies are below normal". (
2
) It was, nevertheless, that typhus prevailed 
throughout the Transkei and that the health conditions of Africans in general 
were deteriorating. (3) 
Sixth, the political motivati.ons of the unenfranchised and an increasingly 
prevalent resentment of authority. Smuts' statesmanlike speeches outside 
South Africa, the foundation of the United Nations Organisation, and 
documents such as the Workers n Charter had a profound effect on the 
Africans. The world had once more been made safe for democracy and, 
strangely enough, they wished to have a share in iL 
Symptomatic of the temper of the African was the spontaneous decision 
by the Natives' Representative Council, an organisation supposed to represent 
Africans throughout the country, to adjourn in protest during the Mine Strike 
of 1946 (14. 8. 46. ). Dr. J .S. Moroka 0 a member of the Council, referring 
to the "wanton shooting" of the black miners, moved the motion of adjournment 







Rand Daily Mail, 12. L 46. 
ibid, 2. 2. 46. 
ibid, 22. 1. 46. ' 3L 1.46., 7.2.46. 
Rand Daily Mail, 15.8.46. 
The Resolution of the Council read as follows~ 
"The Council having since its inception brought to the notice of the 
Government the reactionary character of Union Native policy of segregation 
in all its ramifications deprecates the Government's post war continuation 
of a policy of Fascism which is the antithesis and negation of the letter and 
the spirit of the Atlantic Charter and the United Nations Charter. 
The Council, therefore, in protest against this breach of faith towards the 
African people in particular and the cause of world freedom in general 
resolves to adjourn this session and calls upon the Government forthwith 
to abolish all discriminatory legislation affecting non-Europeans in this 
country". 
Report of Proceedings of the Natives Representative Council, Adjourned 
Meeting of the Ninth Session. , U. G. 12 of 4 7. 
J 
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The Star commented: 
" .••..• it was not entirely clear from the discussion what specific 
act or omission was being condemned. The councillors denounced 
in the most general terms the whole discriminatory native policy 
of the country ••• ~ •••••••..••.•• 
. . . . . . . it must be conceded that the Council acted under some 
provocation and perhaps under considerable stress of feeling. 
Its meeting happened to coincide with the strike by a large 
number of native labourers on the mines / and with reports of 
disturbances in which the police had used bayonets and some 
strikers ·had lost their lives. The council as the only represen-
tative body of natives in existence, must have learnt of these 
happenings with grave concern, yet all attempts to elicit information 
or satisfactory assurances were fruitless •••••....•• 
. . . . . • . . it was ••• the culmination of a process of neglect which 
has left the council with nothing to do but brood over its grievances 
for nearly a decade". ( 1) 
Moroka, in speaking to the motion of adjournment, referred to the Council 
(2) 
as a "Toy Telephone". 
Of all the different factors discussed above, perhaps the most immediate 
cause of the strike was the widespread disappointment with the none-too;.. 
generous findings of the Lansdown Commission and their even more niggardly 
implementation by the Government. After the initial high hopes the subsequent 
disillusionment was extreme. On top of this came the cuts in the food 
rations; which rubbed salt into still open wounds. 
(1) Star'· _ 17. 8. 46. 
(2) See Paton, Alan, Hofmeyr, O.U.P., London, 1964, pp.430-442., 
for a full discussion of these events. 
• 




Plus ca change plus c'est la m~me chose. (l) African labour 
"' conditions over a time-span of more than fifty years - the period we 
have discussed in detail - are remarkable not for the changes and 
improvements that one would expect as a nat.ural by-product of increasing 
mechanisation, industrialisation and sophistication, but for their rigidity, 
especially in wage rates, and their resemblance to conditions at the turn 
of the century. Prof. Frankel's dictum which we have quoted earlier 
adequately states the present writer's views - "Nothing has changed so 
little in South Africa as the black man's rate of pay". 
By the 1940 's the Chamber still relied on views regarding the African 
labour force of the gold mines which were somewhat dubious. Typical 
of these was the Chamber's obsessive pre-occupation with the theory 
of the African's strong preference for more leisure over greater income 
which must lead to a backward-sloping supply curve of black labour. 
The Chamber adamantly maintained that the African "(utilised) extra 
remuneration rather to purchase more leisure than to increase his standard 
of living", (
2
) even though the African in this country had increased his 
average length of service on the mines by more than 200 per cent during 
the first four decades of the century. The average length of stay at "home" 
, in the reserves between periods of employment had, in addition, been 
drastically curtailed, to such an extent that the Lansdown Commission 
referred to the "holiday visit" to the reserves of a fifth of the men from 
the Union and Protectorates. 
Clearly one of the most significant figures for the industry was the 
average cost incurred by a mine for each shift worked by an African miner. 
According to the breakdown already discussed on page 150 , the total 
(1) I am indebted to Mr. H.F. Kenny for this French expression. 
(2) Evidence of G.P.C. to W.N.W.C. (1943), p.169. 
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for 1942 was 3s. 4. 8d. per shift. ( l) The only comparable figure available 
is that for 1924 - 3s. 2d. (
2
) Over 18 years the cost of employing an 
African labourer increased by 2. 8d. per shift or 7. 3 per cent. The pay 
component had, however, remained the same, viz. 2s. 2. 5d., despite 
a marked raise in labour productivity. During the same period the retail 
t f 1. . . d b 8 3 :(
3) Th' '11 h Ch b cos o ivmg m ex rose y . per cent. is i ustrates t e am er 
of Mines' declared. policy of utilising "cheap native labour". 
In 1941, in correspondence with Senator J .D. Rheinallt Jones, the Gold 
Producers' Committee of the Chamber of Mines reported as follows: 
"It will be within your knowledge that during recent years there 
have been substantial general improvements in the circumstances 
of non-European employment, i.e. in regard to housing, feeding, 
ho_spitalisation, recreation and such general amenities. In 
addition, there have been financial concessions of some importance, 
such, for instance, as the setting up in January, 193 6, and again 
in 193 7, of new minimum rates for native employees resulting in the 
fact that average rates of pay today are approximately 1 -!d. per shift 





Capital costs of compound and 
hospital buildings 
Total 
2s. 2. 5d. 
L 15d. 
5 0 28d. 
6. 97d. 
• 94d. 
3s. 4. 8d. 
(2) The figures given for 1924 were as follows: 
Average pay per shift 
Feeding, medical attendance, 
housing, etc. 
Total wages equivalent paid 
Additional cost of compensation, 
recruiting, etc. 
. Total cost of African shi.ft 




3s. 2d • 
Evidence of G. P .C. to the Economic and Wage Commission (1925), 
Statement No. 5, Para. 14. ' , 
(3) Union Statistics for 50 years, Bureau of Census and Statistics, Pretoria, 
H-24. 
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in advance of average rates in 1935; whilst in 1939, the concession 
of the payment of incoming 1 rail fares and food for the journeys for 
natives serving a minimum of 270 shifts 0 represented a further 
improvement in circumstances of employmenL . The monetary value 
of these two concessions was approximately £75, 000 per annum. 
It is also pertinent to your enquiry to refer to the fact that the 
Native Recruiting Corporation, Limited,. and the Witwatersrand 
Native Labour Association, Limited, make regular and substantial 
donations to a number of missionary and cultural organisations, 
entirely for the benefit of natives in all territories to which the 
interests of the mines extend; whilst in 1935 a donation of 
£85, 000 for the benefit of natives in the Union and the British 
Protectorate territories was made for capital purposes for Native 
welfareo 
In regard to the level of cash wages, comment may be made on a 
matter which is frequently overlooked. The average rate of pay 
in cash for all native employees in 1930 was 2s. 1. 9do per day, 
in 1935 - 2s. l. 2d. per day, and in 1941 - 2s. 2. 6do per day. 
Unless quoted in associati.on with the numbers employed in the 
respective years (201, 000; 2 7 2, 000; 3 69, 000) the rates of pay 
are to a great extent deprived of significance. The increase in 
the number of natives employed from 201,000 to 369 0 000 is the 
best evidence that the Industry 1s rates and terms of employment are 
the best open in the Union (or, indeed, in Africa generally) to large 
numbers of natives of equivalent industrial experience. It is 
legitimate to assume that the natives represented in the increase 
in numbers would, if not employed on the mines, be employed 
elsewhere in less attractive or less remunerative employment. 
In the absence of detailed statistics, it is impossible to say 
that there are more natives employed in the better classes of 
employment, or that those classes have achieved any increase 
in rates compared with the averageo The impression is, however, 
that larger numbers of natives are getting higher wages than in the 
past, and the fact that the average rates show comparatively little 
change is not conclusive that individual classes of natives are 
not materially better ofL " ( 1) 
A few days later a correction was offered, which stated: 
"The monetary value of the concessions stated at £7 50, 000 
per annum is underestimated, as the following figures will 
make clear: -
The average rate of pay in cash in 1935 was 2so L 2d., whereas 
the rate today is 2s. 2o 6d. Taking the numbers employed as 
369,000 and the shifts worked per annum as 312, the wage increase 
amounts to £670 0 0000 
( 1) Letter from A. J. Lime beer, Secretary 0 Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 
to Senator J.D. Rheinallt Jones, 12.11.41., Ballinger Papers. 
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The. value of the rail fare and feeding concessions is £280, 000, 
so that the total should be £950,000 instead of £750,000o .. (1) 
The point of view this illustrated is significanL The "improvements" 
in the way of financial concessions to African workers consisted partly in 
restoring a drop in their average rate of pay which had occurred between 
1930 and 1935 1 and partly in paying an i.ncreased. total wage bill through 
employing many more Africans at a minirpally improved rate of pay o 
African labour, the cost of which had remained virtually stationary in 
money terms had, in a period of rising prices, become· relatively cheaper 
and was being utilised in larger quantities o 
It is apparent that in the years immediately after Union, the Chamber, 
if permitted, would have altered its labour policy by providing greater 
opportunities for the African minero Although the pressures for doing so 
increased with the passage of years, the Chamber's propensity, in fact, 
its inclination, to strive for the goal of utilising the black worker to his 
full potential apparently floundered on the mentality of appeasement which 
pervaded negotiations between the Chamber and the white workers o 
This mentality is well illustrated, not only by its abrupt refusal to 
Senator Rheinallt Jones of information on the benefits afforded, during the 
past ten, or even five years, to European, African and Coloured employees 
respectively, but by the terms in which the refusal was conveyed: 
"o .... in view of the fact that the rates of pay and the terms of 
employment of natives employed on the gold· mines are superior 
to any others open in the Union to natives of similar industrial 
experience and available for employment in large numbers, the 
Committee considers the proposed comparison with Europeans 
undesirable and unnecessaryo Moreover 0 -if it be agreed that 
any such comparison is desirable, it is the view of the Committee 
that in the case of the mines, the comparison reveals the native 
position in a more favourable light than in other large industries 
in the Union. 
( 1) Letter from Ao J. Lime beer, Secretary, Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 
to Senator J. D. Rheinallt Jones 0 19, 11. 41. , Ballinger Papers. 
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Admittedly, the prospect of promotion for natives is circumscribed, 
both by legislation and by current sociological views in the Union, 
but, as you are aware, the mines are not in a position to discuss 
that aspect of the matter. You will also be aware of the wide-
spread comment in the Union on the comparison between wages 
and conditions of employment for natives in the Mining Industry 
on the one hand, and on farms and in other industries on the other. 
In conclusion, I am asked to place on record the opinion of the 
Gold Producers' Committee that the discussion of terms of Native 
employment on the lines you indicate is likely to prove dangerous, 
·both to the interests of the natives and to the peace of the country. 
Yours faithfully, 
Signed: A. J. Limebeer 
Secretary 
P. S. The Committee has decided to report this correspondence to 
the Minister of Mines and the Minister of Native Affairs" 0 (l) 
Professor H. M. Robertson has suggested four possible causes for 
tpis acceptance of a "colour bar ... by employers whose costs are raised 
as a result: shared prejudices which prove stronger than economic interests; 
a sop to preserve tranquil labour relations (with the existing force); bowing 
to political pressure; and the knowledge that so long as competitors have 
to meet similar requirements i.n the organisation of their labour forces, 
there can be no unexpected ·challenges to meet on this scoreo (
2
) It was 
due, perhaps, to a combination of all four, rather than one specificallyo 
It is also a possibility that the industry's actions were conditioned 
by its expectationso The estimates of the expected life of the industry 
which were made from time to time have all been proved to be on the 
conservative sideo (
3
) However, even if these were for "public 
consumption" only, informed impartial opinion, while not as pessimistic 
(1) Letter from A. J. Lime beer, Secretary, Transvaal Chamber of Mines, 
to Senator J. D. Rheinallt Jones, 2 7 o 1 L 4 L , Ballinger Papers o 
(2) H. M. Robertson, unpublished paper. 
(3) Estimates by the Chamber in 1930 showed a decrease in black labour 
requirements from 205, 000 in that year to 186, 000 in 1934. This 
period, contrary to expectations, was one of tremendous expansiono 
Report of the Inter-Departmental Committee on the Labour Resources 
of the Union (An 890/1931), p. 3 0, Annexure "V". 
J 
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as the Chamber u found little scope for optimism. Throughout the years 
the many "miracles". have led to a considerably longer life-span for the 
mines than the pessimists had thought possible. (l) The Chamber's 
calculations and resulting actions mightu in fact 8 have differed if they 
had considered not merely the short-runu but also the long-run costs to 
· the ind us try. 
'-. 
We have seen throughout this investigation the results of undue 
complacencyo It may be argued that the colour bar is a political and 
extraneous factor to which the Chamber reacted in the only way possible. 
As the colour bar reserved the skilled and semi-skilled work for whites, 
the blacks could only be employed on unskilled work and at the relatively 
low rates of pay this implied. To obtain the vast amount of black labour 
needed at low wage rates, the industry assisted in the perpetuation of the 
-- I 
migrant labour systemo The wage for the African was apparently determined 
by a combination of three factors: The mines decided collectively to pay a 
wage not determined by productivity, but kept to a minimum since it was 
'regarded merely as a supplement to the "reserve income" derived from the 
land under tribal society, and since 0 with a fixed price of gold, remuneration 
must be limited by ari inability I on the part of the industry I to pay moreo 
The industry, however, adopted a different approach in deciding upon wage 
claims for the Europeano In his case it recognised as early as 1911 that 
"wages are based on a living wage 0 plus a margin which varies according 
to the healthiness and safety of the work 0 and the responsibility and skill 
demanded of it"o (
2
) In 1926u the Chamber defined its wage policy with 
respect to whites as follows: 
"Wages must be adequate to provide subsistence; thereafter, 
they must be determined by th~ value of the work performed, 
Le. the production achieved thereby, and the resultant ability 
to pay themo "(3) 
These criteria were not applied to blacks o 
(1) Even as supposedly threatened men sometimes live longer than expected, 
so mines often continue to work for a considerable· time after the end 
of their "official" lives o 
(2) T.C.M. (1911), p.Lxix. 
(3) The Wage Position on the Witwatersrand Gold Mines, (1926), 
published by the G.P.C., Para.100. 
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It would be superfluous to depict once more the deteriorating economic 
position of the African miner in the years before the 1946 strike. The 
Chamber's analysis was all-too-familiar: 11 The average mine nativeo .. 0 • 
spends about half of the time between the ages of 18 to 40 at his home 
in comparative idleness and 'retires' about the age of 40 - an enviable 
position 11 • (l) However, as we have seen, the average black miner 
spent much of the prime of his life many thousands of feet underground 
in conditions hardly conducive to health, on work both strenuous and 
exacting, with little opportunity for advancement and no provision at all 
for retirement, in short, in a situation which few semi.-industrialised 
workers would tolerate. 
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